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My dissertation is a case study examining how changes in land tenure and taxation policies 
created underdevelopment in the region worst affected by desertification in China: the Minqin 
oasis in the Gansu province. I argue that the tragedy of the commons occurred due to the 
significant decline in institutional credibility of land tenure in the oasis, driven by central-local 
tensions embedded in a tax farming system. My dissertation discusses the concepts of political 
capitalism and its application to the changing roles of the communist state on resource 
management during the collective and tax reform eras in China. I first examined the 
environmental history of the oasis, showing the intricate yet repetitive pattern of interactions 
between the state extraction policy and the ecology of the oasis from the 14th century to the 
communist collective era. I then used Weber’s analysis of center-periphery relations to dissect 
the treadmill of production in a politically-oriented capitalist regime. I show that the institutional 
disarray in the 1980s created a fiscal crisis that pushed the central government to decentralize 
public goods provisions. Under constant pressure to increase tax revenues, the unitary 
bureaucracy intensified the collection of unregulated fees and levies from farmers. They also 
encouraged cash-cropping in massive land reclamation projects by contracting the rights for use 
of wastelands and the groundwater underneath. Local state agents prohibited the traditional 
customs of water-sharing among villagers and operated higher tax rates in mutually cultivated 
areas as compared to privately reclaimed areas. The disruption of productive relations reduced 
the institutional credibility of land rights among the peasantry and, together with the ever- 
increasing need to accumulate capital for industrialized farming, created the homo economicus 
and corporatist state in the ecological catastrophe. In conclusion, I discuss how the case study of 
Minqin adds to the vibrant literature about the treadmill of accumulation theory in environmental 
sociology, and the impact of institutional transformation in post-socialist societies on nature is 
 iv 
also discussed. The data came from an 18 month-long ethnography, 157 oral history interviews 
conducted with three generations of peasants living in the Minqin oasis, and 7,237 policy 
documents gathered from provincial and county record offices in northwestern China. Data 
gathering was completed in 2013. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 





Wen Jia Bao, Former Chinese Prime Minister 2007 
 
My dissertation examines how changes in taxation, land tenure, and procurement policies 
shaped the structure of incentives for the farmers in northwestern China and contributed to 
the severe desertification of Minqin County in northwestern China, which is the region most 
severely affected by desertification. This project explores the roles of bureaucratic control over 
the extraction of surplus value in structuring the dialectical relations between the productive 
relations of the peasantry and the deterioration of the local ecology. I discovered that 
desertification in the oasis was largely due to the changing rules of the game instituted by the 
central government, as well as the changed incentives for local cadre and local farmers. The 
problem requires a closer, Ostrom-style examination of changes in formal and informal 
governance institutions embedded in the fragile oasis ecology. This dissertation studies 1) how 
the taxation and agricultural procurement policies of the government shaped the divergent 
interests of the state bureaucrats and the peasantry before 1978; 2) how transformations in 
property rights in the Minqin Oasis since 1982 influenced norms and informal constraints in the 
farmer economy and how these transformations interacted with local communist bureaucracy 
and global markets; and 3) what the social, cultural, and ecological consequences of institutional 
reform were in Minqin when the Chinese state changed the rules. The objective of this research 
was to construct a consistent view of policy changes and to investigate the effects of these 
policies on the formal and informal institutions at the local level and on the responses of the 
officials and the farmers in the environmental history of Minqin. 
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I have found that desertification in Minqin was closely tied to the Chinese Communist 
Party’s decision to transform its policies. Under communist rule, taxation in rural China became 
much like that in the Roman tax farming regime. Within the bureaucracy, the higher ranked 
officials would contract out the tax obligations to the lower ranked state agents. As long as they 
fulfilled the quota, the lower ranked bureaucrats could keep the surplus revenue, and the central 
and provincial governments would only provide financial assistance for public service and state 
agents’ salaries after the tax quota was met. 
Since the mid-1980s, China reformed its fiscal system and stipulated the specific taxes 
 
that each level of government could extract. The central government reduced its financial support 
for public goods provision at the local level. The reform created a significant financial loss for 
local cadres and changed the criteria for promotion within the hierarchy. Over extraction of tax 
revenues from the central government exacerbated the local bureaucrats’ rent-seeking behavior 
and led them to increase their efforts to collect unregulated fees and levies from the farmers. The 
predatory behavior of local state agents created mass rural disturbance and disrupted agricultural 
production and exchange. To facilitate extraction, the local government prohibited traditional 
customs of land and water sharing in the villages. In response to the new tax burden and the 
altered market incentives, the farmers turned to cash cropping and relied on high-interest loans to 
expand land reclamation projects. In need of the revenue brought by the special agricultural tax 
imposed on cash cropping, the local state agents imposed higher tax rates on originally cultivated 
areas as compared to the reclaimed land plots, which is in direct defiance of the environmental 
protection decree imposed by the central government. The price of the cash crops fluctuated 
widely during this period, in part due to the added supply in the market. Most of the peasants lost 
money, and tens of thousands hectares were deserted. With the natural and manmade vegetation 
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gone, the sand dunes moved in by 20 to 30 meters a year until 2002. This research, therefore, 
suggests that unsustainable development in the oasis was closely connected to conflicts over 
fiscal control between varied interests of the state at the center and peripheral region. 
The Minqin Oasis 
 
The studied area, Minqin County in the Wuwei Prefecture of Gansu Province, has been 
the county hit the hardest by desertification in China. Minqin Oasis, with a total area of 15870 
km2, is located in the lower reaches of the Shiyang River Basin in the He-xi Corridor of 
Northwest China. This area is surrounded by the Badain Jaran and Tengger deserts, the third and 
the fourth largest deserts in China, and about 91% of the total area is covered by the Gobi, saline, 
and deflation basin (Hu 2011). With 112 mm mean annual precipitation and 2582 mm potential 
evaporation from 1953 to 2006, Minqin is a typical oasis agricultural ecosystem that sustains 
livelihoods for close to 300 thousand people, especially small-scale farmers, who account for 
77% of the total population and depended on meltwater from snow and glaciers in the Qilan 
mountain range. With scarce precipitation and strong evaporation, this region is one of the most 
arid in the world (Zhang 2001). Due to growing population, intensive agricultural activities, and 
poor water resource management, this region has experienced serious water scarcity, drought, 
and desertification in recent decades (Zhang, Wang and Yan 2008). In particular, a projected 
increase in surface air temperature in northwest China is expected to result in a 27.2% decline in 
glacier area and more severe water shortages for drinking and irrigation by 2050 (MOST 2007, 
Qin, Hou, Zhang et al. 2002). The water shortage in Minqin oasis and the subsequent process of 




Source: National Key Laboratory of Agricultural Ecology in Semi-Arid Zones Lanzhou 
University 2011 
Figure 1 Wuwei Prefecture and Minqin County 
 
During the 1960’s and 1970’s, the Minqin Oasis was the model of success in ren jing sha 
tui (pushing the sand dunes (desertification) out of agricultural production) programs 
implemented under Mao’s lv hua zu guo (Green Our Motherland) political campaign. Because of 
its geographical location in the Hexi Corridor, the Minqin Oasis was also listed as one of the 
most important sites for san bei fan hu lin (the Three North Shelter Belts) (Minqin County 
Annals 1985).  Contrary to Shapiro (2001:15)’s  suggestion that Mao’s ideological fervor and 
political repression enabled China’s war on nature, much resources and labor were invested in 
reforestation programs in Minqin during the collectivist era. Nevertheless, starting in the early 
1990s, the Minqin Oasis experienced severe desertification, due to over-extraction of water 
resources and salinization. By the late 1990s, more than 30% of the total cultivated land in the 
Oasis was lost to desertification (Hu 2011). The groundwater level in Minqin’s Dam Zone 
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dropped to 22 meters underground,  and in the Lake Zone of:Minqin drinkable water can only be 
found 300 meters from the surface area. 
 
 
Source: Project Concluding Report to the Department of Environmental Protection 2012 (Li 
2012) 
Figure 3 Desertification Type in Minqin 
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Year Wuwei Oasis Minqin Dam Zone Minqin Lake Zone 
1981 May -5.226 -8.25 -1.402 
1991 May -6.005 -13.785 -1.819 
2001 May -8.78 -22.678 -2.344 
Source: Gansu Provincial Development and Reform Committee 2007 
 
On the surface, the collapse of the local ecology was a classic example of the tragedy of 
the commons and authoritarian economic development gone amok (Dietz, Ostrom and Stern 
2003, Feeny, Berkes, McCay et al. 1990, Hardin 1968). However, it is puzzling why, given more 
than thirty years of research and mobilization on reforestation in the oasis, the state and the 
peasantry still chose to risk the sustainability of the oasis economy for short term profit even 
when a centrally commanded development plan was still in place. Moreover, rapid 
desertification happened at a time when there was no major flow of migration into the Minqin 
oasis. Most of the population growth between 1985 and 2002 came from the growth of the urban 
population while 91% of the water usage in the oasis was for agricultural irrigation (Minqin 
County Annals 2011:89). Short-turn profit maximization is not an adequate explanation either, 
given that technologies for drilling deep bore wells and land reclamation became available to 
peasants in Minqin in the early 1970s, but between 1982 and 2002, there was no significant 




Figure 5 Population and Irrigated areas 
 
Research on common pool resources (CPR) has repeatedly shown that overuse is not the 
inevitable path for resources in the public domain (Diamond 2005, Ostrom 2000, Ostrom 2008). 
Institutional norms, property relations, enforcement arrangements, cohesion of the community, 
global trade, and distribution of externalities all play into usage and management of common 
pool resources (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981, Copeland and Taylor 2009, Hansen and Libecap 
2004, Li 2010, Libecap 2008, Ostrom 1990, Ostrom, Burger, Field et al. 1999, Ostrom 2005, 
Ostrom 2010). In addition, it must be asked why there was no resistance from the peasantry 
towards the destruction of environs and their long-term interests. Chinese peasants have never 
been passive objects to be manipulated by the officialdom (O'Brien and Li 2003:2-18). Instead, 
they have always been agents, actively negotiating with other interests groups during the process 
of economic liberalization in the last forty years (Bernstein and Lu 2003:230-46, Oi 1986a, Oi 
1986b, Oi 1989, Oi 1992, Oi 2000, Unger 2002). Moreover, the Chinese state is in itself 
fragmented by varied interests among different levels of governance (Herbst 1989, Oi 1985, Oi 
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1986b, Oi 1994, Oi and Walder 1999). To defend their long term interests, the peasants could 
have engaged in what Gramsci (1971:229-39) calls the “war of position,” probing the structure 
of domination to work the system to their advantage (Hobsbawm 1973:13, Scott 1985, Scott 
2009). The causes of ecological disaster in Minqin were deeper than passive peasants exploiting 
short term profits when marketization happened in rural China, and therefore, it deserves a closer 
examination of changes in state-society relations embedded in the fragile oasis ecology. 
Disasters are deeply rooted in the social, economic, and environmental histories of the 
societies in which they occur (Worster 2004 [1979]:2-15). They are processes that gradually 
unfold through time and created by causes deeply embedded in the path that is dependent social 
and historical occurrences. Institutional norms are powerful in shaping the interpretation of 
disasters because they provide cultural frames of reference (Button 2010a:8, Oliver-Smith 
2009:23-28, Oliver-Smith 2010:4-7). People ascribe meaning and interact with natural events, 
which situate the empirical world in cultural and historical processes (Weber 1975:107-08). In 
this way, nature is “refracted” to become a carrier of cultural meanings and an impetus of social 
action (Foster and Holleman 2012). The inter-causality between environment and culture is best 
represented in Weber (1951:64) analysis of Asian hydraulic civilizations where the need to 
implement irrigation and maintain soil fertility created the foundation of a centralized state- 
patrimonial bureaucracy which, in turn, governed how nature was transformed by agricultural 
production. In hydraulic societies, power tends to be concentrated in the hands of technocratic 
elites, which may lead to a despotic rule that imposes strict control on both nature and labor 
(Wittfogel 1981[1957], Worster 1992:23). During the collectivist era, the Chinese Communist 
Party built extensive irrigation networks in the oasis to solidify its political and economic control 
of the rural populace. How would the related transformation in landscape and relations of 
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In addition, research has shown that when encountering environmental risk, people 
actively draw on values, ideologies, and institutional norms to construct apathy and denial as 
coping strategies (Norgaard 2006, Rosenberg 2000:135). The social construction and 
maintenance of risk and knowledge do not solely rely on individual perceptions of empirical 
occurrences, but are constituted by dynamic interplays of interests among social groups in 
specific historical and cultural contexts (Barnes 1974:2-18). Thus, the “world images” of the 
individual configure social relations and act as “switchmen determined the tracks along which 
action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest” (Nee 2000, Nee 2003, Swedberg 2003, 
Weber 1978:280). Actions and world images are enabled by the conditions of the possibility of 
structuration which refers to “the dynamic process whereby structures come into being and are 
reproduced 
recursively through social practices via the duality of structure” (Giddens 1979:5, 64). Therefore, 
to understand why the tragedy of the commons occurred, it is important to analyze how 
development was signified to the peasantry, how political and economic domination of the 
growth regime was enforced, and how legitimation of local corporatism was formed during this 
period in Minqin. The answers to the abovementioned questions require further inquiry to 






I employed a critical human ecology (CHE) perspective which uses a materialist, 
dialectical, historical, and structural approach to analyze changes in environment-society 
relationships (York and Mancus 2009). I specifically utilized the treadmill of production 
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(Schnaiberg and Gould 1994) theories to dissect state-society relations in the environmental 
history of Minqin which spans from its settlement in Ming dynasty to post-1978 China. 
Continuing the New Ecological Paradigm’s critique of the Human Exceptionalist/Exemptionalist 
ideas (Catton Jr and Dunlap 1978, Catton Jr and Dunlap 1980, Dunlap and Van Liere 1978, 
Dunlap and Catton 1979, Dunlap and Van Liere 1984, Freudenburg, Gramling, Laska et al. 
2008), the CHE approach integrates human ecology with Marx’s historical materialism to 
analyze “subsistence strategies, social relations of production, anthropogenic impacts on the 
environment, environmental constraints on social processes, the requirements for ecological and 
social sustainability, and socio-ecological crisis” (York and Mancus 2009). Historical 
materialism emphasizes that society is based on human’s work on nature. The relationship of 
production is determined by property ownership which is dependent on succession in the modes 
of production and development in productive forces. Changes in productive forces transform 
existing relations of production (economic base) and consequently challenge established social, 
political, and ideological institutions. In Marx (1993:3) words, "society does not consist of 
individuals, but expresses the sum of interrelations, the relations within which these individuals 
stand.” 
Marx (1991) indicates that human consciousness is shaped by the material condition of 
their social relations (283-90). Marcuse (1973 [1933]) states that material activity not only 
reproduces objects and the corresponding social order, but also creates the subjective 
consciousness of the producer towards the material and social worlds.  As such, one’s labor 
produces one’s existence in the natural system as well as production relations in the social realm. 
Labor thus humanizes nature and naturalizes human beings, and it represents the “the universal 
condition for the metabolic interaction (Stoffwechsel) between man and nature, the everlasting 
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nature-imposed condition of human existence” (Foster 2005, O'Connor 1999, Marx 1976:290). 
Labor as the interaction between human and nature is regulated by both the natural laws in the 
physical sphere and institutions controlling property relations in the social sphere (Foster 1999a, 
Marx 1991:949). Institutional norms governing social division of labor, extraction and distribution 
of resources, 
are formed by historical developments in natural environments which, in turn, were shaped by 
human labor (O’Connor 1999). Therefore, “socio-ecological conditions at any given moment 
represent the historical geographical residue of previous eras” (Marx 1972:437). 
The rise of capitalism created an unrecoverable rift in the metabolism between natural 
and social systems, which has perpetuated persistent ecological crises (Clark and Foster 2009, 
Moore 2000, Moore 2003). Inherent inwithin the capitalist system are the contradictions among 
productive forces, production relations, and production conditions, which will eventually result 
in the demise of the world ecology (Foster 1994, Foster 1995, Foster 2009, O'Connor 1994:9). 
As fetishism of capital propels endless accumulation, the commodification of land and labor 
becomes exploitative and unsustainable (Dickens 2004, Kovel and Michael 2002, O'Connor 
1997). As the capitalist order rises, the world ecology and economy become entwined into a 
dialectical relationship in which nature and society co-evolute at any given historical period 
(Braudel 1992:30-3). Given that institutional norms governing property relations are historically 
and ideologically path-dependent, the expansion of capitalism means the expansion of a 
particular socially constituted consciousness towards nature.  As capitalism becomes the world 
ecology, the production of nature thus becomes “transitory but identifiable socio-ecological 
moments” that are shaped by the ecological and social effects of capital accumulation at the local 
and global levels (Moore 2000, Moore 2003). In Marx’s time, the emergence of capitalist 
agriculture during the second agricultural revolution not only depleted soil fertility and increased 
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peasants’ dependency on chemical and imported fertilizers in Western Europe, but also chained 
monoculture farming to the mercy of the capitalist market and promoted the imperialistic 
exploitation of distant land and labor (Clark and Foster 2009, Foster 2011, Foster 1999a, Foster 
and Clark 2009, Foster 1999b). In the capitalist world ecology, the economy has to continue to 
produce and grow in order to generate profit. As competition increases, each firm has to produce 
“as if on a treadmill, running ever faster to stay still, while spewing out an unending stream of 
goods and environmental externalities (Gould, Schnaiberg and Weinberg 1996, Gould, Pellow 
and Schnaiberg 2008, Schnaiberg 1980:225-30, Schnaiberg and Gould 1994:69). With each 
technological breakthrough, the withdrawals of resources and addition of waste to the 
environment grow while unemployment increases (Barbosa 2009). The increase in productivity 
is harmful to the sustainability of both social and natural systems as nature and labor are 
transformed into only exchange values (Schnaiberg 2009). 
Specifically, economic development in the peripheral regions is severely hampered by 
their fragmented political power against global capital and by the export commodity 
concentration in their trading relations with core regions (Burns, Kentor and Jorgenson 2003, 
Rubinson and Holtzman 1981). The ecological damages caused by the unequal trading relations 
and predatory development further weakens the political and social stability in the periphery 
(Grosfoguel and Cervantes-Rodriguez 2006, Smith 1994). The nation states, in their drive to 
survive in the global political economy, only focus on attracting more capital and become 
accomplices to the exploitation of workers and natural resources (Rudel, Robertsn and Carmin 
2011). Modern state bureaucracies therefore become a determining factor in the creation of 
social and environmental inequalities and in the continuation of the socio-ecological epoch of 
capitalist world ecology (Barbosa 2009:3, Gould et al. 2008) The treadmill theory of production 
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and consumption focuses primarily on states located in the historical contexts of monopoly 
capitalism (Foster 1995:9). Nevertheless, the treadmill theory is applicable to both capitalist and 
state socialist societies (Schnaiberg 1980:230). The inherent drive for competition also exists in 
post socialist economy, “given the states’ hegemonic projects of maximizing heavy industrial 
production and mandates from the central government for each factory to meet or exceed 
ambitious production goals” (Pellow 2009).  Industrialized farming pushed by the authoritarian 
Chinese government has taken the form of local corporatism and state capitalism, both of which 
are shaped by China’s position in the world economy and subsequently by the particular path of 
institutional transformation the Chinese Communist Party has chosen. Changes in social and 
economic institutions at the macro level in China, and the intensification of the world economy 
since the 1980’s, have fundamentally altered the social and ecological interaction in 
Northwestern China, especially in the Minqin Oasis. 
Institutional Transformation in China 
 
Institutions are “congealed networks” of interpenetrating and juxtaposing social relations 
and interests (Granovetter 1985, Swedberg 2003:46). Institutions guide the formation and 
implementation of interests. They also enforce and sanction social interactions and relations in 
different “fields” of action (Bourdieu 2006). Specifically, economic institutions can mobilize 
resources for collective action (Granovetter 1985). The introduction of rational capitalism into 
formally redistributive or reciprocal economies usually results in the reconfiguration of the 
corresponding institutions and lessens the social dimension of economic decisions (Polanyi 
2001:251-55). Nation-states from the former communist block often experienced “enormous 
political challenge to the social form of the modern state system” as the central planning system 
demolished the separation between economic and political activities (Rosenberg 2000:134) In 
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post-communist countries, transformations in economic and social institutions were path- 
dependent as “domestic political structures become part of the evolving transnational fabric of 
economic relations” (Schwartzman 1998). 
After the death of Mao, the Chinese communist regime decided to abandon its failed 
centrally planned economy and gradually brought in free market mechanisms by dissolving the 
rural communes and establishing “Special Economic Zones” along its eastern coast (Dicken 
2007:226). The unique aspect of economic liberalization in China is the strong association 
between institutional transformations and geography. In 1978, Deng proposed the promotion of 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics” in order to alleviate abject poverty across China. Instead 
of abandoning state socialism entirely (Shock Therapy), the Chinese Communist Party first 
focused on rural reform and limited introduction of a market economy from 1978 to 1984 (Rofel 
2007:4). In the “state socialism” system, the economy was under the control of political actors 
within the communist bureaucracy, and there were no alternative social and economic 
institutions in the Chinese society (Nee and Matthews 1996). The re-introduction of the market 
to rural areas opened channels of upward mobility in addition to the ones dependent on the 
political hierarchy. Consequently, rural production increased two fold in the early eighties, and 
for the first time in the history of PRC, rural and urban inequality decreased (Walder 1989). 
The spark of “four modernizations” has not only created strong economic growth (14% 
 
annual income rise) but has also contributed to the emergence of regional inequality (Harvey 
 
2007:120). Globally, the confluence of neoliberal policies on trade with the United States and 
Western European countries created the opportunity for China to build its economy on export 
oriented industries (Harvey 2007:121). The economic transformation in China has more than 
opened up the internal market to foreign capital (especially oversea Chinese from Hong Kong 
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and Taiwan). As a process of restructuring of the corresponding political and social system 
according to a neoliberal framework, participation in global free market capitalism involves the 
gradual introduction of private property (as of 2015, land is still considered a “public” property 
people can lease), rule of law, certain forms of representation into the allocation of political 
power at the township level, and even legitimization of authoritarianism. 
Since 1978, the Chinese communist regime has repeatedly used reforms to market 
economy to defend its legitimacy. The reform in rural areas was a direct attempt to reduce social 
strife after the Cultural Revolution (Bian 2002). It was only after six years of experimentation 
with a market economy that the regime lessened its redistributive policies in response to the high 
inflation occurring in urban areas (Walder 1989). Foreign direct investment was prohibited 
outside the “Special Economic Zones” until 1992 as a response to the issues raised by the 1989 
student protests. In 1999, the regime allowed foreign and private partnerships as part of the 
conditions to be incorporated into the WTO (Whyte 2009). Moreover, in 2004, the capitalist 
class was finally incorporated into the communist party (Barbosa 2004). 
 
The Chinese neoliberal turn has not happened in a vacuum devoid of environmental and 
social-historical factors. One of the unique developments in the neoliberal China was the 
replacement of the Maoist patrimonial forms of social organization in the Cultural Revolution 
period with a rational-legal bureaucracy capable of fostering market development (Walder 1989). 
The re-establishment of local bureaucracy was related to rapid decentralization of political power 
(Wei 2008:132). What appeared from economic reform and political decentralization became 
known as “Local Corporatism,” in which “an institutional arrangement between plan and market 
emerged as a hybrid governance structure” (Nee and Matthews 1996). With the subsidence of the 
central redistributive state, provincial and local governments had to become self-reliant in terms 
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of revenue (Park 2008). When initial reforms began in socialist economies because of 
overproduction and debt, the ruling elite and bureaucrat classes within the Communist Party had 
advantageous positions to engage in global trade and solidify their class position (Bergesen 
1992).  This political and economical arrangement created opportunities for the local cadre to 
exploit alternative sources of rewards in a transitory market (Rofel 2007:12). The economic 
interests of local officials are often deeply entangled in the growth of the local economy. The 
performance-based promotions encouraged rent-seeking behavior and created an “agency” 
problem in which the benefits of local and state enterprises’ administrations run counter to the 
long-term interests of the community (Morris 2008:55, Rofel 2007:9). Therefore, local 
corporatism has become a major cause of uncontrolled growth and environmental pollution in 
China, which contributed to the demise of the Minqin oasis during the studied era. 
Extraction, Domination, and Governance 
 
The spread of neoliberal capitalism since the 1980s has reshaped market-state relations 
by changing the contexts and rules of social action. Polanyi (2001:43-55), in The Great 
Transformation, states that the development of rational capitalism was intimately linked to the 
development of the nation state. He argues that the advent of rational capitalism has caused the 
economic sphere to supersede social and political influences (Polanyi 2001:71-74). Nation states 
therefore have to act as a “protection racket” for capital by subordinating society via 
administrative bureaucracy. Because of the increasing flow of capital, political regimes have 
become embedded in a global network and sovereignty has been redefined by the relative 
position of nation states in the world system (O’Rian 2000). To remain competitive, states have 
to increase their revenues and legitimacy by allowing the alteration of the economic institution 
and intensifying the capacity of extraction from the subjects (North 2005:27-35, Tilly 2009:1-3). 
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Given that agrarian societies have minimal tax potential for the state, modern regimes have to 
promote the growth of the market economy so they can expand their fiscal systems to draw from 
the intensification of exchange (Ardant 1975:165-66). 
Institutions usually cannot be transformed rapidly because of the cognitive and cultural 
lag of the pre-existing social order (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). The informal rules and 
oppositional norms generated by the interest groups of old institutions can become barriers to 
transformation (Nee 2005:45). The resulting structural rigidity in economic institutions may 
become sources of corruption and may hamper the re-establishment of rules, even the soundness 
of the state (Nee 2005:45). Specifically, developments of fiscal systems are usually path-
dependent processes; they are resistant to significant changes, even when the initial conditions 
that produced those outcomes no longer exist (Martin, Mehrotra and Prasad 2009:13). Being the 
source of life of capitalist states and compromises of classes, parties, and status groups in the 
society (Weber 1978:352), tax policy can be both the cause and consequence of macro 
transformation in the political economy of the nation-states.  To extract resources from the 
subjects, the ruling elites and different interest groups have to achieve compromises in the best 
allocation of material and opportunities (Seligman 1909:1,9). As extractive relations between 
direct producers and ruling elites form the foundation of all social relations (Marx and Engels 
1970 [1939]:64), negotiation over taxation becomes the foundation of governance and 
consequently institutionalizes the material base of social relations and the cultural inclination of 
group dynamics (Campbell 2009:263, Lieberman 2009:124). As such, the study on taxation 
helps to examine the formation and consequences of economic and political contingencies 
embedded in the historical context of institutional transformation (Martin et al. 2009:13, Wong 
1987).  It provides an impetus for analysis on the interplay between states and economic 
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development, which profoundly affects both the struggles between the ruling and the ruled, and 
the dialectical relationship between humans and nature. 
Tilly (2009:177-78) states that the expansion of state capacity in resource extraction and 
distribution is crucial to the cohesion of the center-peripheral relation in any political regime. To 
stay in power, the central government not only has to establish dominance over the control and 
distribution of available resources; it also has to reduce competing regional powers’ ability to 
coerce (179). To consolidate power, it is crucial to create and maintain resource dependency of 
subjects living in peripheral regions (Fischer 2012). Thus, central governments have to establish 
a bureaucracy capable of exerting a system of domination based on directives from the elite 
(Weber 1968:968). In the agrarian economies of empires, the central states have to rely on the 
cooperation from local gentry and landlord class (Tilly 2009: ix). Nevertheless, the rise of 
modern exchange economy has provided states the opportunity to “rationally organize authority 
relations” which facilitates extraction through “efficient coordination of collective action through 
coercion” (Antonio 1979:987, Weber 1968). The rational-legal bureaucratic structure is used to 
expand the autocratic domination of the ruling elite (Weber 1968:985). The objectification of 
formal rationality embedded in a top down organization often is counterproductive to the 
pragmatic needs of the ruled (Horkheimer 1974:1, Murphy 1994:29-30). The effectiveness of 
control from the center contradicts the efficiency of economic production and long- term 
sustainability of the status quo (Antonio 1979). Consequently, the interests of the central 
bureaucracy become subverted by patron-client relationships at different levels of governance 
(Antonio 1986). 
Since the 1949 revolution, in order to achieve rapid industrialization, the Chinese 
 
Communist Party has systematically extracted surplus value from its peasantry by manipulating 
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procurement prices between its agricultural and manufacturing sectors (Unger 2002:12). To 
control the vast rural population without relying on a landlord class and a fully developed 
rational-legal bureaucracy, Mao developed the politics in command system by instigating endless 
political purges against class enemies and the formation of communes in the countryside (23). 
His tactic of domination proved to be extremely efficient as for the first time in history, the 
central government gained control over daily production in every corner of China (Shapiro 
2001:47). Nevertheless, this structure of domination inhibited the correct valuation of goods and 
labor and subsequently, the possibility of having any sound fiscal policy based on the price 
system (Naughton 1995:22). As a result, the Chinese political economy since 1978 has 
demonstrated a tenacious hold on power by local elites and the collusion with the capitalist class 
in the “Local Corporatism” system. As the local bureaucrats and rogue capitalists consolidate 
political representation, the increasing rural-urban divide and disparate regional development 
became pressing issues confronting the stability of the Chinese “socialist” system. The central 
bureaucracy becomes deficient and loses administrative power against the rogue capitalist 
practices at the provincial and local levels. The jostling of power between the center and the 
periphery over extraction and distribution of surplus value directly resulted in the 1994 overhaul 
of China’s taxation system (Jin, Shen and Zou 2012). The social and ecological consequences of 
this transformation are the crux of inquiry in my dissertation research. 
Methodology and Data 
 
The data for this study came from two sources: oral history interviews and policy 
documents from local and regional archives. In all, I conducted 83 oral history interviews with 
four generations of peasants in the Minqin oasis, as well as 45 oral history interviews with cadres 
working at different levels of the Chinese government in northwestern China. 
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Table 2 Professional Backgrounds of Interviewees 
Profession Number 
Peasants 83 



























I conducted an additional 17 interviews with scholars and activists who have researched 
the history of land reclamation in the Hexi Corridor in addition to 12 cash crop buyers, 
international and domestic who participated in the seeding melon boom of the 1990s. I used 
snow-ball sampling to recruit my interviewees from all townships in the Minqin County. From 
October 2010 to December 2012, I farmed in Zhang Mao village and established strong rapport 
with the locals. Therefore, I used snowball sampling to recruit my informants. Snowball 
sampling is useful to access valid testimonies from marginal groups as the intimacy and support 
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provided by in-group members create a trusting environment for the interviews (Johnson 2002). 
These interviews were recorded with the consent from my informants for later review and coding. 
I hired two graduate students at Lanzhou University who grew up in Minqin to transcribe the 
interviews. If consent to tape record was not given, notes taken during and immediately after the 
interviews preserved essential information. 
I employed oral history interview because I wanted to understand how the bottom-up 
perceptions of environmental degradation in Minqin. Oral history interview is the “recording of 
personal testimony delivered in oral form (Yow 2005:3). It enables the qualitative researchers to 
examine empirical reality and historical events through the lenses of the informants (Somers 
1994). Though personal memory can be unreliable, I made sure the core information of the 
events corroborated with other accounts. Moreover, memory of the individual can be influenced 
by collective memory, especially by recollection of people in the same social group. Therefore, I 
used oral history interviews to observe how events “are given meaning to” by group interaction 
and how meanings and interpretations of past events evolve as the baseline changes. Production 
of knowledge is always contingent on past frames of perception; changes in the configuration of 
social relations inevitably influence how new events are signified by the informants (Guba and 
Lincoln 1994:110-12). Moreover, the interpretation of disasters is affected by the cultural 
framework used and the expectation of control by the local community (Button 2010b:15-20). 
However, research on climate change issues often encounters the shifting baselines phenomenon 
as human perception and culture change when the surrounding environment is gradually 
transformed (Yin 2008). Therefore, to increase the validity of my data, I relied on historical 
records such as provincial and county annals to sensitize the influence of collective memory on 
individual testimony (Yow 2005:58). 
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I was aware that open-ended interviews are interactive encounters and might not be 
neutral tools of data gathering (Atkinson and Amanda 2002, Fontana and Frey 2003). Hence, 
when analyzing my interview data, I placed my informants’ life histories in the contexts of 
gender, generational cohorts, and local culture. 































Male 1 12 42 31 10 9 2 1 108 
Female 4 6 20 7 7 1 4 0 49 
 
Through selective coding, I analyzed how my informants comprehended institutional 
transformation during their lifetime, and how they attributed meanings to ecological deterioration, 
agricultural production, and resource management. I compared how my informants recounted 
their responses toward state policies over the years. I paid special attention to my informants’ 
attempts to make sense of their life events and how they selectively granted significance to 
events in order to integrate these experiences into their present interpretation of environmental 
degradation. I used macro-level institutional transformations as sensitizing concepts and situated 
each oral history account to the specific structural and economic relations in rural Northwestern 
China so I could identify and explore social contingencies which might influence my informants’ 
perspectives (Lofland and Lofland 1984). I have shared my data chapters with five of my key 
informants to verify the validity of my interpretations. I password-protected the interview 




My dissertation relied heavily on policy documents (7000+ pages) gathered from the 
 
Gansu provincial, Wuwei Prefecture, Liang Zhou District, and Minqin County record offices in 
 
2011 and 2013. I conducted textual analysis on policy directives, party newspaper reports, 
official brochures, and biographies of party bureaucrats in the Minqin oasis and Gansu province. 
In addition to quantitative data on agricultural production, taxation, and water management, I 
paid special attention to internal policy documents which were used to establish ideological 
coherence within the bureaucracy. I was able to obtain immaculate records on agricultural 
production, procurement, land reclamation, and political suppression in regional and local 
archives. 























6 9 10 20 16 3 0 54 
Wuwei Prefecture 
Records Office 
0 22 13 39 29 18 5 136 
Liang Zhou District 
(Wuwei County) 
Records Office 
0 24 46 38 59 13 3 180 
Minqin County 
Records Office 
16 37 53 46 42 38 26 258 
 
Drawing together original source information from disparate segments of the political apparatus 
can provide a detailed yet comprehensive overview of the historical contexts and the opportunity 
to explore social contingencies across an extended time span (Firebaugh 2008:35, Silverman 
2006:153-56). Discourse in texts can be used as indications of how social actions are structured 
in specific cultural contexts (Abbott 1991, Charmaz 2006:37). In addition, I examined official 
explanations on the necessities of implementing changes in property relations, official ideologies 
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toward economic growth and environmental protection, and on how technology and global 
capital were portrayed by the communist party. I explored the trajectories of ideological changes 
to analyze mediation of conflicts between state and peasantry in addition to observing how these 
reports justified past policies. I coded perspectives on environmental protection, property action, 
and economic development in Excel and examined how these accounts reflect the interests of the 
state (Saukko 2003:99-108). The analysis offered insights into how prefecture and county 
bureaucrats, grassroots cadres, peasants, and the emerging bourgeois class conceptualized labor 
and nature, which influenced the state-society relation in Minqin. 
Table 5 Archival Data by Types 
 
Types of Policy Documents 
 
No. of Policy Documents 
Policy Announcements 232 
Policy Implementation Reports 157 
Investigative Reports 91 
Annual Planning 56 
Year-End Evaluations and Reports 34 
Bureaucrats’ Missives 43 
Depositions 15 
Policy Documents Total 628 
Wuwei Daily (Wuwei Ri Bao) : 1982-2002 




Significance of Study 
 
This case study provides a detailed analysis of the state-society, human-nature relations 
during a major period of institutional transformation in which property and social relations were 
reconstituted in NW China. I examined how the interests of state-agents at different levels such 
as the government, the emergent bourgeois, and the peasantry contributed to the exploitation of 
nature and the peasantry. I intend to provide a nuanced picture of the agency of the fragmented 
“state” and varied class interests in the peasantry when the local economy in Minqin gradually 
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integrated into the global capitalist market. The treadmill of production theory has largely 
focused on conditions in western industrial capitalist societies and has under-theorized the 
actions of different interests groups during periods of institutional transformation (Foster 2005). 
Using this case study, I refine the treadmill of production/consumption approach by showing 
greater sensitivity to the interests of the state and all economic classes involved. 
Limitations of Study 
 
Although I tried my best to balance the gender ratio in my interview samples despite the 
conservative gender scripts in rural northwestern China, only 32% of my interviewees were 
female. The unequal distribution prevented me from providing an ecofeminist perspective on 
how gender disparity played into the oppression of the peasantry and the destruction of the local 
ecology. In addition, due to time constraints, I could not provide more in-depth discussions on 
how China’s negotiation with GATT and WTO shaped its macro fiscal policies, which had 
profound influences on the bracketed globalization in Minqin. I would also like to reorganize the 
chapters so that I can have more space to properly introduce the concept of institutional 
credibility to the discussion on legal transformations in China.  Moreover, archival research in 
China can be a treacherous business because of the lack of clear regulations on access to the 
records office. My identity as a Chinese American officially prevented me from accessing any 
policy documents published after 1982. Though I tried my best to be thorough and 
comprehensive in collecting archival data, it is possible that my status as a Chinese/Taiwanese 
American might cause me to miss policy documents that provided an alternative description of 
historical events. Finally, I translated all the interview and archival data by myself, and I might 
have made mistakes in diction and tone. Though I have requested five key informants to verify 
26  
the details, I did not have the resources to enable everyone quoted to read the dissertation. I will 
address these issues when I revise my dissertation for publication in the future. 
Chapter Synopsis 
 
Chapter 1 is the introduction to the central research questions of the dissertation. It lists 
the theoretical framework, methodology, relevant literature, significance and limitations of my 
research. 
In Chapter 2, I analyze the environmental history of Minqin up until the economic 
liberalization in 1978, which showcases the intricate yet repetitive pattern of interaction between 
the state extraction policy and the oasis ecology in Hexi. I show that historically, the central 
government viewed the region as ideal to produce surplus grain for military campaigns. Settled 
agriculture in Minqin could only become viable when the hydraulics were built and properly 
maintained through the military-style mobilization of the peasantry and mass investment from 
the center. Ironically, the central governments’ need for mono-cropping and the cost of 
extraction tended to limit the tax base and potential surplus of agricultural production. I then 
demonstrate how Mao’s collective system was similar to the dynasties in its center-local 
relations. 
In Chapter 3, I inspect how the collectivist era transformed the landscape of the oasis and 
established a hydraulic society by damming the Shi-Yang River. I discuss how the 
disenchantment of nature and agricultural production occurred coincidentally as the traditional, 
patrimonial system of domination was demolished by the Chinese Communist Party. I explain in 
detail how the CCP, in its attempt to rapidly industrialize urban centers, established unequal 
property relations which expedited the exploitation of labor and nature in Minqin. I end the 
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chapter by analyzing how the collapse of the communes and the procurement system set the 
stage for the tragedy of the commons in later decades. 
In Chapter 4, I show how the mid-1980s and 1994 tax reforms altered the fiscal relations 
among different levels of the Chinese state.  I discuss the social, cultural, and ecological 
consequences of economic liberalization in Minqin. I will also discuss how corporatism based on 
political capitalism fundamentally transformed state-society relations in the oasis. I show the 
jarring interplay between the agricultural and environmental protection policies of the state and 
the informal institutions used by the peasantry to navigate the constraints imposed by the market 
and nature. 
In the conclusion of my dissertation, Chapter 5, I highlight my research findings and 
explore how the treadmill of production was facilitated by the collusion of interests between 
local bureaucrats and the international capital. I point out that the “context,” which structured 
socioeconomic actions causing environmental degradation in Minqin, was constituted by an 
interwoven web of fiscal obligations between different levels of government. These fiscal 
obligations shaped the material interests of the peasants and the cadres who were entangled in a 
zero-sum game of surplus extraction. When governance became subsumed with surplus 
generation to keep the unitary bureaucracy from disintegration, agricultural production became 
disembedded from its underlying social relations and ecology. A fiscal crisis of the state then 
occurred when the worsening ecological and social conditions kept elevating the real cost of 
production in the oasis. 
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Chapter 2: An Oasis Where Water Is Never Lacking 
 
 
壹方黃土養壹方人，何處黃土不埋人- The unique features of a local environment always give 
special characteristics to its inhabitants. 
Minqin Proverb 
 
Mín Qĭng, Mín Qĭng Zòu Mín Qĭng! (Minqin bound!) From the front seats of their 
mangled shuttles, scrawny, swarthy drivers yell in the distinct Minqin dialect, markedly different 
from other regional tongues in Gansu. As their voices ring out in the regional bus terminal in 
Wuwei, the bustling prefecture city of Gansu, one can easily decipher the distinctive sounds of 
the Minqin dialect from those of neighboring counties. The desert highway connecting Wuwei 
with the remote county is paved by a gradual succession of accents. By the time the shuttles 
reach the county seat 110 km away, the changes in dialects become so profound that one might 
easily reach the conclusion that the Wuwei and Minqin oases are in different provinces 
altogether.  Local dialect in Minqin stresses nasal consonants and intonation shifts abruptly 
downward at the end of each sentence, which creates an abrasive and halting sound (Wu 2006). 
The county annals in 1832 states that newly arrived officials often could not comprehend words 
spoken by the natives as the Minqin dialect was formed by a mixture of Shanxi and Henan 
(central plains) accents brought by migrants who were relocated by the central government in the 
early Ming dynasty (Pan 2010). Yet, a closer examination of the idioms and phrases used in the 
dialect would show that the use of repetitive words to express emotion is quite similar to the soft 
sounds of the Yangtze River delta where the first settlers of the oasis, Han soldiers, hailed from 
700 hundred years ago (An 2010). Protected by the remoteness of the oasis, the Minqin dialect 
slowly absorbed and integrated idiosyncrasies of languages used by successive waves of 
migrants. The result of this linguistic and cultural convergence is an environmental history of 
state-driven migration into the oasis ecology of the Hexi Corridor: a people proud of their ability 
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to adapt to the harsh surroundings, a culture that encourages migration, and a land which has 
gone through continuous cycles of reclamation, desertification, and abandonment. The 
environment history of the oasis has been deeply entwined with center-local tensions embedded 
in a tax farming system. The imprints of this politically oriented capitalism can be found in the 
changing landscape and productive relations carved deeply into the ecology of the Minqin oasis. 
The Hexi Dream 
Human beings have long left their footprints in the oasis. What is barren desert today 
used to be an inland freshwater sea called Zhu Ye Ze. The earliest record of the sea appeared in 
Yu Gong written before 500 BC about the mythical account of Yu, the first emperor of the Xia 
Dynasty, who allegedly built the first irrigation system to start settled agriculture in China. 
According to Yu Gong, Zhu Ye Ze marked Yu’s last endeavor of building irrigation projects to 
turn the north China steppe to farm lands (Wang 1970). From that point on, the present Hexi 
region has become the line of demarcation for two modes of production and culture: settled 
agriculture of the Hans and pastoralism of the Huns. The variability of water resources from the 
inland rivers caused repeated clashes between the Hans and the Huns.  In 121 BC, the Han 
dynasty defeated the Huns in the battle of Qilian Mountain and extended its political control to 
the He-Xi Corridor (Hexi Zoulang corridor west of the Yellow river). To protect its frontier 
region and provide grain for the troops stationed, the Han dynasty started to encourage 
demobilized soldiers to farm in the area. In 68 BC, the central government established Wuwei 
(Wuwei: showing the force) county and officially incorporated present day Minqin oasis into the 
agrarian empire (Li 1989). 
As military outposts, the size of settlements in the oasis always corresponded to the 
strength of the dynastical center thousands of miles away. As such, human interaction with the 
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oasis ecology became circular. When the center was strong, these settlements would benefit from 
efficient resource allocation and acted as major trading and military outposts of the empire. 
When the power of the empire ebbed, they were either sacked by the nomadic tribes from the 
Tibetan plateau and the Mongolian steppe or temporarily became independent fiefdoms. Both 
outcomes resulted in drastic reduction of local population as settled land was abandoned. The 
exposed land became barren as high seasonal wind stripped the soil away which altered the 
course of inland rivers (Li 1999). By 661 AD, when the Tang dynasty conquered Hexi, the 
inland sea was already divided into several large lakes and many canals dried up because of 
abandonment in earlier periods (Li 1998, 1989). The dry riverbeds then acted as conduits for the 
advancement of sand from the north, eventually burying human settlements and making the area 
inhospitable for human habitation (Li 2003a) Yet, after decades of desolation, the region would 
again become a site of fascination for settled agriculture. This was certainly the case when 
General Feng Sheng took his troops to the Hexi Corridor in 1372. 
Born in the Yangtze River province of Anhui, Feng Sheng led peasants in his village to 
join the Han insurgency against the Mongolian rulers in his early twenties. By the time the Han 
insurgency conquered Da Du (present day Beijing) and ended the Mongolian dynasty (Yuan) in 
1368, he was a major general (Ma 1988). In 1372, his troop, made of soldiers from the Yangtze 
River delta, decisively defeated the Mongolian army in the Hexi corridor and incorporated the 
major oases into the frontier region of the Min Dynasty (Pan 2010). Sandwiched between the 
high mountains of the Tibetan plateau and the vast Gobi desert, the oases in the Hexi corridor 
had long attracted the attention of Chinese agrarian states. The Hexi corridor was the most 
prominent passage way for the Silk Road connecting Xian to Xinjiang and thus, it served as the 
lifeline of Chinese expansion into Central Asia. Yet, to the Chinese rulers at the center of the 
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empire, the corridor represented far more than just a line of military defense; instead, the 
development of settled agriculture in the region was regarded as a triumph of the Han civilization 
over the “barbaric” lifestyles of the nomad (Li 2003b). Land reclamation and control of inland 
rivers symbolized the superiority of the Han culture in taming nature and thus, became models 
for the “barbarians” to assimilate into the Chinese empire. A prosperous Hexi Corridor also 
served as an escape valve for population pressure in the central plains. The vast arid region west 
of the Yellow River has fueled the expansionist imagination of Chinese rulers, which, in turn, 
has shaped the environmental history of the Hexi corridor in the last two thousand years. 
The first settlers in Minqin were the 2000 soldiers stationed in the fortress of Cai Qi in 
 
1374, which was located near the confluence of two rivers feeding the inland lakes in the oasis 
(Zhang 1988). The nomadic Mongolian tribes, which lost the tax revenue and grain extraction 
from the central plains a few years prior, had to rely on the grassland surrounding the inland 
lakes for survival (Dang 2001). For the next 270 years, the Minqin oasis stayed as a constant line 
of scrimmage between the Ming dynasty and numerous Mongolian forces. In fact, up until 1927, 
the official name of the oasis was Zhengfan: crush the barbarians (Zhang, Cheng and Chung 
2003). Throughout the rule of the Ming dynasty, the agrarian empire never resolved the threats 
from the Gobi desert (Wu and Guo 1996). Instead, temporary peace was obtained through 
building of the Great Wall (2100 km) and by opening trading posts along the frontier. Both of 
these projects required a strong military presence and as a result, at the height of the dynasty, 
there were more than 110 thousand soldiers stationed in the Hexi corridor. Being 2221 km away 
from Beijing and without modern transport, the corridor created huge resource allocation 
challenges for the bureaucrats in charge of supply. As such, the dynasty was well aware of the 
importance of food security. “There is nothing more important than setting up self-sufficient 
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agricultural production for the garrisons” [Translated by author] (Zhong 1995). In Hexi, 
agricultural settlement always followed the expansion of military fortresses. In addition to 
turning 70% of the troops into soldier-peasants, from 1378 to 1528, the state recruited peasants 
in Henan and Shanxi to migrate to the Hexi Corridor. In these state sponsored “homestead” 
drives, the peasants were given 50 mu of land (3.33 hectares), necessary production materials, 
and exemption from agricultural tax for two years (Wu and Guo 1996). The discovery of salt 
mines in the fringe of the Minqin oasis in 1389 also pushed the expansion of the oasis. In 
exchange for the licenses to mine and military protection from the Mongolians, traders agreed to 
recruit peasants to migrate to this area and oversee grain production and provided 20% of the 
grain harvested as tax (Xie and Xu [1884] 1990). To encourage expansion in Hexi, the dynasty 
also stipulated that in addition to the 50 mu assigned by the state, additional land reclaimed by 
peasants would never be taxed (Wu and Guo 1996). 
Frontier Society 
 
If Max Weber had the opportunity to study the Hexi corridor, he probably would find the 
region as “meteorically precarious” and as “riparian in character” as Palestine (Weber 1952, 
Weber 1968). From the earliest written record to present day, the Minqin oasis has constantly 
suffered from erratic weather (Minqin County Annals 1994:64). Briefing through the county 
annals, one can easily find that in four out of five years, the oasis regularly suffered either from 
extreme draught or severe flooding. The high variability of rainfall combined with the arid 
climate of oasis ecology has made the human-made hydraulics crucial to the expansion of settled 
agriculture in the Hexi corridor. Sociologists and historians have long been fascinated with 
hydraulic systems as their emergence may shape the social organization of riparian societies 
(Weber 2003:97-98).  The investment needed to build and maintain the irrigation systems favors 
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the establishment of centralized bureaucracies and patrimonial states (Foster and Holleman 2012, 
Weber 1968). The water systems integrate the “tiny worlds” of small yet independent subsistence 
economy into a larger system of extraction and distribution of wealth (Worster 1992). In time, 
power is either concentrated in the hands of family clans or the agro-managerial class as 
“domination of the priests” obliterates the belief that nature is “an intrinsically significant 
autonomous entity” (Marx [1867] 1976:649-50, Smith 1994). An inward-looking hydraulic 
society is formed when the state uses control over water as the primary regulators of production 
and as the ruling bureaucratic apparatus and its large hydraulic works become bondage of inertia 
for the society (Wittfogel 1981[1957]:24, Worster 1992:24). 
In Minqin, the initial migration and settlement followed the expansion of fortresses, 
which lined the inland rivers so settlers could easily obtain water from nearby sources (up until 
1396, the name of the oasis was linghewei-defense along the river) (Ma 1988). The settler’s 
community centered on military organization.  In order to centralize power, the Min dynasty 
abolished provincial governance in the frontier region and all of the “defense regions” were put 
under the control of the center.  In the original plan for settled agriculture in the region, each 
fortress, acting as the support bases for the Great Wall, housed a hundred soldiers together with 
enough numbers of grain producing peasants. Even today, if one draws a line connecting all the 
location with names ending with the sound pu (fortress), one can easily trace the remnants of the 
Ming Dynasty Great Wall across the oasis. To prevent invasions from the nomadic tribes, the 
emperor assigned his sons to northern frontiers and throned them as lords. Due to its military 
significance, in addition to troops stationed by the imperial court, the northwestern frontier was 
put under the control of four lords (Li 2003b). Each of them was given serfs and large amount of 
land to generate enough income for defense and the daily governance. The grain and income 
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generated by the serfs were outside of the jurisdiction of the military bureaucracy (Minqin 
Irrigation History Editorial Board 1994:65). Authority did not only come vertically from the 
dynastical center; the centrally appointed bureaucracy had to work with the horizontal bases of 
power from the lords as well. Traditional and absolute power of the lords was firmly reinforced 
by the establishment of the Confucianism school five years after the first settlers arrived (Minqin 
County Annals 1994:12). Each fortress became a justification for patrimonial domination and a 
node of extraction by both the military bureaucracy of the center and the periphery lords. Even 
though the center stipulated low tax rate for settled areas, the peasants still dealt with myriad 
forms of taxation and servitude according to the discretion of the local lords (Xie and Xu [1884] 
1990). 
 
However, by early 1420s, population expansion in upstream Wuwei and Yong Chang 
oases made the inland rivers seasonal. The changing natural conditions forced a transition of 
productive relations. A more effective way of administration was needed to allocate water when 
the rivers were either dried up or flooding the surrounding farmlands. In his report to the 
imperial court, magistrate Zhang states that “90% of the land in the oasis is sandy and without 
irrigation, agricultural production is close to impossible. Since the founding of the garrison, there 
has been no official position dealing with irrigation and thus, the oasis is often inundated by 
floods” (Xie and Xu [1884] 1990). In 1429, the agrarian empire established a new bureaucratic 
position (shuili tongpan) for building irrigation canals and allocating water in the oasis. 
Interestingly, the issues facing the bureaucrats were primarily related to the variability and 
overflow of the inland rivers not the scarcity of the water resources (Li 2003a:30). During this 
time, the noted local handicraft was “leather shoes” which “helped the peasants to ward off the 
dense humidity of the oasis climate” (Xie and Xu [1884] 1990).The official rationalization of the 
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irrigation economy marked the start for the agrarian state to absorb the subsistence economy into 
a larger extraction and distribution network than that controlled by local lords. It also marked the 
beginning of concerted effort to transform the landscape and the emergence of third locus of 
power in the oasis: clans, whose influence reached its peak during the Qing dynasty. 
The Ming dynasty fell to perpetual decline in the 16th century. Natural disasters 
 
decimated agricultural production and ideological cohesion provided by Confucianism could no 
longer support the top heavy patrimonial political system (Tian 2001). In addition, by the 16th 
century, oceanic vassals had replaced caravans as the primary means of trade between China and 
the West. With the decline of the Silk Road, the oasis economy in the Hexi corridor became 
concentrated on subsistence and on providing for the demands of the stationed troops. Money 
was seldom used as taxation and exchange were done through bartering (Wu and Guo 1996). In 
the Minqin oasis, the decline of dynastical power was detrimental to the sustainability of the 
socioeconomic system as the bureaucracy had to shift vital resources from irrigation to defend 
frequent invasion from the nomadic tribes. In last than thirty years, constant warfare reduced the 
population by 67% (Wu 2000).  By 1582, the system of defense against the Mongolian and 
Tibetan tribes already expanded to 90 fortresses, up from 14 in 1392. Given that the inward 
looking economy left no alternative base of taxation for the increasing military expenditure, the 
lords and military bureaucrats had to increase tax associated agricultural production. In 1546, the 
first riot erupted over the new tax on land reclaimed by the peasantry and out migration started to 
appear (Xie and Xu [1884] 1990). As a result of outward migration, lack of labor power 
destroyed the garrison system.  At the same time, the abandoned land and irrigation canals 
became easy conduits for sand dunes. Eight years later, the administrative township of the oasis 
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was buried by a fierce dust storm and not long after the Ming dynasty rule over the oasis ended 
 
(Minqin County Annals 1985:47). 
 
The death spiral the Minqin went through in late Ming Dynasty represented the 
incompatibility between the expansionist drive of the agrarian empire and the arid ecology of the 
oasis. The dynastic center always viewed the Hexi corridor to be a fertile land to extract grain for 
military purposes. Through the manipulation of agricultural tax rates, the military bureaucracy 
aimed to solidify its control on the frontier region by increasing population and economic 
production. To the bureaucrats at the center of the empire, the introduction of settled agriculture 
in arid Hexi represented the superiority of the Han civilization over the “barbaric” lifestyles of 
the nomads. Nature thus was viewed by the center not only as an unlimited substratum for 
material production but also as a worthwhile obstacle to be overcome by the Han culture. As 
such, in addition to the production and extraction of grains, the successful implementation of 
settled agriculture in arid Hexi symbolized the strength and capacity of the central state even 
though the actual governance of the region was more dependent on the local lords and clans. The 
tension between the vertical and horizontal foci of power caused the unbalanced tax burdens 
between the peasantry and the lords, which, in turn, shaped economic organization and humans’ 
relation to nature. 
When the Center Held 
 
The establishment of the Qing’s rule in 1643 started another cycle of settlement and 
abandonment in the Minqin oasis. To increase economic production, which was decimated by 
the peasant rebellion and ethnic conflicts in the end of the Ming dynasty, the founder of Qing 
waived the first 10 years of agricultural tax for newly settled migrants into formally abandoned 
agricultural zone (Zhang 1988) It was during the Manchurian’s rule when settled agriculture in 
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Minqin expanded to its present size. As a result, agricultural production became dependent on 
 
the codified rules of resource allocation and, more importantly, on the extraction of groundwater. 
Driven by increase in population, the pressure from the bureaucracy to subjugate nature for grain 
production in the oasis intensified, which increased the importance of clans in economic 
production governance. 
In the early reins of the Qing dynasty, the Manchurian army was involved in a prolonged 
battle against the Tibetans in the Qinghai plateau. The need to provide food for military conquest 
elevated the political and economic importance of Hexi corridor in the minds of rulers in Beijing. 
Once again, military conflicts with the Mongolian and Tibetan became the main drivers for 
expansionist policies in the oasis. State-led migration into the oasis started in 1695, and the local 
bureaucrat implemented strict allocation rules of water (Wu and Guo 1996). From the beginning 
of summer in the lunar calendar (usually in early May) to the beginning of fall (usually in late 
August), the flow of the inland rivers was directed to the established canals. Each village had 
access to irrigation for a full 24 hours before water was directed to the next village. It would take 
27 days to irrigate all of the villages in the oasis before water was sent to the first village again. 
In an average year, each village received four rounds of water during the growing season, and 
after the harvest, each village was allowed to access water freely until the beginning of the lunar 
winter when water returned to the rivers and fed into the inland lake (Gansu Local History 
Editorial Board 1990:129). The distribution of water shaped the production relations and the 
related social organization, which, in turn, reconfigured the natural environment in the oasis. 
Because of its military endeavor in the region, the central court in Beijing effectively exerted its 
control to agricultural production in the oasis for a period. Hence, the bureaucracy had sufficient 
political power to settle water conflicts among villages and between the upstream and the 
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downstream oases. When the center held, the state enforced its laws to protect the fragile balance 
between ecology and agricultural production. In fact, after realizing the importance of forest in 
moderating water supply during dry years, the state banned logging on the Qilian mountain 
range, stipulating that “since the effect of falling a tree on the Eight Treasure Mountain (Qilian 
Mountain) is no different from killing a person in the downstream oases, anyone who breaks the 
logging ban will be sentenced to death” (Minqin Irrigation History Editorial Board 1994:97). 
To the Qing rulers, the primary function of settlement of Hexi was to enlarge population 
bases for taxation. In 1650, the meritocracy of the bureaucracy began tied to land reclamation 
and taxation; those who could recruit enough migrants to reclaim 100 mu became the top- 
positioned bureaucrats, so were the ones who increased tax collection for three straight years 
(Liangzhou History Editorial Board 1988:42). Contrarily, if a bureaucrat failed to complete his 
tax obligation for a year, 10% of his salary would be deducted. To increase the efficiency of tax 
collection, in 1725, the central state overhauled the agricultural tax system, folding the service 
burden of each peasant into the overall tax imposed on land. The base for tax calculation shifted 
from persons to areas of land thereby changed the relations of production between landlords and 
peasants. In the following year, to drastically increase the base for tax collection in the oasis, the 
central court designated the liu-lin lake zone in Minqin as a new site of settlement (Wuwei 
Annals Editorial Board 1983:21). The courses of two major inland rivers in the oasis were 
altered to provide water for the newly settled areas. Coincidentally, a new set of bureaucratic 
positions on water allocation were established, and taxation rules were strictly enforced around 
the same period. Under the new system, the amount of water allocated on each plot of land 
corresponded to the average amount of grain produced (and hence, the amount of grain extracted 
by the state) in the last three years. For every 250 shi (7,000 kg) of grain extracted, a full day of 
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irrigation water was given to the villages. Equating grain production on a set amount of land to 
tax collection and water allocation encouraged the development of intensive agriculture, which 
required a massive amount of labor. Ten years after the lake zone was opened for resettlement, 
the population in the oasis increased by 18,000. By 1825, the population in the oasis reached 
180,000, which was later determined by scientists at the Chinese Academy of Sciences as the 
maximum ecological capacity of the oasis (Zhu and Tang 2002). The population in Minqin 
increased tenfold in the century after the tax reform in 1725, and sandwiched between two 
deserts, the planted area in the oasis expanded only twofold (Qian 2008). The ecological 
conditions worsened quickly, and the oasis became stuck in a poverty trap (Sachs 2002). It was 
not until the Great Leap Forward that the population and planted areas in Minqin exceeded this 
number. 
An Empire Based on Clans 
 
The changes on tax system in 1725 influenced the productive relations between labor and 
nature and, consequently, the social organization and the natural landscape in the oasis. The 
intensification of control and extraction from the center needed the cooperation from the local 
clans. According Fei and Liu (1982), “a Chinese clan is a self-contained socioeconomic 
functional group which has a hierarchical structure to facilitate the transmission of information 
and authority and to coordinate various functional related tasks.” The survival and 
competitiveness of a clan depends on the balance between its size and efficiency in production 
(Freedman 1958). In agrarian societies, the increase of clan sizes generally corresponds to the 
increase in cultivated areas, and when clans grow to the point that the efficiency of production 
actually drops, a split and an out-migration become the most possible solution (Fei and Liu 
1982). The expansion of the oasis was closely tied to the growth of local clans and the state’s 
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interest in adding revenue. A politically oriented capitalism thus emerged when state contracted 
tax farming became the dominant source of profit making for the landed class (Weber 1978, 
Weber 1981). 
The political influence of the clan was best exhibited by tax collection as the rigidity of 
the military bureaucracy lacked the ability to effectively extract surplus grain, maintain 
infrastructure, and preserve the ecology crucial to production. The center has to rely on local 
bureaucrats for extraction, which provided rent-seeking opportunities for the landlord class who 
constituted the majority of the lower echelons of bureaucracy. In one of the policy analyses 
submitted to the Hongzhi Emperor in 1497, Magistrate Yu noted, “Using the official state 
apparatus to collect taxation would make the cost to be prohibitive. The more effective way for 
tax collection is to utilize the local clans” (Wu and Guo 1996). Contracting grain extraction to 
locals was efficient for the empire because it provided stable revenue and reduced the transaction 
cost of taxation. All through the Ming dynasty, the official bureaucratic positions of local 
governance ended at the county/fortress level (wei), yet there were still four lower bureaucratic 
levels of tax enforcement positions comprised by those who were associated with the gentry. 
With the decline of the central power in the 16th century, the clans became prominent in 
maintaining the hydraulic system in the oasis, which resulted in the consolidation of wealth. As 
they took over the allocation of water, much like the patricians in the Roman ager publicus, the 
clan leaders exercised their power to transfer their tax burden onto the shoulders of the remaining 
peasantry, which facilitated massive land abandonment and consolidation of land holdings to the 
clan leaders. The majority of the peasants who remained were forced to become serfs for the 
gentry. As a result, by 1619, a typical landlord’s complex in the Minqin oasis already occupied 
six acres and had 260 rooms (Xie and Xu [1884] 1990:128). 
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The Manchu also relied upon the clans for tax collection. A report from early Qing 
dynasty estimated that the peasantry survived on 30% of the grain produced and the center 
extracted another 20%, and the remaining half went to the pockets of lower-level bureaucrats, 
which significantly increased peasant burden (Xie and Xu [1884] 1990). Starting from 1702, the 
Manchu court officially incorporated clans into the decision over water allocation by creating 
positions in local bureaucracies for the “irrigation elders” (shuili laoren) (Pan 2010). The official 
rationale was to have the elders work with the local bureaucrats to fairly distribute water to each 
village as the clan leaders had the most detailed information on local production. The state also 
depended on the clan leaders for financial resources to extend the hydraulic system into newly 
resettled areas. Additionally, to accumulate enough funding for the irrigation projects, the 
government began to charge an interest for the loan of relief grain to the peasantry whenever 
there was a natural disaster. Most of the loans came from clan based granaries (Xie and Xu [1884] 
 
1990). Although the original intention was to efficiently utilize local resources, the collusion 
between clans and local bureaucrats nevertheless exacerbated social stratification and destroyed 
the long-term sustainability of the oasis. 
In the Minqin oasis, farming was always a collective enterprise. The reclamation of land 
and the maintenance of irrigation canals all depended on kinship ties to mobilize labor. Conflicts 
over water and land resources were often settled through armed scuffles between clans. Clans 
would also pull their resources together to influence the decision of bureaucrats in judicial cases 
related to water. The first contracts showing how the lake zones were settled clearly indicated 
that the state-led migration in 1726 was financed by resources shared by members of the same 
patriarchal clans. In addition, the demarcation of land ownership was decreed by clan elders, not 
by official bureaucracy (Zhao, Wu and Li 2003). In fact, because the meritocracy of the 
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bureaucracy was tied to the amount of land reclaimed and the length of canals built, clan leaders 
often held key positions in the local bureaucracy as only they could mobilize enough labor and 
resources to maintain the infrastructure. This created many opportunities for the clan leaders to 
privilege their own clan or to take bribes. According to the water rules set by the bureaucracy, 
the allocation of water to each village was timed by burning incenses, and both the irrigation 
elders and the bureaucrats had to be present to ensure the allocation was fair. However, by 
submerging the incenses into different mixtures of water and oil, the irrigation elders could 
control the amount of water allocated by reducing or accelerating the burn speed (Xie and Xu 
[1884] 1990). Moreover, the tax rules set by the central court required the peasantry to divide its 
tax payments to two installments: wheat in May and other grains in October. Most of the 
peasants had trouble turning in enough wheat or grain before harvest and had to borrow from the 
landlords. The interest rates charged by the clan leaders could sometimes reach 75% in a year 
(Xu 1964). All of these practices enabled the clan leaders to consolidate land resources as they 
helped the center to efficiently extract grain. It was not until 1940 that the Republican 
government attempted to use a legal rational system of governance to replace the “irrigation 
elderly” positions in the local bureaucracy (Liangzhou Tax Bureau 2011:24). All throughout the 
agrarian empire, below the county level, the rule of the empire depended entirely on the tacit 
compacts between the bureaucrats and the clans. Thus, as Weber stated, China had always been a 
 
“nation based on patriarchal clans” (Ye 2005). 
 
Be Aware of the Wolf Girls 
“The authority of the eternal yesterday” has to rely on customs and traditions, which 
constituted the base of traditional authority (Coser and Merton 1977). In Minqin, the traditional 
authority of the clans primarily came from fear against the enchanted. In Minqin, the livelihood 
of the peasants depended entirely on the flow of glacier water, which varied widely from year to 
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year. Surrounded by deserts and dealt with more than 120F differences in temperature in a year, 
the peasants lived precariously from natural disasters and the great unknown. According to the 
Minqin County Annals (1980), in the first 100 years of the Qing dynasty, there were 38 years of 
famine, and in many of these years, not even one bushel of wheat was harvested in the oasis. 
Correspondingly, in the same hundred years, 97 temples were constructed to worship different 
deities related to nature (Ma 1988). The needs to constantly appease nature formed the social 
bonds connecting the metaphysical assumption (hence, consciousness toward nature) of the 
peasantry to traditional social institutions in the oasis as only the patrilineal clans could mobilize 
enough resources for ceremonies and operation of the temples. According to an 1823 accounting 
book I discovered, to host the annual ceremony for Guang Sheng Di Jun, the god of benevolence 
and righteousness, the heads of the Yang clan distributed different tasks to different households 
in accordance with the ability of each family. In 1840, the Lu and Yang clans contributed 100 
gold to establish the Temple of Dragon King, the god of water; parts of the temple can still be 
seen half buried in the desert northwest of the county seat. The traditional and moral authority 
the clans gained from the religious ceremonies strengthened their control over the hydraulic 
system, which formed the base for the moral economy of the oasis. 
The enchanted world did not only exist in religious ceremonies headed by the clans; 
instead, every element of the natural world formed a coherent system of meanings, which were 
collectively interpreted by the peasants and, in turn, influenced the agrarian economy in the 
oasis. In the fables and folksongs of the oasis, dunes, wild animals, spirits, and various deities, all 
shared the stage, imparting wisdom on survival and imposing justice in the community. One of 
the more interesting stories recorded by the county annals of 1877 happened in the year of 1677 
about a young peasant who wandered into the desert and fell in love with an attractive woman 
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who was actually the personification of a wolf spirit. The love story ended when the groom, in 
his attempt to protect his wife, mistakenly killed her instead. The ending paragraph of this story 
warned against explorations away from the settlements, stating that in the northern boundaries of 
the oasis, many young guys would lose their vitality by falling into the siren of wolf spirits 
(Miqin Cultural Bureau [1919] 1978). Another record in the county annals mentioned that three 
tinker men traveling between the Wuwei and the Minqin oases were ambushed by a group of 
jealous spirits living in the dunes whose curses turned gold into stones and tricked the travelers 
to suicide (Xie and Xu [1884] 1990). Discourses on gender and alchemy aside, one can easily 
note that, according to the historical records, during this period, many people were murdered by 
Mongolians or roving bandits on the paths connecting the oases and that tilling the land probably 
provided a safer livelihood compared with trade (Wuwei General History Editorial Board 
2007:94). The moral, cognitive, and interpretive unity of the enchanted world in these fables 
reinforced the inward-looking tendency of the hydraulic society in the oasis and impeded the 
development of other forms of economy. 
Requiem of the Oasis 
 
Following the same path the Ming dynasty traveled, the collapse of the oasis economy in 
the Qing dynasty happened in accordance with the weakening of central power in the latter half 
of the 19th century. Driven by severe social stratification and ethnic conflicts, the Hui rebellion 
erupted in 1862 and lasted more than 16 years in the Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia provinces (La 
1994). As a Han settlement in northwestern China, the Minqin oasis was sacked and burned 
twice during the insurgency (Minqin County Annals Annals 1994:67). The introduction of the 
western goods, mass-produced in colonies in China’s east coast, obliterated local handicrafts 
workshops. To pay for the goods and the heavy tax burden created by military endeavors, the 
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peasants were drawn to the global opium trade, which destroyed the fertility of the land and 
created ample extracting opportunities for local warlords (Gansu Local History Editorial Board 
1989:217). In the next 70 years, the Qing and the Republican governments seldom had direct 
control over the region. Although the Republican government nominally regained control of the 
Gansu province in 1932, the central power was so weak that the provincial governor could not 
collect tax revenue outside the provincial capital, Lanzhou . Power was shared by different 
warlords whose constant conflicts depilated the irrigation network and decimated the population. 
Fortresses built by the landlords once again became the nodes of economic production and 
provided refugees for the remaining peasants.1 A patrimonial system based on rich landlords and 
tenant farmers, whose debt and labor burden made their status close to serfs in the manors, 
persisted until 1950. The decaying semi-feudal society could not muster enough resources to 
maintain the hydraulics and to enforce the forestry laws. Production plummeted, famine ensued, 
and mass abandonment of formerly cultivated land again became the main drivers of 
desertification in the oasis. 
The long environmental history of Minqin before the communist revolution demonstrated 
the coevolution processes between nature and society, between formal and informal institutions, 
and between the development of state apparatus of taxation and the individual consciousness 
toward nature. The expansion of settled agriculture in Hexi has always represented the expansion 
of the dynastical power and Han civilization over surrounding cultures and nature. Because the 
agrarian economy completely relied on the availability of water resources, the organization of 
power and the extraction of grains had to adhere to the productive relations and social 
organization in the hydraulic society. To allocate water and to extract tax effectively, the 
 
 
1 Interview #62 
2 Interview #58 
3 Interview #12 
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dynastical center had to collude with the interests of local gentries. Yet the effectiveness of 
taxation from the center contradicts the efficiency of the economic production and long-term 
sustainability of the status quo (Antonio 1979). Consequently, the interests of the central 
bureaucracy become subverted by patron-client relationships at the different levels of 
governance (Antonio 1986). Although the availability of water resources was crucial to food 
production, the repeated demise of settlement in the oasis was never solely due to the population 
pressure on land or scarcity of water. In fact, the continuity of the oasis economy primarily 
depended on the balanced division of fiscal income between the center and the local interests. 
Before the 1950s, limits of agricultural production in the oasis were determined by the lack of 
technology and institutional stability. All the village elders I interviewed recalled that when they 
were young, seeding in the spring was often delayed by too much groundwater in the field.2 
Thus, it was no wonder that in the 1970s, the communist party secretary of the county proudly 
 
proclaimed to his superior that “Minqin is an oasis where water is never lacking”.3 
 
A New Beginning 
 
The downward spin of the oasis continued in the first part of the 20th century. For almost 
 
30 years, the Muslim warlords had fought over the Hexi region. Constant warfare was the norm, 
and in 1926, tragedy once again descended on the oasis as bandits led by General Ma Junying 
overcame the town and killed thousands in the oasis (Pan 2010). As the central and provincial 
governments had no control over fiscal extraction and the flow of surplus, the rules and laws of 
the Republican government could not reach into the oasis. Under pressure from warlords and 
nature, agricultural production turned to bare subsistence as the local government could not 
maintain any political stability and provide the provision of public goods. 
4 Interview #32 
5 Interview #37 
47 
 
He JieFang who was born in 1932 remembers the times before the liberation as extremely 
difficult as the warlords forcibly enlisted youngsters as soldiers, and as a result, all of his five 
brothers had to leave the oasis to be hired as laborers working in Wuwei, Xinjiang, or Inner 
Mongolia.4 His parents were working as tenant farmers for the local landlord who, in addition to 
owning more lands than the rest of the villagers, loaned grain to the peasantry to extract the 
surplus value. Because the warlords often imposed levies and fees in springtime, the peasants 
had to borrow from the landlords in spring and pay back in fall. According to He, the interest of 
these grain loans could reach 30%–45% of the amount borrowed. The local landlords could 
charge this exorbitant rate because “at that time, the baozhang and xiangzhang (administrators at 
the village and township levels) all came from landlords’ families. They were the ones who were 
connected to the top. They were also educated and for us illiterates, even if we were given 
power, we would lack authority”.5 However, the political instability and the harsh condition for 
 
economic production proved to be challenging for the landlord class as well; in addition to 
constantly bribing the warlords, they had to divert surpluses to arm the villagers and build small 
fortresses to ward off the bandits. As the son of tenant farmers, He stated that “compared with 
landlords in other places, most of the landowning people in Minqin were less well off. They 
spent so much money trying to protect their assets, they did not have the money to spend on 
fixing irrigation and as a result, the times were really hard for everyone.” Minqin oasis was a 
microcosm for China during the Republican time. All over China, the central state had no power 
to establish a sound fiscal system while fighting the Japanese and negotiating with western 
colonial powers. Small-scale modernization only happened in coastal cities, and the patrimonial 
system was on the verge of collapse. Nevertheless, a new form of domination set out to change 
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When Chairman Mao stood on top of Tiananmen and proclaimed the rise of new China 
on October 1, 1949, Minqin was still mired in a great deal of uncertainty as the oasis was only 
“liberated” a week ago. The communist takeover in Minqin did not start as a peasant revolution. 
The coup in the oasis started when young students who studied in the provincial capital Lanzhou 
and were fed up with over extraction and abject poverty in the oasis decided to push the warlords 
out (Wuwei Daily 2011). Working with business owners in the township, they expelled local 
armed force associated with the Hui warlords a month after the People’s Liberation Army sacked 
the provincial capital. On September 23, 1949, the students and business owners went the banks 
of Hongshui River, the demarcation between Wuwei and Minqin oases, to welcome the 
communist troops. In a few months, the new order immediately mobilized the peasantry to plant 
trees and grass to protect the broken canals (ibid). The cadres knew the importance of irrigation 
and forestation to agricultural production in the oasis. They were also aware of the symbolic 
importance of reforestation, which represented the beginning of political stability and social 
cohesion in the oasis. 
Yet the symbolic presentation of political stability was only the first step of establishing 
the new order. Mao aimed to turn China into a socialist utopia by remaking the mass into 
“socialist men,” and the first steps were to eradicate alternative sources of power such as clans 
and religion (Li 1950). Thus, starting from the 1951 repression movement (zheng fang), Minqin 
was entangled in a series of political purges. Utilizing the revolution fervor of the young 
students, more than 860 “antirevolutionaries” were sentenced through 66 public struggle sessions 
 
(Minqin County Annals 1994:22). More than 8,000 believers of a Taoist sect (yiguandao) and 
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local Catholics (shengmuhui) were sent to makeshift labor camps and reformed through physical 
labor.6 Soon after, the landlord class who had de facto governed the oasis and weathered political 
instability for almost a century met their demise. 
Minqin did not have a huge land-owning class as years of instability since the late 19th 
century was detrimental to the landlords. According to one land reform document published 
internally for the county cadres, only about 1,064 households can be considered to be of landlord 
class (Minqin County Annals 1994:43). Instead, Minqin had a significant stratum of “middle 
farmers” who owned small plots of land for subsistence farming. 














Household 2.97 2.45 2.18 36.4 38.15 17.2 0.61 
Land 18.2 6.37 4.5 44.5 20.5 4.11 1.34 
Source: Minqin County Annals 1994 
 
The land reform movement happened in two installments: through fiscal taxation and 
through confiscation of land. Beginning in 1950, the landlords and the affluent farmers were 
charged a punitive tax rate, and once the movement started in 1951, junior high students were 
used to go into each village and confiscate material wealth from the landlords and more affluent 
farmers who could afford to hire helpers during harvest season (Zhang 2010b). In addition, land 
co-owned by clans and temples were confiscated as the aim of the movement was to completely 
eradicate the influence of the clans. Eighty-seven -year-old Chai Yang remembers, “When the 




6 People’s Government of Minqin #76 1956 
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from those families complained, stating that they should not be considered as landlords, but the 
communist killed a few of them. After that, their descendants lived a simple life, and my parents 
increased their share of land in the village. They farmed only a few years on that land until the 
people’s commune took over”.7 
To transform the village identity to a new socialist one, the communist government had 
 
to repeatedly use political movements to mobilize the mass and create a collective identity (Ma 
 
1950, 1951). Thus, starting in the early 1950s until the Cultural Revolution, almost every other 
year marked the beginning of a new political campaign in the oasis. Right after the land reform 
movement, the “three anti–five anti” movement began to purge communist cadres who were 
“corrupted by bureaucratic leanings” and small business owners who dodged tax (China 
Agricultural Annals Editorial Board 1982). In reality, this movement was really to eradicate the 
remaining bourgeois as, ironically, many of the carders and bureaucrats (including Chairman 
Mao) came from affluent farmers or urban intellectual backgrounds. During this period, the 
urban areas in new China started to experience shortage of grain and oil, while at the same time, 
many of the poor peasants who received land just a couple of years ago started to sell their plots 
because they lacked the means of production. The “two polarizations” alerted Mao, who decided 
to hasten the advent of the collective system (Naughton 2007:137). Mao wanted China to mimic 
the Soviets who consolidated land holdings and pushed for mechanized farming. However, the 
great helmsman overlooked the fact that Minqin oasis, like most of China, did not possess 
enough capital to leave subsistence farming. The result was the over extraction on land and 
people, and none of that was more tragic than the construction of the dam in Minqin during the 
Great Leap Forward era. 
 
 
7 Interview #59 
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The New Socialist Nation 
 
To Mao and the party central, changes in production relations in agriculture were 
central to the transformation of China from a feeble empire to a modern nation state because it 
creates the new socialist citizen. In his early writing, Mao (1937:282) interprets the dialectical 
materialist approach to be based on production relations between human and nature, and he 
claims that one can gain the insights on social relations only by understanding the interaction 
between human and rules of nature. Nevertheless, Mao’s conceptualization of human-nature 
relations differed significantly from Marx and Marcuse (1992) as Mao believed that human is not 
a part of nature and the progress of human society depends on its continuous struggle against the 
constant development of natural condition (Mao 1981). Hence, to build a modern state in China, 
according to Mao, it was important to erase past rationalities associated with peasant societies, 
which incorporate and accommodate to natural laws. This may be the ideological foundation of 
what (Shapiro 2001) called Mao’s war against nature in which the strength of ideological purity 
was perceived to be capable of overcoming natural constraints. 
Yet Mao’s war against nature did not only serve to unify the ideological underpinning 
of the new China. In reality, this “war” helped the party central to build a state apparatus and 
subsequently reorganize social lives to facilitate a more efficient extraction of resources. In a 
society that was more than 90% rural and no longer outsourced taxation to local agents, the 
functions of the state could be fulfilled more easily by creating external “threats,” be it nature or 
imperialist powers, to mobilize the mass and quiet dissents. The battle Mao was really fighting 
was to alter the myriad state-society and human-nature relations in a peasant society (which 
according to Marx, 1844, form the human consciousness) to a streamlined production line able to 
channel the entire surplus to the centrally planned economy. The Mao-style “great 
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transformation” aimed to metamorphose 500 million Chinese peasants from vibrant social beings 
with low economic efficiency to the unit of production only driven by the commands of the 
totalitarian regime—a burlesque dream of modernity. 
Much like the collectivization movements in the Soviets and the villagization in 
Tanzania, the collectivization movement in China relied on state coercion to push for a 
modernist project in which ideological fervor was thought as the panacea to shorten spatial and 
temporal path in development (Lieberthal 2003, Scott 1999). Mass mobilization was used to 
compensate ineffective bureaucracy. Thus, Maoist China was stuck in a vicious cycle: as the 
institutional inefficiency eventually slowed down the effects of ideological fervor, a bigger and 
more radical wave of mobilization was needed to stimulate development. The push for 
collectivization in 1955 could be viewed as the solution for the two polarizations in 1953; in 
turn, the Anti-Rightist campaign of 1957 was aimed to reduce resistance for the formation of 
village-based communes in 1956 when grain production was reduced by 36.9% in Minqin 
(Zhang 2010:165). And tragically, the Great Leap Forward was designed to be the ultimate fix of 
institutional failures in the first 10 years of the People’s Republic. To Mao (1959), “socialism not 
only releases the producers and production material from the established order, it also releases 
the vast natural resources rendered unusable by the old society to economic production.” In 
 
Maoist China, the correct political organization and ideology therefore became White ([1967] 
 
2003 ) “power machine” whose capacity not only determined the distribution of land resources 
but also changed “man’s relation to the soil” forever. 
Ironically, although the Great Leap Forward movement was officially a struggle 
 
against class enemies, Mao, much like the emperors in the past, chose building large hydropower 
projects as the means of mass mobilization (Shapiro 2001). Near the provincial capital of Gansu, 
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tens of thousands of peasants and urban residents worked to divert the Yao River so the river 
could vertically climb nearly a thousand meters over the Liupan Mountain and become a “sky 
canal” to irrigate terrace fields near Lanzhou (Zhang 1996). Eight hundred kilometers away, the 
Great Leap Forward movement officially kicked off in Minqin on August 24, 1958, when more 
than 30,000 peasants were assembled to build the Hong Ai Shan dam, the first and the largest 
desert dam in China (Li 2013). Following the “Central Line” (Zong lu xian), the peasants were 
asked to “give hearts to the party, be organized militarily, act like in battle and live collectively” 
(Zhang 2008). According to Liu Yiwen whose parents were mobilized in 1958, the peasants were 
given only two buns a day and were not allowed to harvest their crops in fall.8 Those who were 
fortunate enough to farm was told to “deep plow at least 3.33 meters so each mu can produce 
more than 5000 kg of grain” (Minqin County Annals 1994:673). The local propaganda poster 
asked the peasants to “humble the high mountains, make the rivers change course, we would 
rather lose meat (weight) but we will not delay the construction, level the black mountain top and 
build a man-made sea in the desert” (Zhang 2010a). The constant push to speed up construction 
eventually created irreversible tragedy: on Christmas Eve of 1958, the half-built dam could not 
withstand the added pressure of the frozen lake and collapsed. More than 1,500 houses in 
surrounding villages were submerged underneath icy water (Minqin County Annals 1994:12). 
Those who survived then endured two years of famine; according to the official data, close to 
6,000 in Minqin were starved to death, more than 20,000 were severely malnourished as they 
survived on eating tree barks and chalk, and 30,347 fled the oasis to inner Mongolia (Minqin 
County Annals 1994:97). The real figure must be two to three times than the official record as 
the population of Minqin oasis inexplicably halved from 1958 to 1962, and almost every 
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informant who were older than 50 years old during the time of interview recounted tales in which 
half of their villages died of hunger. 
Although the official history of the Chinese communist party states that the 1958– 
 
1962 famine happened because of natural disasters, the consensus among scholars in the west 
shows that the over-extraction of grain was the true cause (Marx and Engels 2004 , Yang 2012:5). 
believed that the production and distribution of surplus shape the organization of society. As the 
communist party monopolized grain distribution by building the government procurement 
system-grain control system in 1953, the central state could finally get rid of the grain vendors 
(douzi) in the market, who often acted as contracted tax agents for the states (Minqin County 
Annals 1994, Bureau 1984, Xu 1964). “Before the revolution, harvest was based on class based 
social relations. After the revolution, harvest was based on state-society relations. State becomes 
a grain monopoly.” In its effort to rapidly industrialize and urbanize, the Chinese regime learned 
from the Soviets and imposed the “scissor cut” on pricing, which artificially deflated the price of 
agricultural goods and inflated manufactured goods Oi (1989). The scissor cut generated over- 
extraction to the point that, during the great Chinese famine, 100 million urban residents had 
access to one-third of the food supply whereas the actual producers of grain, 600 million 
peasants, could only share the remaining two-third (Unger 2002). Even then, the central 
government, misled by the bureaucracy, still set higher grain quotas every year, and the lower- 
level cadres resorted to extreme coercion to extract. A 1959 internal report from Yanglu 
Commune to the county government in Minqin proudly stated how the cadres raided peasant 
households in the middle of the night, tied up the families, and “beat the sneaky class enemy to 
submission and discovered 0.8 kg of hidden grain”.9   Indeed, the great Chinese famine in the 
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Great Leap Forward movement was more a disaster caused by a faulty pricing system, an 
ineffective bureaucracy of extraction, and a complete failure of political institutions than natural 
disaster or Mao’s ludicrous modernist dream. 
New Regime, Old Business 
 
Xu, Bennett, Tao et al. (2004) states that the expansion of state capacity in resource 
extraction and distribution is crucial to the cohesion of the center-peripheral relation in any 
political regime. To stay in power, the central government not only has to establish priority in 
controlling and distributing the available resources but also has to reduce the ability to coerce 
competing regional powers while increasing the resource dependency of subjects living in 
peripheral regions. To achieve that goal, central states have to establish a bureaucracy capable to 
exert a system of domination based on directives from the center Tilly (2009:179). In the case of 
People’s Republic of China, by the late 1950s, the communist party already annihilated the 
gentry and landlord class and prohibited market economy, which tends to offer more tax 
potential for the state (Weber 1968). To maintain its system of extraction, the communist regime 
had to build and rely on a rudimentary bureaucracy at the local level.10 Consequently, the over 
taxation negotiation (grain surplus) among different levels of government has shaped the 
institutional foundation of productive relations in the peasant society. In the dynastical history of 
China, local governments in the Hexi corridor never had the authority to set its own tax; instead, 
as previously discussed, the revenue of the local governments came from levies added on to 
agricultural tax. It was not until 1935 that the Republican government stipulated a three-tier 
taxation scheme in China when county governments finally had its own revenue stream (Gansu 
Tax Bureau 1984). However, the runaway inflation caused by the war against Japanese invasion 
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rendered the entire scheme useless as the whole country descended to a patrimonial system based 
on warlords. 
Building a system extraction was one of the first priorities for the communists once they 
took power in Northwestern China in late 1949 (Gansu Daily 1950). A directive from the 
Northwest Military Command reprimanded the low-level cadres for neglecting grain extraction 
because of “the false belief on benign governance”.11 A few months later, the People’s 
Government of Gansu Province released the temporary rules for agricultural tax, which set the 
share of the central government to be 13% of the harvest and the local share to be 15% and in 
total; the total tax and levies could not exceed 80% of the production.12 Interestingly, much like 
its predecessors, the party also allowed a three-year tax exemption for newly reclaimed land in 
Gansu (Liang District Tax Bureau 2008). Agricultural tax was paid in kind as surplus grain was 
needed to support the repression of the KMT guerrillas and the Korean War effort.13 From 1949 
to 1953, the central government determined all fiscal quota and expenditure for local and 
provincial governments; at the same time, all of the tax revenue was turned in to the central 
government (Ardant 1975:165–66). This extreme centralization created limited incentive for the 
peasantry and the local government to expand production and accumulate capital for urban 
industrialization. As a result, in addition to installing the procurement system to replace grain 
markets and to push for initial collectivization, the 1954 fiscal reform divided the revenue 
streams among different levels of governance. The county governments in Gansu got to keep all 
the sales taxes, and the Gansu provincial government retained 80% of the agricultural tax 
collected; 30% of which was given to county (Gansu Tax Bureau 1984, Liang District Tax 
 
 
11 Northwest Military Command 1950 
12 People’s Government of Gansu Province 1950. 
13 Shaanxi Military District Report 1950 
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Bureau 2008). In 1955, agricultural tax accounted for 53.4% of the total tax revenue in Hexi, and 
total grain extracted increased by 6.7% compared with the previous year. In 1957 and early 1958, 
the central government stipulated that agricultural tax would not exceed 15.5% of the average 
yield of the previous five years. The county government would use the yield of 1956 as the 
baseline for the calculation of revenue and allowed expenditure (Liangzhou Tax Bureau 2011, 
Shi 1996:388). Clearly, the communist regime was on its path to establish a rational-legal 
bureaucracy. 
However, the revolution fervor of the Great Leap Forward destroyed any hope to govern 
by numbers. To increase the efficiency of extraction and control, Mao pushed for rapid 
collectivization (da bingtuan zuozhan) and consolidated natural villages into communes. In 
Minqin, 547 natural villages were folded into 12 people’s communes. The massive hydraulic and 
backyard furnace projects severely disrupted agricultural production. In 1961, the average yield 
per mu in Minqin was only 65 kilos, which was only 45.3% of the yield in 1956 (Minqin County 
Annals Annals 1994:165). In 1962, the average yield lowered to 49.5 kg per mu (Gansu Local 
History Editorial Board 1990:388). However, the communes still extracted surplus grain 
according to the extraction baseline set in 1957. The ensuing famine was a mass murder done by 
the colossal failure of the fiscal and procurement institutions, which eventually stopped to 
function as villages after villages were wiped out because of starvation. The shortage of grain 
was so severe that when the state’s relief effort temporarily allowed grain to be traded in markets 
in late 1961, the price was more than 10 times than that set by the state (Gansu Local History 
Editorial Board 1995:308). 
To save the entire regime from collapsing, in 1962, the party central loosened its 
extraction by clarifying the ownership structure of land and production teams (the original 
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natural villages) as the unit of production (Minqin County Annals 1994:322). Between the 
production teams and the commune, specific contracts of duties and obligations (Sanbao yi gu 
ding) were established. Agricultural production rebounded in 1964, and the people’s communes 
survived only as administrative units (Gansu Local History Editorial Board 1990). However, up 
until Deng came to power, China was deeply mired in the vicious cycle of political and fiscal 
instability. Increase in agricultural production threatened centralization, which initiated massive 
political purges, such as the Four Cleanups movement and the Cultural Revolution, against the 
bureaucracy and the central government reformulated the tax code so it could have more control 
(i.e., changes in tax code 1968 and 1970). The overreaching center reduced the effectiveness of 
governance and transaction costs of tax collection surged, which pushed for another round of 
decentralization (i.e., fiscal decentralization in 1971–1973). The vacillations of the tax system 
accurately reflected the inability of institutions in the planned economy to properly distribute 
resources to promote agricultural production. Individual peasants stayed as underutilized innards 
of a broken machine, chained to ideological conflicts and rigid control on production materials. 
In Minqin, the lack of investment and technology combined with incessant pressure from the 
ever-increasing population impoverished the peasants.14 The economic institutions of communes 
 
created no incentives for the peasantry who could only be driven by political mobilization. 
Ironically, the oasis ecology in Minqin was well protected during the Mao years. From 1953 to 
1979, under Mao’s Green the Motherland campaign, more than a million mus of oleasters were 
planted as shelter belts. Oleaster fruits even became a major export of Minqin to the international 
market (The Editing Commitee of Minqin County Annals 1994:69). In addition, a massive 
amount of labor was channeled to build irrigation canals (412). I will discuss in detail the 
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combined effects of changing the tax regime and the mass mobilization of land reconfiguration 
 




The environmental history of Minqin up until the economic liberalization in 1978 
showcases the intricate yet repetitive pattern of interaction between the state extraction policy 
and the oasis ecology in Hexi. In both dynasties and the Mao years, the central government 
viewed the region as ideal to produce surplus grain for military campaigns. Settled agriculture in 
Minqin could only become viable when the hydraulics were built and properly maintained 
through the military-style mobilization of the peasantry and mass investment from the center. 
Ironically, the central governments’ need for monocropping and the cost of extraction tended to 
limit the tax base and the potential surplus of agricultural production. When the center was 
strong, military commands and political mobilization could temporarily sustain the war against 
natural laws—agricultural production in arid regions. When the center became weak, the 
extraction and the maintenance of economic system were outsourced to local state agents who 
had very different political and economic interests from the policies set by the center. For the 
local gentries, tax farming in the Hexi Corridor created stable and lucrative avenues for the 
primitive accumulation of capital.  Since, political capitalism tend to inhibit the growth of 
rational capitalism, the political-economic institutions of production and extraction imposed by 
the center could not form a rational-legal bureaucracy and, consequently, had to rely on local 
gentries who lacked the necessary capital and jurisdiction to maintain hydraulics in the entire 
watershed, which eventually created severe stratification and social instability when the local 
ecology deteriorated. 
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The communist regime in Hexi was engaged in the same pattern of interaction with 
nature after 1949. The myriad changes in agricultural and taxation policies resulted from Mao’s 
failed attempts to unify and modernize a disintegrated empire in one generation. Mao’s 
monocropping policy to increase grain output (Yi liang wei gang) to fight the “imperialist 
enemies” echoed the push for grain in dynasties past. After he wiped out the gentry, Mao was 
left with the option to militarily reorganize the peasant society into production group, team, and 
brigades (communes), which reflected the inability of the planned economy to generate surplus. 
Within the commune system, power became based on political privileges in the hierarchy, which 
inadvertently positioned the local bureaucrats as the local elites. Although Maoist mobilization 
promoted grassland preservation in Minqin, the peasantry connection to nature also became 
broken in the process and could only be mediated by administrative and production commands 
from the communes. The eradication of all other forms of social organization created a vacuum 
of civic engagement in resource management, and ideological purity was blindly thought to be 
the only factor in shaping production relations. It was no wonder that in the late 1970s, the 
county party secretary proudly proclaimed that “the Minqin oasis is an oasis which never lacks 
water and therefore does not need any river water from the upstream Wuwei County. As long as 
we have the right conviction and social organization, we can extract groundwater forever”.1516An 
ominous statement foretold the ecological catastrophe waiting when the center started to retreat 
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Chapter 3: Dazhai Spirit 
 
 
農業的根本出路在機械化-The fundamental way out for agriculture lies in mechanization 
 
 
Mao, Ze Dong (Mao [1959] 1999) 
 
Lu still vividly remembers that fateful morning in 1962 even though it was almost half a 
century ago. Barely before sunrise, the village loudspeaker began to blare out orders from the 
county militia brigade: “Attention, all men under the age of 45, bring your shovels and report to 
your respective commune offices immediately”.17 As the head of the production unit, Lu was 
jolted awake and sprinted out of the door to gather his fellow villagers. Close to a hundred of 
peasants were already waiting when he and his men arrived at the commune office. “About time 
to let those thieves know what we are made of,” people murmured. It wasn’t until they boarded 
the trucks, Liu heard from fellow villagers, “we are going to bomb the dams of Wuwei”.18 The 
relationship between the Minqin and Wuwei oases had always been testy because, historically, 
the competition over water resources repeatedly generated clan conflicts between the upstream 
and downstream settlements. From 1722 to 1900, the central court in Beijing had to intervene six 
times to prevent major armed conflicts stemming from disputes over water allocation.19 The bad 
blood between these oases even shaped the identities of the settlements. In the Minqin dialect, 
residents of the upstream settlement are casually referred to as “Wuwei Thieves” while the 
children in Wuwei are taught not to be as narrow-minded as the “Desert Rats” downstream 
(Chen 2001).20 When the communists took over the He-Xi corridor, one of the foremost issues 
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ordered to fill up the springheads, stop building reservoirs, and let the Shiyang River flow free 
between January and early April in the lunar calendar21 However, conflicts over water still 
erupted in 1956 and 1957 before the Great Leap Forward movement halted agricultural 
production.22 
In 1962, after years of futile pleas to the provincial government, Minqin’s chief 
magistrate, Zhang Shu Gang, decided to put the issue to rest once and for all by calling the 
county militia to take control over the springheads in Wuwei. Zhang’s raid failed miserably as 
hundreds of Wuwei peasants thrashed the “invading bandits” on the banks of Shiyang River.23 
Nevertheless, the unrest forced the provincial government to intervene yet again and in 1963, 
 
representatives from the Wuwei, Minqin, and Yongchang oases entered into a long-term water 
sharing agreement.24 At the same time, in Minqin, the first ever countywide irrigation meeting 
decided to allocate water based on available quantity, which in effect, abolished the two- 
hundred-year tradition of water allocation by time (Minqin County Annals 1994:211). The 
change symbolized how in dealing with natural resources and production, traditional customs 
were replaced by bureaucratic rules during the collective era. However, none of the agreements 
were followed as upstream deterioration forced even Wuwei oases to be without a steady flow of 
water. Instead, each oasis used their ways of finding water sources.25 The fiasco of armed 
conflict and empty agreements accurately reflects the state of CCP governance in the He-Xi 
corridor from the 1960s to the early years of reform. Behind the facade of a totalitarian regime, 
murky jurisdictions and patronage relationships crisscrossed the bureaucracy. As political purges 
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destroyed the bureaucratic norms governing the cadre’s behavior, rural governance was left to 
each commune that acted as patrimonial fiefdoms. The fragmentation of political power 
prohibited a comprehensive approach to agricultural production and water conservation. Since 
the dysfunctional bureaucracy could not support a rational approach to extraction, the ensuing 
chaos in fiscal relations detrimentally shaped peasants’ relation to nature during the Dazhai 
movement years. 
Beyond the Apocalypse 
 
The colossal failure of the Great Leap Forward did little to dampen Mao’s enthusiasm for 
rapid modernization. Though the 1961 amendments to the People’s Commune Law (commonly 
known as the agricultural Sixty Articles) reversed his radical approach to collectivization by 
redirecting property rights to the administrative village, Mao did not give up his belief that 
science and collectivization will rapidly transform productive relations in rural China (Zhou 
2009). By the mid-1960s, “the agricultural sixty” had temporarily stabilized food supply, yet the 
Chinese economy was largely in shambles. The clash with the “Soviet revisionists” had severely 
restricted the credit line, and investment in rural infrastructure dwindled (Song 2005). It was in 
these circumstances that Mao made the Dazhai Commune in Shanxi province a model of rural 
development in the totalitarian regime. According to the state media, under the staunch 
leadership of the party secretary, Cheng Yong Gui, the villagers in Dazhai Commune achieved 
self-reliance by protecting the local environment and transforming the hilly terrain into terrace 
fields (Chen 2008b). The success of the Commune showcased how the correct ideology would 
generate self-sustaining, productive relations that reduced food shortage in rural areas without 
any investment from the government. Nevertheless, the reality of the Dazhai model was that the 
central state passed the buck in agricultural investment to the communes while still attempting to 
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maintain its extractive apparatus. As Mao said to the planning committee of the third five-year 
plan in 1965, “…Agricultural development should rely on the Dazhai spirit, if you give them 
money, they will not achieve any. It is better for them not to receive support” (Song 2005). 
In Minqin, the “agricultural sixty” restored agricultural production by releasing land 
 
rights and control of labor to the production brigades and teams (Minqin County Annals 
 
1994:322). However, the peasantry could not choose what to produce because production goals 
were assigned to each mu of land, and all of the production tools were deemed collective 
properties.26 The production committees would assign a small plot of land to each household and 
the outputs of it would not be taxed. Instead of receiving monetary rewards for their labor, each 
villager would be compensated by work-units (gongfen).27 Work-units were evaluated by the 
head of the production team based on gender, age, and class statuses of individual villagers in 
addition to the types of tasks completed.28 In general, a day’s work would earn one work-unit for 
men, 0.7 for women, 0.6 for elderly and 0.4 for minors (Minqin County Annals 1994:167). After 
the harvest, grain would first be transported to the grain stations for tax-in-kind (gongliang), and 
the value of each kilogram of grain was set by the central economic planners at the beginning of 
every fiscal year. After tax, the remaining grain would be purchased by the state at different 
prices based on the grain quotas (gouliang) set by the economic plan. The CCP, like the 
dynastical rulers, viewed the He-Xi Corridor as a place to provide surplus grain for the nation 
and the central and provincial governments set high grain quotas for counties in the Corridor 
 
(Gansu Local History Editorial Board 1990). In addition to the assigned purchase quotas, the 
 
production teams were needed to meet “added purchase,” (chaogouliang) “war-time reserve,” 
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(chubeiliang) and, during the Cultural Revolution, “loyalty” (zhongziliang) quotas.29 After the 
central and provincial governments had taken their share, the Minqin county and communes then 
charged the cost of production and depreciation (shengchangfeiyong), national trust fund 
(guojiajijing), collective fund (gongjijing), social security (gongyijing), collective management 
(dadui guanlifei), and water and electricity fees before dividing the remaining grains based on 
the population (80%-70%) and work-units accumulated throughout the year (20%-30%).30 The 
 
high extraction rate impoverished peasants in Minqin and left little room for the accumulation of 
primitive capital. Li Ting Zhu remembered: 
Li: Back then, in my production team, the more you worked, the worse off you become. 
Since so little grain was produced, sometimes your work-units would have negative value 
after the communes took their shares. 
KRM: How could people survive on “negative values”? 
Li: You borrow work-unit values from the production team, and the borrowed amount 
would be deducted from next year’s harvest. After the subtraction, the value of a day’s 
labor was usually around 0.05 yuan.31 
 
The official agricultural tax rates in Gansu were 6% from 1959 to 1966 and 2.07% from 
 
1967 to 1973 and the administrative fees (tiliu) of the communes were not supposed to exceed 
 
7% of the total output.32In reality, the average amount of grains left after tax and fees were less 
than 44% in 1970 (Minqin County Annals 1994:179). As the scissor-cut continued to keep the 
grain price below the cost of production, by the mid-1960s, production teams in Minqin began to 
operate in the red. The average production team deficit was 150 yuan a year, while some 
production teams had a debt of more than 2,500 yuan (ibid:180). Meanwhile, the amount of 
grain extracted by the central government in Minqin increased from 8.3 million jin in 1965 to 58 
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million jin in 1976.33 34The rapid increase in the amount of grain extracted occurred not only in 
Minqin but throughout the He-Xi Corridor, putting additional pressure on the peasants and local 
ecology. For example, Gu Cheng Commune in the upstream Wuwei Oases provided 97 thousand 
jin of grain to the central government from 1966 to 1970.35 Encouraged by its success, the grain 
quotas in Gu Cheng were increased by 20% in 1971.36   To provide surplus grain, the 
administrative village committees pushed the labor-hours of the peasantry to the extreme, which, 
ironically, lowered the values of each work-unit and made the peasants poorer.37 Jiang You 
Huang recalled: 
Jiang: We were still small, but my mother had to work in the production team. She could 
not take care of us as she had to work in the field all the time. The head of the 
[production] team would knock on the door before daybreak. The only time she came 
back to us was during lunch, and then she had to leave again. They had meetings every 
night… 
KRM: What meetings? 
Jiang: It was during the Cultural Revolution. What else were the meetings about other 
than learning and struggling against each other?38 
 
The Iron Ladies Platoons 
 
The Wuwei District Revolutionary Committee39 knew they had a problem going into 
1971. The county economic reports of 1970 showed stagnant growth in grain, and for the third 
straight year, the district failed to harvest enough cotton to meet the quota. A report from the 
Wuwei County stated: “There are people who fail to understand the greatness of the ‘grain link, 
full development’ policies. They claim that grain and cash crop production are antithetical to 
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34 Minqin County Grain Bureau 1976 #077 
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36 Wuwei County Agriculture and Forestry Bureau Records 1971 agricultural tax assignment task 
form 
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38 Interview #15 
39 In 1971, the Wuwei District covered Wuwei, Minim, Gulang, Tianzhu, and Yongchang 
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each other, saying that the cotton yield was too low. This is the best time to plant cotton, but we 
cannot give the seeds out.” Worse still, “some people who had landlord class background 
deserted the communes and fled to Xinjiang during spring planting season.40 They professed to 
others that there are many factory jobs available in Xinjiang.” Another report to the District 
bluntly asked for a waiver on the cotton quota as “Hezhai Commune planted 43.3 mu cotton but 
harvested nothing, and they were not the worse ones.”41 At the same time, the Wuwei District 
was instructed by the Provincial Revolutionary Committee to “prohibit the collection of 
management fees by the communes and administrative villages so the peasants will be motivated 
when they see yearly increase in their income. The lower level governments must reduce the 
numbers of over-spending households (chaozhihu) and the families of cadre need to set examples 
by voluntarily turning in the grain they owed.”42 Clearly, by the early 1970s, the District had 
already hit a ceiling of surplus extraction, which threatened the survival of the commune system 
in the region. 
Even after the “Sixty Articles,” the proper valuation of labor in the communes continued 
to be one of the most challenging tasks in rural governance. To fulfill the promises of a socialist 
society, the central government stipulated that 70% to 80% of the available grain should be 
distributed based on the household size.43 Nevertheless, since every production team had 
different population compositions and labored in varied soil and water conditions, the actual 
implementation of the distribution ratio was largely decided by the production team leaders. As 
recalled by 78-year-old Ma Ren, “those who could not work also had to live, every team had a 
different ratio. Some did a 70 [population]-30 [work-unit] split, and some did 40%-60%. The 
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teams that produced more food tended to lean more towards population.”44 The production team 
leaders determined who received the work-units after a day’s work as well. “For example, he 
may give you a .8 or .5, and whatever he said would be recorded. There was no negotiation.”45 
Production team leaders became the foci of political power at the grassroots level of governance 
because they controlled resource allocation and definition of value, two essential components of 
the productive relations. The production team leaders were usually appointed by the party 
secretaries of the production brigades, who, in turn, were assigned to the positions by the 
commune party secretaries. As long as they fulfilled the grain and corvée quotas allocated by the 
county government, the grassroots cadres had high degrees of autonomy as information, and 
hence decision-making, was constricted within the small circle of commune governance. The 
relative insulation of power from external reviews was especially prone to generate a clientalist 
political structure where the preferences of the superior strongly shape the resource available for 
the underlings in the hierarchy (Oi 1985, 1989) because the power was based more on patronage 
than codified rules or abstract principles, rural China in the collective era resembled an 
unfastened network stringed together by tax obligations than a well-organized totalitarian 
machine. 
At the beginning of the Dazhai Movement in 1964, few people envisioned it would 
evolve to the behemoth “left-leaning” mistake that defined the collective era in rural China. In 
his first public comments on the Dazhai Commune, Mao praised the commune as an advanced 
model of agricultural production and marveled at its spirit to achieve self-reliance (Zhou 2009). 
However, Mao’s brief comments on the Dazhai spirit quickly turned into an official ideology 
once the Cultural Revolution began in 1966 (Ho 2003). All across China, rural or urban, the 
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“rebel faction” first struggled against the alleged “capitalist-roading” bureaucrats and, 
immediately afterward, against each other. Since no one was sure what constituted “right- 
leaning” tendencies exactly and political alliances in the center shifted from month to month, 
complete adherence to Mao’s spoken words (often lifted out of context) was deemed the safest 
path to survival. Mao’s cult of personality soon penetrated as widely into every corner of social 
lives in Minqin as did the little red book edited by Lin Biao. 
The Cultural Revolution in Minqin started in 1967 as hundreds of county bureaucrats and 
teachers were sent to reform camps—the “Five-Seven Cadre Schools”—near the edge of the 
Badanjiling desert (Zhang 1992). The commotion reached its apex when two rebel factions, 
manned by high school students and peasants from surrounding villages, fought to control the 
county militia armory and destroyed several factories in town (Minqin County Annals 1994:36). 
Outside of the county seat, the Revolution instigated rounds of struggle sessions in the 
communes against known class enemies (offspring of the landlord class).46 The political 
 
upheaval petered out as it reached the administrative village and production team levels as “most 
of the folks in the same village could trace their lineage to one or two extended families. Since 
everybody was equally impecunious, and nobody owned anything, what could you gain from 
struggling against your family?”47 However, all cross the Wuwei District, Mao’s cult of 
personality was used as a mobilization tool to accelerate production and tighten social control. 
For example, the Wuwei District Agricultural Office noted in August 1967, “The communes 
implemented the ‘Three-Bring and Four-Study’ orders during the summer harvest. They brought 
portraits of Chairman Mao, red flags, and slogan banners to the field in addition to reciting Mao 
Ze Dong thoughts while working, reporting to the Chairman before returning, and studied his 
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teachings every night.48 We estimate that this summer’s agricultural production increased 68.8% 
than the previous year”.49 In the alternate reality of the Dazhai movement, ideological purity was 
able to generate surplus productivity as long as the peasants followed Mao’s words closely. The 
Iron Ladies Platoons in the Hong Liu Commune in Minqin had “been blitzing the obstacles of 
production while conducting nightly study sessions of the ‘Lao San Pian’50 since February. 
Because the Ladies implemented the Chairman’s teachings, they completed an irrigation canal in 
five days instead of eleven days as originally planned”.51 People’s Daily (1972) recounted that 
“…determined to contribute to the glorious revolution, the Ladies walked into the desert…and 
after a winter’s hard work, they successfully reclaimed more than 100 mu of land by planting 
shelter belts around the sand dune…which harvested more than twelve thousand jin of food. 
Born to be illiterate peasants, the Ladies not only changed the natural landscape, they also 
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Figure 4 Administration During the Cultural Revolution 
 
Unfortunately, the Dazhai nightly struggle sessions in Minqin quickly devolved to 
personal squabbles disguised as alleged ideological impurities.53 One recurring theme of the 
arguments was the distribution of work-units between genders.54 In communist China, rural 
women shouldered the majority of farm work as they often were assigned to repetitive and 
tedious tasks such as weeding, tilling, and harvesting. However, since men were perceived to be 
more physically able, their tasks, often seasonal, were defined to be more physically taxing and 
should receive more work-units. As described by Rou, 
In our production team, during the irrigation season, men were supposed to carry the 
heavy diesel pump down the wells and women had to rearrange the lynchets. It probably 
took the men an hour total to climb in and out of the wells. They just sat at the bottom of 
the well and chatted with each other, but they received full work-units. While we worked 
the whole day and received less than 70%.”55 
 
53 Interview#27 
54 Interview #43,21,89,77,145,132 
55 Interview #112 
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A report to the Minim Communist Party Committee stated “women cadres were extremely 
dissatisfied with the compensation they got. They held a contest in 1976 during the harvest and 
finished at the same time as their male counterparts”.56 Another constant source of contempt in 
the struggling session was the assignment of temporary tasks, which had lower work-unit value, 
in the production team.57 Since there was no institution established to redress the grievances and, 
officially, state’s extraction could not surpass the basic grain ration given to the peasantry, the 
peasants had little incentives to increase their productivity. The Houko System then acted a 
double-edged sword in rural productive relations; since the peasantry and its labor value were 
chained to their specific production teams, the organization had little leaways to shed 
unproductive labor or deny access to rations of basic services (Putterman 1986, Rozelle 1994). 
Multiple initiatives were made by the District to motivate the peasants to pay back the grain 
“owed” to no avail.58 Chen Yinan recalled his days as a production team leader, “I often had to 
yell at the loudspeaker for more than half an hour before anyone would respond to my order. It 
was particularly infuriating when they [production team members] talked back to me using 
Chairman Mao’s quotes”.59As the Cultural Revolution wore on, cadre-peasantry relations 
became more and more fraught with indignation. A missive from Xu Bai Commune pleaded, 
 
“Peasants were poisoned by the Gang of Four and had serious anarchist tendencies. They often 
contradicted orders even beat and scolded cadres. Some cadres became so afraid that they started 
to give every task the same work-units, which weakened the correct valuation of labor.”60 The 
Wuwei District also observed, “some of the grass roots cadres have three fears and three 
 
56 Minqin County Communist Party Office 1979 #10 
57 Minqin County Revolutionary Government Resettlement Office 1969 #11 
58 Wuwei County Revolutionary Commission 1971 #78 
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complaints: They are afraid of the draught which caused some insubordination, of the decreasing 
income and living standards in their teams, and of their supervisors’ criticisms. They complained 
loudly against the sky for not raining, against the soil for not producing, and against their own 
fate for being chosen as team leaders. They had low morale and some refused to do anything”.61 
In other words, the state bureaucracy recognized clearly how the “weapons of the weak” and the 
 
“little traditions” of the Chinese peasantry could sabotage the planned economy by engaging in a 
protracted battle with the perceived unfairness of the work-unit system (Scott 1985, Scott 2009, 
Scott 1976). As lamented by the Minqin County Party Secretary in 1978, “there was no 
individual responsibility for the production and no evaluation of one’s labor.62 The work unit 
valuation was dead long before it entered the team records.” Nonetheless, the central government 
 
continued pushing for accelerated grain extraction even though the pricing and value system was 
fundamentally broken. In 1971, Wuwei District promulgated, “Following the great strategy plan 
of Chairman Mao, we…need to ‘cross the Yellow River’ of grain self-sufficiency by producing 
more than four hundred jins per mu. For springhead regions, the grain production needs to ‘cross 
the Huai River.’63 We need a Great Leap Forward to win the grain battle”.64 A new approach to 




61 Wuwei County Communist Party 1971 #20 
62 Minqin County Communist Party Office 1978# 13 
63 In the 1957 Agricultural Development Plan, the Party planners stated that collectivization 
would drastically increase agricultural production and by 1967, regions north of the Yellow 
River would produce more than 400 jin per mu, regions in between the Yellow and Huai Rivers 
would produce more than 500 jin per mu, and regions south of the Hua River would exceed 800 
jin per mu. During the Dazhai Movement, “crossing the rivers” became political slogans for 
increasing agricultural production. However, none of these goals were realized until 1982 
(People’s Daily 1999). 
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Crossing the Yellow River 
 
The new approach to agricultural production was about changing how water was allocated 
in the oases. Much like the dynastical rulers, the communist bureaucracy in Minqin viewed the 
restoration and expansion of irrigation crucial to its legitimacy and, more importantly, governing 
strategies. In the oasis ecology, those who monopolize the access to water control the distribution 
of land as well as the rhythm of agricultural production, which constituted the spatial and temporal 
axes of productive relations in agrarian societies. However, compared with its predecessors, the 
Chinese Communist state was able to penetrate much deeper into the daily interactions of its 
subjects. Walder (1986), in his studies on neo-traditionalism in communist China, noticed that the 
most basic building blocks of organization in urban China, the work-units (danwei), were, in fact, 
the principle source of political authority (10). The communist bureaucracy could obtain 
compliance from the urban workers because the Danwei, acting as 
small welfare states, monopolized the provision of public goods and access to political statuses 
(Won 2012). Since there was no labor and credible consumer markets, the workers became 
organizationally dependent on their superiors and the patron-client relations in the hierarchy 
(Gold 1984, Walder 1983). Similarly, since the middleman between state and society in rural 
China, the gentries, were annihilated in the early years of PRC and that the means of production 
were controlled by the state, the peasantry in Minqin had no choice but to become 
organizationally dependent on the bureaucracy. The dams, canals, and embankments built by the 
state not only constricted the flow of water; they were also a stringent form of social control in 
the oasis. Irrigation was a powerful political weapon for the Communist as the hydraulics 
transformed nature into be a component in the statecraft of domination. The enormous cost to 
change the landscape was in reality what Foucault (1977:92-102) termed “the political 
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investment of the body” because, by controlling the flow of water, the state could discipline 
subsistence peasants enough to turn them into farm laborers regulated by the center. Should the 
planned economy operate like a delicate pocket-watch, combining the works of distinctive parts 
to a synchronized whole, then the managed flow of Shiyang River must be the coil springs that 
timed and regulated the social and economic organizations of the agrarian society in Minqin. 
That was why, from 1952 to 2005, there was not a year in which the county government 
stopped expanding its hydraulic system, even during the toughest time of the Great Leap 
Forward years. From the commune leaders in Minqin to cadres in the Gansu Provincial 
Government, putting the water system in the oasis under bureaucratic control was continuously 
regarded as the foremost priority of governance (Pan 2010:26-30). Barely three years into its rein, 
the Minqin County government began to mobilize the local peasantry to straighten the natural 
rivers and transformed them into a series of irrigation ditches. The expansion of these ditches 
eventually formed the main thoroughfare of the 91.7 kilometer-long Great Leap Forward Canal 
in the 1970s.65 In 1962, the completion of the Hong Ai Shang Dam intercepted the flow of 
 
Shiyang River entirely, which coincided with one of the worst draughts the oasis had 
experienced. As the water started to fill the newly-built reservoir and the downstream Qingtu 
Lake began to dry up rapidly in the summer heat, the peasants in Minqin discovered that the 
water available for summer irrigation (dapaishui) was only half of the pre-1962 volume. As a 
result, the hundred-year-old tradition of allocating water by time could no longer function.66 The 
conflicts over water allocation escalated in 1963, and subsequently, the first county-wide 
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scientific measurement, [the county] devised a plan that used cultivated area in the communes to 
determine how water was allocated. Human replaced nature (tian) in water management” (ibid). 
The changes in water allocation fit well with the Party’s drive for collectivization and 
mechanization in the oasis. Eager to modernize China within a generation, Mao ([1959] 1999) 
viewed collectivization as the revolution of productive relations and mechanization as the 
revolution of productive means (216). The Great Helmsman once remarked, “the fundamental 
way out for agriculture lies in mechanization” (Mao [1959] 1999:247). In Minqin, 
collectivization and the hydraulic infrastructure allowed the state to meticulously calculate the 
amount of water needed for production on each mu of land.67 By turning all productive inputs 
(labor, water, and land) into quantifiable factors in the planned economy, the state believed it 
could increase the utilization of resources, thereby maximizing its extraction potential for the 
“Grain as Key Link” (yiliangweigang) policies. The Party’s emphasis on grain extraction started 
during the Great Leap Forward years when it feared mass starvation would result in regime 
collapse. The severe shortage of food debilitated the development of the heavy industry sector in 
the urban area as well (Ho 2003). In 1960, the Party’s Central Committee stipulated grain 
production as “the fundamental of the fundamentals in economic growth,” and that “the battle to 
increase agricultural output has to be treated as the foremost task of the whole Party”.68 The He- 
Xi Corridor was designated by the provincial government to be a crucial grain contributor in 
Gansu. Numerous hydrologists and geologists working at the national and provincial levels were 
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seasonal pattern, only 30% of the water flow in Shiyang River was properly utilized.70 For grain 
production to “cross the Yellow River,” the county government needed to “deepen the 
collectivization of land and production materials immediately so the peasants could transform the 
fields for mechanized farming”.71 In the high fever of the Cultural Revolution, the Wuwei 
District ordered the lower level governments to bear down on their peasants to usher in the 
modernization of agriculture. By the end of 1967, allegedly, the peasantry in the Wuwei District 
had “expanded summer plantation by 300 thousand mu, irrigated 330 thousand more mu, use 9 
times more phosphate fertilizer, and increase the utilization of semi-mechanized tools by 184%, 
compared with 1966 levels”.72 Suffice it to say, the peasantry’s organized dependence on the 
hydraulic system would be the quintessential factor for the state to overcome the resistance from 
individual production teams. Collectivization, mechanization, and the hydraulics constituted the 
holy trinity of bureaucratization of social relations in the oasis. The daily subjugation of the 
peasantry to the bureaucracy would, therefore, serve as the foundation of everlasting state power 
in the totalitarian regime.  However, nature in the He-Xi Corridor had a different plan. 
The Critical Juncture 
 
In the early 1970s, the provincial cadres in Gansu ran out of options to spur production.73 Rather 
than becoming self-sufficient as predicted by Chairman Mao, collectivization and the Dazhai 
movement instead caused many communes in the He-Xi Corridor to rely on relief grains 
(fanxiaoliang) (Wuwei General History Editorial Board 2007:43). Worse, in 1971 and 1972, the 
Wuwei District experienced record drought during the planting system. The flow of the Shiyang 
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River and its tributary streams dwindled to drops.74 Further, the hydraulics and shelter belts came 
under assault from the surrounding sand dunes as many of the technocrats were labeled as class 
enemies and sent to reform camps in the desert (Liu 2011). As a result, in Minqin, the cultivated 
area decreased from more than 90 thousand mu in 1960 to less than 60 thousand mu in 1974 



























Figure 5 Changes in Shiyang River Inflow and Actual Irrigated Areas in Minqin 1956-1984 
 
At the same time, the pressure to produce more grain in the Wuwei District increased 
dramatically. Beleaguered by political upheavals, the central government abandoned its national 
food supply systems and decreed that each province had to become self-reliant in grain in 1970. 
The economic planners in the Wuwei District had to come up with a policy alternative which 
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demanded by the revolutionary counterparts.75 Fortunately, they found a solution in the meeting 
minutes of the 9th National People’s Congress of PRC in 1969 and the Agricultural Conference 
of the North Regions in 1970. 
The 9th National People’s Congress marked the advent of the power of the Gang of Four 
faction in the CCP as Mao’s cult of personality was institutionalized into the party structure 
(Song and Zhang 2006). In this meeting, the Party decided to speed up the Dazhai movement by 
ordering the construction of small-scale irrigation projects all around China.76 In the Wuwei 
District, since the surface flow of the Shiyang River reduced dramatically in the early '70s, the 
center’s call for small-scale irrigation projects were treated as an order to drill mechanized wells 
in the watershed.77 Of all the settlements in the Shiyang River Watershed, the peasants in Minqin 
had the longest history of utilizing groundwater. Because of their geographical location at the 
end of the Shiyang River, as early as the mid-Qing Dynasty, peasants in the same clan would dig 
shallow wells, measuring 1-3 meters deep, to supplement river water during the peak time of 
summer irrigation. The shallow wells were seasonal, as the rising groundwater level in fall would 
naturally submerge the wells. In the 1950s, as the party expanded village cultivated areas, the 
peasants began to build rectangular-shaped sinkholes (laochi) about three meters deep. These 
sinkholes were compatible with pedal-powered waterwheels and could deliver water to wider 
areas than shallow wells. During the planting season, peasants in each production group would 
rotate between their field and irrigation tasks to ensure the steady supply of groundwater.78 
 
 
75 To appease Mao while preventing complete anarchy during the Cultural Revolution, Prime 
Minister Zhou En-Lai pushed for the “grab revolution, promote production” (zhuagemin 
cushengchan) movement in late 1967. Every state entity was divided to the revolutionary and 
economic units so production could continue even during the massive purges (Zou 2010). 
76 Wuwei District Revolutionary Commission 1971 #98 
77 Minqin County Waterworks and Electricity Bureau 1970 #3 
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Nevertheless, as the water conflicts between the upstream and downstream settlement escalated 
rapidly and as the Hong-Ai Shan Dam intercepted the natural flow of the Shiyang River in 1959, 
the sinkholes gradually lost its capacity to provide steady water supply for irrigation purposes. 
The Minqin government started to include the construction of, brick wells (tujin) 8 to 10 meters 
in depth, into the corvée labor of the production teams. At the same time, the county government 
petitioned to the provincial government for more technological assistance (Liu 2012). Soon, 
water extraction no longer depended on manual/animal power. 
In 1965, the Gansu Ministry of Water Works tested out the first mechanical well in the 
Hexi-Corridor in the Datan Township of Minqin. The mechanized wells utilized a caldron 
shaped drill bit to reach 20 to 30 meters below the surface and relied on diesel pumps instead of 
pedal-powered waterwheels. Fittingly, the peasants named the invention “the caldron wells” 
(guozhuijing). The county government subsequently held a countywide meeting to demarcate 
boundaries of wells between each commune.79 The news of the caldron wells’ success spread 
like wildfire among the cadres. The construction of the wells meant not only added input to the 
production process but also significant political merit for the village and communal cadres 
because it stabilized grain production when the river water dwindled. Given the shortage of 
chemical fertilizers in the oasis, one can even argue that the most prominent reason for increases 
in grain output in Minqin in the late 1960s was the utilization of mechanized wells. The 
technological sophistication to construct and maintain mechanized wells exceeded the 
capabilities of individual production teams. Instead, the communes established year-round well- 
drilling task forces that were also responsible for fixing the rudimentary mechanized tools. In 





groundwater level dropped, the more sophisticated well-drilling became, the more complex the 
organization of production developed, and the deeper the involvement of the bureaucracy. 
The interests of the provincial government were crucial to the rapid adaptation of 
mechanical wells in the Shiyang River Watershed. Minqin’s breakthrough was held as a shining 
example of the new socialist countryside by the provincial government. The utilization of 
mechanical wells in Minqin was praised as “being resolute in controlling agricultural 
production.” The provincial government further commemorated the county cadres for “not 
fighting with upstream oases [to get water] and not dependent on nature’s giving.” (Zhang 
1992:29) In 1971, the Wuwei District Revolutionary Commission stated, 
 
The Minqin experiences proved that as long as we…stay proactive in finding 
groundwater sources close to the surface and extract deeper groundwater in a rational 
manner, we will take charge of the force to conquer any natural disaster. Consequently, 
we will eliminate our dependency on nature. Within a year, we will increase grain output 
substantially.80 
 
A few weeks later, the Wuwei county government sent all of its commune and production 
 
team cadres to Minqin learning the “advanced well drilling and irrigation technology”.81 For 
once, the “desert rats” became the models for everyone to emulate in the District. Engrossed in 
the midst of political purges of the Cultural Revolution, the “complete implementation of the 9th 
National People’s Congress’ decision” soon carried a cloak of ideological fervor in Gansu. The 
Wuwei District ordered its administered counties to drill as many wells as possible because the 
expanding extraction of groundwater symbolized the triumphs of the Dazhai spirit over the 
insidious plots of Liu Xiaoqi.82 83 In order to showcase their political loyalty to the revolutionary 
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factions, the county governments in the District raced to drill as many wells as fast as possible. 
In 1970, upstream Huang Yang district first mobilized more than 7000 peasants to participate in 
the “irrigation battle against the revisionists”.84 In early 1971, the District ordered lower-level 
governments to assign quotas of wells constructed to each production team to achieve the year- 
end goal of one well-irrigated mu for every peasant in the District.85 In a separate administrative 
order, the District stipulated that every commune needed to devote at least 60% of its members 
to build district-wide hydraulics after September. In addition, each production team had to assign 
 
10% of its labor force and food rationing solely to drill wells and build the supplementary 
irrigation ditches any given time of the year.86 The cadres in Wuwei County boasted in 1971 that 
because of the 160 thousand mobilized peasants, the county would finish drilling 1000 shallow 
wells (tujin) and 400 mechanized wells in 18 months.87 Not to be outdone, the Minqin County 
government and the People’s Bank branch in Minqin co-issued a missive stating that: “the most 
important goal of governance was to mobilize enough peasants in the battle of irrigation. We will 
do everything to achieve the 1000 new mechanized well quota of 1973”.88 The mobilization to 
drill mechanized wells was so successful in Minqin that, when the county Revolutionary 
Commission asked the provincial government for funding to bolster the Hong Ai Shan dam in 
1973, the deputy governor of Gansu, Xi Hen Hang, stated, “ Minqin has so many wells, why do 
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Figure 6 Numbers of Mechanized Wells in Minqin 1965-2005 
 
The frantic pace to extract groundwater was only a major component of a larger 
movement to transform the rural landscape in the district. In the mid-1960s, Minqin County 
already began to alter the landscape under the banner of the “Socialist Five-Good Farm Projects” 
(wu hao tian).89 The Five-Good projects planned to usher in modernity by changing the 
traditional, irregular-shaped plots to standardized rectangular farms (tiao tian).90 For instance, 
the Shang Tang production team reported in 1971, “in a few years, we transformed three hundred 
plus fragmented small plots into thirty-six tiao tians, which constitute 84% of the total land in 
the village. With determination, we demonstrated the modern appearance of the new socialist 







89 The “Five-Good” refers to standardized plots, planed shelterbelts, supplementary ditches, 
electricity, and new village layouts. 
90 One tiaotian is usually 180-200 meters in length and 30-40 meters which equals to the size of 
10 mu. 
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standardized farms were built to usher in mechanized agriculture to increase grain output.92 As 
the 9th People’s Congress established mechanization as a key policy in agriculture, political 
pressure increased for cadres in the Wuwei District, where only 16% of the arable land had been 
standardized. The new plan in 1971 called for achieving the standardization of all arable land in 
a few years.93 Simultaneously, the rapid transformation of the rural landscape further eroded the 
last vestige of the pre-1949 land demarcations, which were, in actuality, the material testimonies 
of the myriad kinship and clan ties before the revolution. It was almost as, by changing the 
physical layout of the farms, the Party could permanently bureaucratize the amorphous social 
relations in the village into a rigid structure of production led by the Party’s hierarchy. 
Not surprisingly, transformation this large in scale and this convoluted in reach 
encountered much resistance from below. The District Revolutionary Commissioner stated in a 
public speech, “Many failed to recognize the importance of the Five-Good movement…They 
refused to change neither the irrigation ditches and practices nor the plots and demarcations. 
They execrated that if you change the physical layout of the land, you would have low crop 
yields for a decade”.94 The peasants were also resistant towards the “Greening the Motherland (lv 
 
hua zu guo)” campaign, which was started by Mao in 1958 and involved planting trees all 
throughout rural China.95 After all, in the Minqin Folklore, the surrounding deserts, and seasonal 
sandstorms were the embodiment of the “Yellow Dragon.” One could do all s/he could in tilling 
the land and plant trees, but all of that effort would be nil if the omnipotent Yellow Dragon 
decided to bury the villages.96 Therefore, to mobilize the peasants, the cadres had to first turn the 
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enchanted into the rational. The building of the new socialist countryside required the peasantry 
to subscribe the idea that natural resources, like their labor power, was only something calculable 
and explainable according to scientific principles. In this new era of rationality, neither traditions 
nor myths were usable in the calculated management of daily affairs. Since the perception of 
what constituted nature was refracted by the complex social relations embedded in the historicity 
of the oasis, the physical exertion to transform rural landscapes served the purpose to discipline 
both the peasantry and nature in accordance with the communist ideology. In this way, the new 
alternative modernity centered on the social relations construed by the Party bureaucracy (Li 
2009). The Five Good Farm and irrigation projects were not only implemented to increase grain 
production, but, to a certain degree, they consittuted the bureaucracy’s “symbolization of 
domination by demonstrations and enactment of power.” (Scott 1990:45). As Chen Liu recalled, 
Many seniors regarded that the traditional plots and water-sharing customs as the 
percolated wisdom of our ancestors and they were secretly unnerved by the changes. My 
[the post-revolution] generation was more frustrated that we were always ordered to level 
land. All the digging and leveling created little in return for us, and we kept on wondering 
the cadres ordered these assignments just to deprive us any free time to engage in other 
activities.97 
 
Yet, the wholesale transformation of such an immense empire carried an exorbitant price tag. 
Where would that money come from? 
The Importance of Peitao 
 
True to the Dazhai spirit, the cost of fighting the “irrigation and landscaping battles” was 
mostly delegated to the lower-level governments and the peasantry even though it was the CCP 
Central Committee, led by the Gang of Four, who first sounded the battle cry. The Wuwei 
District stated in 1971, “in terms of building the irrigation infrastructure; we need to implement 
the Central Committee’s guideline, which stresses on local effort…and self-reliance of the 
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production brigades and teams”.98 Even before the Dazhai movement, the cost of building and 
maintaining the hydraulic system in He-Xi had primarily been shouldered by the peasantry. In 
1962, the Gansu Ministry of Water Works explained its rationale for collecting water fees as 
“…by extracting fees and materials from those who benefited, we can strengthen the 
maintenance of the irrigation system.” The fee was set to be one jin of grain for every mu 
irrigated by river or spring water. The amount was added to the tax-in-kind quota of each 
production team, and the brigades kept 50% of the fee collected. The rest went to the coffer of 
the county irrigation office. Interestingly, no fee was collected for areas irrigated entirely by well 
water. 99 Given that, in the 1960s, most of the production brigades in Minqin operated on a 
deficit and had trouble to collect even the agricultural tax, it was not surprising that the water fee 
seldom materialized in the overall budgets of the lower-level governments. Worse, lower-level 
governments had to shoulder the added cost of mechanized farming since the bureaucratization 
of production had each commune to produce its own mechanized tools.100 101 As a result, once 
the “irrigation and landscaping battles” started in 1970, the county governments in the Wuwei 
District began to demand more and more corvée labor from the peasantry to offset the cost of 
well construction.102 In many villages, the corvée duties reduced grain production, pressing the 
peasantry so much that the district government had to “…station special task forces in train 
depots to stop the blind flow of peasants before sending them to the Mao Ze Dong Thoughts 
Learning School in order to restore order of the community and rail traffic”.103 Contrary to the 
optimistic outlook on the effects of mechanization, the lower-level governments had to return 
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more than 1.3 million jin of purchased grain and 660 thousand jin of water fee-in-kind to the 
communes lest the villagers died of starvation in 1971 (ibid). The district’s endeavor to increase 
grain production already suffered its first setback within a year into the implementation of the 9th 
National People’s Congress Guidelines. 
Moreover, the expansion of mechanized wells severely strained the relations between 
different levels of government in the Wuwei District. In report after report, the Minqin and 
Wuwei counties complained loudly to the District and Provincial governments that their 
administered communes had no resources to build the ancillary facilities (peitao)-ditches or the 
diesel pumps/electric grid necessary for the wells to function. In Wuwei County, “of the 400 
mechanized wells built in 1971, about 110 wells had no ancillary facilities”.104   The Minqin 
branch of the People’s Bank of China sternly warned the communes that, to get investment for 
the mechanized wells, the lower-level governments needed to provide the funding for peitao so 
the investment given would become effective as soon as possible.105 The lack of ancillary 
facilities became such a grave issue in the oasis that, in 1974, the county government hold a 
countywide mechanized wells peitao meeting to clearly separate fiscal obligations between the 
county, communes, the production brigades and teams (Minqin County Annals 1994:217). 
However, as the water table continued to drop, and the cost of mechanized wells continued to 
increase, the various polities in Minqin never reached a consensus on who should shoulder the 
expenses throughout the 1970s.106 As the political purges wreaked havoc in the upper-level 
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funding from the District to fulfill the political missions on well construction.107 However, the 
lack of a market prevented the lower-level governments to purchase construction materials 
directly; instead, they had to wait for the District to assign the steel and concrete quotas, thereby 
significantly increased the cost of construction. By 1976, the subsidy provided by the District for 
the construction of peitao in Minqin already exceeded 4500 yuan per well at a time when one jin 
of grain cost only 0.176 yuan.108 To pressure the production brigades and teams to cough out 
their shares of the overall cost, the county government stipulated that “the usage of well and 
peitao subsidies still need to follow the brigade and team self-reliance guidelines…more money 
will be given to brigades that open more wells than planned, and the brigades that fail to 
accomplish the well quotas will lose the subsidies” (ibid). Additionally, the production teams 
that failed to fulfill the required quotas suffered severe political consequences. A report from Shi 
 
Sheng Brigade stated, 
 
The brigade secretary believed that the peasants’ failure reflected the struggle between 
two lines in the Dazhai movement. Even though the problems came from below, the 
causes were the conducts of production team leaders. Therefore, he initiated a meeting 
that brow-beat the blind arrogance and laziness of those cadres who failed to show the 
brave revolutionary spirits of the Dazhai warriors.109 
 
The frequent quarrels between various levels of governance over expenses related to 
mechanized wells could be attributed to the collapse of the tax bureaucracy amid the chaos of the 
Cultural Revolution era. Once the initial wave of purges had passed, the Gansu provincial 
government attempted to regain its control over the revenue streams by requiring the lower-level 
governments turn in the full amount of tax collected. Starting in 1968, the lower-level 
governments in He-Xi had to relinquish their rights to hold on to their shares of the revenue; 
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instead they had to request their budgetary expenses from their superiors. This approach ensured 
the Gansu provincial government could fulfill its tax obligation with the central government 
hence avoiding political retribution. However, it severely weakened the fiscal soundness of the 
lower-level governments. The Gansu provincial government soon realized its debilitated 
bureaucracy could not impose enough monitoring to avoid shirking at the local level (Li 1990). 
In the early 1970s, the central government decided to let provincial governments to keep all of 
the revenue (and be fully responsible for their operating cost) as long as they fulfill the tax quota 
to the center (Li 1990). Gansu, in turn, implemented the same fiscal structure to its administered 
areas while specifying that the provincial and lower-level governments would negotiate the 
division of extra-budgetary income every year. Though the ratio of revenue division stayed 
roughly the same (after the center’s cut of 40-45%, the provincial took 25-30%, district 10%, and 
county 25%), the tax policies changed three more times before the installment of the Household 
Responsibility System. Consequently, there was the extremely low stability of fiscal relations 
between different levels of government, and the mercurial predatory behaviors of the center and 
provincial governments prohibited any resemblance of budget continuity at the lower-level (Li 
1990). As a result, the lower the position was in the command chain, the more self-reliant the 
state agent had to be, and the more coercive and discretionary governance became. 
In addition to the turmoil caused by the Cultural Revolution, another cause of the 
instability of fiscal relations was that the rigidity of the procurement system could not generate 
enough growth to support the weight of the bureaucracy. Levi (1988) states that the survival of 
every regime rests on the balance between its economic needs for the continuous supply of 
resources and its political desire to maintain order. In other words, the state has to maximize its 
extraction potential while at the same time, minimize the transaction cost of extraction (Levi 
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1981, Poulantzas 1980:269). Likewise, in building its extractive apparatus, the CCP had to weigh 
the contrasting demands of strengthening “the dictatorship of the proletarians” by putting every 
economic relations into the planned economy or increasing economic efficiency by letting other 
class and social interests to take a share of the pie. Mao apparently favored the former over the 
latter. That was why, even though the urban food supply had stabilized by the mid-1960s, the 
“Grain as Key Link” policies continued for almost another two decades. The Party’s emphasis on 
grain production reduced its reliance on market forces, and the quota system freely exploited 
what, Seligman (1909), as cite in Tilly and Wood (2012:9) termed “the perceptual bias of 
taxation,” to push for scissor-cuts in the planned economy. 
Yet, by removing competition of other economic interests, the transaction cost of taxation 
ballooned as the regime had to build an exhaustive apparatus of extraction and exchange as well 
as paying the enormous costs of collectivization and mechanization. The tax codes became so 
convoluted that as early as the mid-1960s, the grain and tax bureaus in Gansu began to fight with 
each other over how and who should tax oil and food products derived from grain to the point 
that “it is hard to distinguish what can be exempted from taxes as every department has its own 
definition”.110 The tax and procurement bureaucracy became even more disorganized when the 
upper-level governments lost control of the planned economy amid waves of political purges.111 
The ensuing chaos further prevented the correct accounting of food and goods coupons at the 
provincial and district level.112 As the central government printed more and more coupons to 
replace the missing circulation, the economic planners lost track of the real cost of production, 
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which then obfuscated the correct valuation of labor and natural resources. The wrong price 
signals from the center forced the lower-level governments to pay for out-of-plan productive 
inputs at a much-inflated rate and caused them to, 
not think about the cost nor accounting….because they could not fulfill their planned 
fiscal revenue and had to shoulder the deficit, they began to raise the prices of their 
products unilaterally, which greatly limited the national planning of price.”113 
 
To fulfill the rigid proposed production goals, local governance in Hexi soon became entangled 
in a vicious cycle of inflation and over-extraction, which further bankrupted the economic plans 
and hastened the disintegration of the national procurement and distribution system. Bartering 
soon emerged as the dominant means of economic transaction between different levels of 
governance.114 
Thus, by the late 1960s, the Gansu provincial government began relying on the 
 
distribution of chemical fertilizers and industrial products to pay for the cash crop produced in 
the oasis. However, the county procurement cadres in Minqin often had to alter arbitrarily the 
amount and types of compensation to the peasants mid-year as the provincial prediction of 
factory productivity invaraibly faltered.115 At the same time, the district and county governments 
in Wuwei had to invest more and more resources to engage in a cat and mouse game against 
those production teams who dared to obtain a more favorable compensation of their labor by 
bicycling produces to the county seats.116 Lacking capital investment and human power to 
enforce the planned economy, strict ideological indoctrination became the only reliable 
 
113 Wuwei Prefecture Grain and Taxation Archives 1979 “Transcription of Duan Yun’s speech in 
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114 Minqin County Bureau of Finance 1961 #279, #653; Gansu Provincial Revolutionary 
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regulations on socio-economic behavior for out-of-sorts state agents. As stressed by the People’s 
Daily (1972), “without the correct political standpoint, one simply does not have his soul. It is 
important to teach the production team members placing public interests before private ones 
(xiang gong hou si) (People’s Daily Daily 1972). We are resolutely against peasants to engage in 
any commercial activities.” Shi shared, 
KRM: As the brigade secretary in the 1970s, did you start any land reclamation project 
near Xuehe? 
Shi: You could not do anything without direct orders from the commune/county cadres. 
Anything without permission from the higher-ups was considered as capitalist-roading 
and was struggled against. After all, we could not even finish planting the plots in our 
village let along starting new projects. The ideological control were so strict that if it was 
discovered we used chemical fertilizer or planted cash crops on our preserved plots 
(ziliudi), we would be labelled as anti-revolutionaries. People had to find a way to sneak 
the fertilizer back home. 117 
 
Conclusion: the Faustian Bargain 
 
 
In the first Regional Price Meeting since the early 1970s, the deputy minister of the 
National Planning Committee, Duan Yun, attributed the collapse of the economic plans to “the 
evil capitalist-roading Gang of Four” who, in their effort to build their sphere of patronage, 
arbitrarily raised prices and promoted free exchange of goods:118 
Once the equilibrium of price was established, the market mechanisms would bankrupt 
the economic plans and caused the nation to fall into anarchist conditions… Many 
danweis refused to implement the price set by the center but instead determine their 
prices. They even formed their alliance for bartering by setting a ‘cooperative price’ (xie 
zuo jia ge) for the preferred partners. In many districts, every level of governments added 
its own surcharges on the goods, which caused rapid inflation and severe discrepancies 
between the planned and market prices at the village level.119 
 
Duan Yun acknowledged towards the end of the meeting that “though we recognize that we need 
 
to overhaul the pricing system, our nation simply does not have enough fiscal latitude and 
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resources to alter most of the unfair pricing at this point” (ibid). The center’s decision to impose 
political control by monopolizing production and distribution created an economic system with 
high transactional cost and low efficiency. Further, since the center could only move the 
disorganized bureaucracy through mobilization based on ideology and that one’s ideological 
purity could only be determined by those in close proximity, the exercise of power rapidly 
became constricted in localized social relations. Ironically, the bureaucratization of the 
proletarian dictatorship, in effect, turned the administrative hierarchy into thousands of 
independent fiefdoms constructed by millions of patron-client ties, which dramatically weakened 
state capacity and created what Ho (2003) described as the “general lawlessness of the Cultural 
Revolution Era.” 
In Minqin County, implementation of the central policies relied only on the annual “four- 
level cadre” meetings (si gan hui), during which lower level cadres from communes, production 
brigades, and teams would spent three days in the county guesthouse to recite the policies 
directives together (Qiu 2014). Other than the standard ritual of expressing loyalty to the 
dominant political faction in the center, every commune had to agree to the production goals set 
by the county government. However, “the calculations of land, labor, grain, and feed were 
thorough and detailed yet the numbers were either false or just plain fake. All of that effort was 
useless, and once the personnel and directives from the upper-level changed, everything 
[calculation] changed as well” (ibid).  As pointed out by Libecap (1989) and Greif (2006), new 
institutions will emerge when prevailing ones lose their self-enforcing capacity and fail to 
generate economic benefits. The failure of the nationally planned economy made each bureau 
and levels of government to calculate its cost and benefits to ensure fiscal stability. In the Wuwei 
 
District, a decoupling of formal and informal institutions soon emerged over water resources. To 
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ensure their fiscal (thus, political) survival, throughout the Shi Yang Watershed, state agents in 
upstream settlements started to extract as much water as possible regardless the detrimental 
effects to the downstream oases.120 The disintegration of the water-sharing agreement 
subsequently generated enormous rent-seeking opportunities for bureaucrats who had any 
authority, however remote, over water distribution. At the grassroots level, reports after reports 
described events such as “[redacted] village party members treated water work cadres to dinner 
so their villages had access to irrigation for four more hours than planned which generated strong 
protests from downstream villages and resulted in two armed conflicts, each involving more than 
200 peasants”.121 These rents compounded with inflation and intensification of corvée labor 
 
crippled the fiscal stability of the production team. The Minqin Communist Party Committee 
bemoaned in 1978, “[the grassroots cadres] could not control spending related to debt interests, 
chemical fertilizer, and the cost of well water. The spending consumed all the agricultural funds 
and made the production teams powerless to pay back government loans and debts to their team 
members”.122 Further, “there was no way we could fulfill the grain extraction goals set by the 
center. It is hard to run agriculture, to be cadres, and to lead the peasants” (ibid). 
In late 1978, the central government called the chief officer of the Minqin County Bureau 
of Forestry to Beijing and presented him the highest honor commemorating Minqin’s effort to 
plant shelter belts stretching hundreds of kilometers from the oasis.123   Absent from the minds of 
the Ministry of Forestry officials were what made the shelter belts possible, the countless hours 
of corvée labor, came from the same institutional arrangements that had slowly suffocated the 
 
 
120 Wuwei County Revolutionary Committee Production Head Office 1970 #20; Minqin County 
Revolutionary Committee 1971 #36; Minqin County Bureau of Water and Electricity 1977 #66 
121 Wuwei Revolutionary Production Head Office 1971 #127 
122 Minqin County Party Committee 1978 # 46 
123 Li Ke Xing 2002 
95  
material foundation of the proletarian dictatorship-the economic plans. As the cadres stood 
proudly on the platform thousands of kilometers away, agricultural production in the Minqin 
oasis decreased by more than 50% in 1978.124 The mighty hydraulic empire finally buckled 
under its weight of success. Gone were also the social organization of the collective era which 
channeled human-nature relations through the political hierarchies of the communes and 
production brigades. When the gust of economic liberalization began to blow from the coast in 
the early 1980s, only the impenetrable material interests of the counter-bureaucracy remained 
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Chapter 4 Enter the Empire 
 
 
收稅就是最大的政治-Taxation is the preeminent business of politics 
 
Former Head of the Daba Township in Minqin 
 
Most great story needs a heroic protagonist who, through devotion and willpower, not 
only achieves the impossible but also influences the lives of many others. Often, the heroes could 
do little to counter the hardship created by the adverse environment, yet their tragic defeats gave 
meaning to the mundane and affirm the existing norms and boundaries in a society. If we view 
Minqinese battle with desertification since 1949 as an epic story of human determination against 
nature’s confinement, then Party Secretary Shi Shuzhu is undoubtedly the hero whose lifelong 
efforts to build shelter belts around his village has been revered by the locals and the state 
alike.125 Born in 1938 to a poor family near Song-He village, a settlement right next to the 
 
Tengger Desert, Shi had a tough childhood as the encroaching sand dunes gradually destroyed 
the meager plots owned by his family. In 1952, his family had to relocate because their small hut 
was buried entirely during a sand storm. Merely a few years after the relocation, the new village 
was again under threat as the blowing wind removed the topsoil and fertility of the farmland. It 
was in this critical juncture, as the party secretary of the local Communist Youth League, Shi led 
the youths to plant shelterbelts around the villages. The early success promoted Shi to production 
brigade secretary at the age of 22. Starting in 1964, Shi led the villagers on numerous sand 
control projects. After 18 years of hard effort, these projects successfully turned the surrounding 




125 The Chinese Central T.V. made two documentaries on Shi’s endeavor in 2001 and 2002. He 
also was awarded the provincial green forestry model and the 1995 and 2002 national model for 
forestry preservation. 
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In the Minqin idiom, sand control projects are called pressing the sand (ya sha). The term 
is a literal description of the tactics used in the field before the 1990s. The mobilized peasants 
had to excavate clay manually from the riverbanks, transport it on mule carts, and pack it tightly 
onto the top of the targeted sand dunes. The added weight of the clay would temporarily halt the 
movement of the dunes, giving the peasants time to plant grass and shrubs in a diagonal, grid- 
like fashion (cao fang ge) to stabilize the sand. To avoid disrupting agricultural production, ya 
sha usually occurred in late fall and early spring, when the temperature hovered around -18 C in 
Minqin. Needless to say, without mechanical tools and sufficient grain rations, the physical 
exertion required in these sand control projects was immense. Shi naturally encountered many 
objections from his villagers. However, Shi’s character garnered high esteem from his peers. 
Many people I interviewed recounted how Shi’s charisma and fairness triumphed over doubts 
from below.126 Shi was also a savvy political player in the regime, constantly using his 
connections to attract county and provincial funding for his production brigade (Sha 2001). He 
even used his political capital to protect irrigation and sand control technocrats in the tumultuous 
years of the Cultural Revolution. When I interviewed the 74-year-old retired cadre in his state- 
sponsored apartment in 2011, his political acuity still showed every time he adroitly spun my 
questions on the ecological destruction in Minqin to opportunities to generate more funding from 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences.  It was no wonder reports after reports described, “No matter 
how hard the tasks were, the villagers of Song-He would always follow the deeds of their 
secretary” (Li and Zhen 1995). The 5500 mu of preserved grassland and 1500 mu of woodland 
surrounding the Song-He village stand as the “green memorial” of Shi’s 47-year-long fight 
against the Tenggar desert. 
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Shi’s life story echoes many similar accounts of heroism in Minqin. Browsing through 
district and county newspapers,127 one can discover almost every notable event in the Oasis’ 
recent history came from the leadership of a particular village/brigade secretary. For example, 
the ‘70s land reclamation projects in Chang Sheng Township was directly tied to the dedication 
of Liu Xue Dong, and the industrialization of the Lake Zone in the mid-1980s could not be 
separated from the vision of Gao Zi An (Jiao 2013:36-54, Minqin Bureau of Propaganda 1993). 
Nevertheless, the seemly personal heroics of village cadres could not be separated from the 
historical contexts of the collective and early reform eras; the collective mode of production 
successfully eliminated any other interest groups in the oasis. The political dominance was 
reinforced by the state’s monopoly on resource distribution and valuation of labor, which 
enabled the state’s bureaucracy to penetrate into existing social relations. Since labor time and 
value were defined by the state, human-nature relations became mediated through the 
bureaucracy. As pointed out by Zhang, 
Before 1949, almost every village had a community forestry group (chai hui) which were 
based on local clans. The elders organized the building of the sand walls (sha qiang) and 
set rules to protect the surrounding shrubs. From the 1950s on, it was the village 
secretaries who organized conservation. Once we had the CCP, there was no need for 
other organizations. Our view of the surroundings (zhou wei huan jin) [nature] changed 
accordingly128 
 
On the other hand, the commune system created little incentives for the peasants to fulfill 
their grain quotas. As a result, the bureaucracy had to rely on the village secretaries, who, in turn, 
had to utilize their kinship networks, to reduce shirking. Personal networks were also crucial for 
the village secretaries, as it helped them obtain the much needed subsidies from the bureaucracy. 
 
 
127 I coded 20 years (1982-2002) of Wuwei Daily (Wuwei Ri Bao) in addition to all four years 
(1998-2002) of Minqin Daily published (Minqin Ri Bao). 
128 Interview #140 
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Subsequently, grassroots governance in Minqin became a hybrid of top-down commands 
enmeshed in the webs of personal allegiance and clan ties.  Mao’s hydraulic empire in Hexi was, 
in fact, supported by a loose foundation of grits (production brigades) coalesced by grain and 
statue labor quotas. During the 1970s, a chasm of material interests between county and 
commune/village cadres began to emerge as the bureaucracy lost its control on the planned 
economy. When the de-revolution of the communist system began to hasten the retreat of the 
state in the 1980s, new forms of taxation and procurement were created to maintain the 
extractive function of the bureaucracy. The legacy of the hybrid authority soon ushered in the era 
of local corporatism and rapid ecological destruction in Minqin. 
Capitalist Roading 
 
Though the Gang of Four met its demise in 1976, the Chinese countryside was still mired 
in the rigidity of the planned economy. Lacking, support from the military, Hua Guo Feng had to 
start another ideological battle in order to assert his authority over the fragmented bureaucracy. 
In Minqin, the years between the death of Mao and the collapse of the communes were marked 
with economic stagnation and a great degree of uncertainty. In 1976 and 1977 the central 
government, under Hua’s leadership, pushed for another round of the Dazhai movement. 
Nevertheless, the collective system was already on its deathbed. No amount of mobilization and 
revolutionary slogans could resuscitate the fervor of the peasants and lower-level cadres. Though 
the slogans were as resolute as before, not much progress was accomplished in the oasis as the 
commune and brigade cadres could provide little incentives nor impose enough sanctions to the 
peasantry.129 An investigation led by the District Party Committee discovered, 
Some state agencies unfairly shifted the cost of irrigation, infrastructure, and education to 
the production teams. The county, commune, and brigade generated 643,653 unpaid 
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work-units, which was equal to 63.8% of the total work-unit recorded by all production 
teams [in Minqin] in 1977. The total cost of these projects was 636,555 RMB, which 
equal to 86 yuan per person and was exactly the entire income of each peasant in 1977. 
Production team members were livid and expressed that “though the cadres described the 
great benefits of the movement, we could not shoulder the exploitation by each 
administrative level. If the exploitation stay the same, “agricultural development” will 
stay an empty phrase.130 
 
However, in its report to the District Party Committee, the county bureaucrats still attributed the 
rapid decline in grain production to the “rampant pollution of capitalism,” which lured peasants 
to various sideline productions.131 Worse, since the first mechanical well was opened in 1974, 




Table 7 Inflow to Hong Ai Shan Dam by Decade 
Unit: 100 Million Cubic Meters 
 
Year 1956-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-2000 2001-2005 
Annual 
Inflow 
4.6 3.74 2.84 2.06 1.47 0.98 
Source: Gansu Provincial Development and Reform Committee 2007 
 
The lake zone in Minqin started to suffer severe and continuous drought.132 The declining 
production caused debts to the county to increase rapidly. In 1978, the Minqin branch of the 
China Agricultural Bank could only recover less than 30% of the overdue loan.133 Under the 
pressure from the county, commune cadres had to use all available agricultural funds to pay back 
the interests, further shortcutting well and irrigation maintenance.134 To survive, production 
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132 Minqin County Bureau of Agriculture 1981 #120 
133 Minqin Communist Party Committee 1978 #40 
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irrespective of the demarcations established by the county government.135 The overlapping 
boundaries of extraction caused continuous conflicts between villages, as well as between 
peasants and collective farms owned by the Gansu province.136 The county government’s 
adjudication had limited effects, as the inter-village conflicts slowly ate away the facade of the 
collective system. 
Below the surface of stagnation, however, was the undercurrent of change. Even during 
Hua’s rein, in 1977, the Chinese government already started to encourage the establishment of 
commune/village enterprises (she dui qi ye).137 These rural enterprises were aimed to lessen the 
regional production gap of the inefficient state-owned industries (Naughton 1999). They were 
controlled closely by the local county, yet gradually became a major source of rural economic 
growth in the 1980s (Huang 2008). A year later, in the Third Plenum of the CCP’s 18th Chinese 
Communist Party Congress, Deng Xiao Ping with the backing of the military and the reformers, 
soundly defeated the Maoist faction and ousted Hua from power. Soon after, the central 
committee passed the landmark No. 37 resolution returning the autonomy of daily production to 
peasant organized groups, which, in effect, started the de-revolution of the Chinese collectivist 
system.138 By the time the wind of change reached Minqin in late 1978, the county bureaucrats 
were caught off-guard. “Merely a few weeks ago, we were writing missives ordering the 
production brigade cadres to watch for capitalist-roading peasants ruining the revolutionary 
spirits. Now, we need to make a bad village in collective economy (jiti jinji) a model (yang ban) 
for everyone”.139 Lacking precedents, in the rush of policy implementation, the county ordered 
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the production teams to self-divide into groups based on the relative locations to wells utilized.140 
 
This decision inadvertently marked the first time that village social organization in the oasis 
became divorced from river irrigation; the “green revolution” of deep bore wells had altered 
productive relations. Symbolically, from this point on, the peasants in Minqin were no longer 
like their forefathers whose livelihoods were tied to the Shiyang River and its subsequent social 
organization (clan or collective). The new generation of Minqinese could traverse and produce as 
far as technology and capital took them. 
To be clear, up until the late 1980s, there was sufficient well water to support agricultural 
production in Minqin. The rapidly declining grain output in the 1970s had more to do with the 
failure of the overall fiscal structure than any natural calamity. The Party Secretary of the 
Dongzhen Commune stated, 
Our commune always had steady increase in grain output, and overall life quality slowly 
improved as well. At its highest point, the reserve grain of our commune was 1.78 million 
jin… However, in the last couple of years, the more increase we had in grain production, 
the higher our grain quota became, which depleted our grain reserve and severely 
damaged people’s willingness to produce...From 1965 to 1976, our grain quota increased 
by more than 10 times but the grain ration of each peasant decreased every year. In 1977 
and 1978, grain production dropped rapidly, and the per person grain ration dropped to 
376 jin a year. Once we subtracted 1 million jin owned to the county, each peasant only 
had around 300 jin of grain to survive for a year… Because of this [over-extraction], 
people could only maintain a very low standard of living141 
 
Thus, by 1978 in Minqin, the collective system could no longer increase extraction in the oasis 
when the social control mechanisms built into the hydraulic system started to disappear with the 
dwindling inflow of the Shi Yang River. As North (2005) points out, new institutions tend to 
emerge when the prevailing ones lose their self-enforcing capacity and can no longer generate 
economic benefits because of changes in technology or organization. In other words, the 
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increasing reliance on deep-bore wells was bound to transform productive relations in Minqin; 
the implementation of Resolution No. 37 only sped up the process. Nevertheless, the inertia of 
organizational beliefs could thwart the development of new institutions even if they offer more 
economic efficiency (Libecap 1989). The initial reforms in Minqin likewise encountered 
resistance from cadres and peasants alike.142 Contrary to the wide and jubilant acceptance 
described in the county policy papers143, the great majority of my interviewees remembered 
widespread suspicion as they vividly remembered how the slightest infraction of the party line 
could cause severe punishment during the Cultural Revolution.144 The peasants’ hesitation was 
based on practical economic concerns as well. Years of deprivation had incapacitated capital 
accumulation, and there were simply not enough production tools to be shared by the newly 
divided groups. Moreover, two decades of cultivation organized by administrative commands 
had destroyed the customary ties that supported the myriad activities crucial to farming in the 
semi-arid climate. Eighty two year-old Jiang fittingly described, “Initially, the younger 
generation did not know how to coordinate with each other without the curses from the village 
secretary’s loudspeaker”.145 In addition, the division of production teams also damaged the 
established interests in the villages as the awarding of work-units were tied to the tasks 
completed and amount harvested instead of class and gender statuses, which made the relatives of 
cadres lose their political privileges146 The new management by task quota (ding er guan li) 
system also 
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single-handily determine the valuation and timing of labor.147 With the patron-client relations in 
grassroots governance on the wane, agricultural production and the value of each work-unit 
started to rebound in the fall of 1979.148 Similar successes across China prompted the central 
government to continue its push for economic liberalization in the countryside. In Minqin, the 
reform soon altered the organization of productive relations and, consequently, the cadres and 
peasantry’s relation to nature. 
Grassroots Cadres 
 
If, as Knight and North (1997) point out, institutions are sets of rules which structure the 
strategic choices of social actors by providing information and sanctions, then it can be argued 
that the transformation of institutions invariably involves the redefinition of social statuses and 
the material interests associated with each social-political role. From 1979 to 1985, in less than 
six years, rural governance in Minqin experienced the dissolution of the work-points system, the 
implosion of communes, and the re-establishment of a rudimentary market economy. 
Subsequently, the roles of grassroots state agents changed as well. Gone were the days when the 
production brigade and team leaders acted only as the task managers of a planned economy. In 
the era of new norms, rules, and complex division of labor, the (administrative) village 
secretaries and production team (or after 1984, the natural village) leaders needed to play three 
roles simultaneously. They first were the facilitators of institutional transformation, using their 
political savvy and connections to ensure the implementation of new rules. Starting in 1979, the 
Minqin County government imposed a series of new rules which increased resource utilization 
yet, unintentionally, hastened the demise of the commune system. For example, the water permit 
laws of 1979 and 1981 attempted to assert the state’s authority in charging for well water 
 
147 Minqin Communist Party 1979 #37 
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extraction.149 Nevertheless, the new regulation exposed the state’s inability to monitor the 
situation in a constant and effective manner. The 1981 Shelter Belt Conservation Regulation 
prohibited land reclamation and grazing in village shelterbelts but the ensuing confusion over 
land demarcation forced the county government to re-affirm villages’ ownership of collective 
woodlands in 1982.150 The 1984 decision of the CCP Central Committee to establish the 
category of “wasteland” nullified the legality of Minqin County’s forest and grassland 
conservation regulations.151 As the absolute state retreated, the grassroots cadres needed to 
protect the villagers from the unreasonable demands of the higher-ups (Sui 1989). They also had 
to jockey for the county funding as the “vertical relations of command- in which the state 
unilaterally controls production, resources, and pay scales” gradually dissolved (Unger 1989). 
The cadres were also the arbitrators of resource division. The development of institutions 
happens because of conflicts over the distribution of surplus (North 1997). The goals of early 
reforms changed rapidly from “uniform cultivation” in 1979 to “submit to state’s cut first, then 
keep the seeding for the collectives, and the rest would be the peasants” in 1983, to “market 
economy, open choice, and gradual development” in 1985.152 To promote rural growth, the 
central government first increased the procurement price for grain in 1981 and eventually ended 
compulsory grain quotas in 1985 (Kung 1992). Correspondingly, in Minqin, annual grain output 
increased, in average, 8.4% from 1980 to 1984. Moreover, the county tax revenue increased from 
35.89 million yuan in 1980 to 72.45 million yuan in 1985. As a result, the fair division of village 
 
land became the most important duty of the secretaries. At the beginning of the Household 
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152 1979: tong yi zhong zhi; 1983: xian jiao guo jia de, liu zhu jiti de (zhong liang); 1985: shi 
chang jin ji, zi you zhong zhi, zhu bu fa zhan. 
106  
Responsibility System, the peasants would divide village plots into three grades based on soil 
fertility. Each household would have one plot from each grade for a year. Even after the 1984 
law extended the leases to 15 years, the great majority of the villages I interviewed would still 
adjust lease contracts according to changes in household sizes every 2 to 3 years. In addition, the 
villages usually kept 5 to 8 % of the total village land as backups for annual adjustments. Since 
what constitutes property rights in China had always subject to interpretation, the rapid pace of 
the early reform opened up much space for grassroots cadres to develop and pursue local 
adaptations (tu zheng ce). The “deliberate institutional ambiguity” in reality empowered 
grassroots cadres’ capability to arbitrate village disputes (Ho 2001). Different from Jowitt (1983) 
“lifeless mask of heroic vanguardism,” these local adaptations allowed the cadres and peasants to 
circumvent ideological battles generated by tensions with the retreating absolute state. For 
example, a few weeks after the conclusion of the third plenum of the 1978 Party Congress, Da 
Ba village in Xiqu Commune already began to reward production with cash incentives.153 Half a 
 
year later, Hong Shen village in Dong Zheng Commune decided to delegate sheep raising to each 
household in addition to implementing work-unit incentives for quarterly weigh-ins.154 Yong 
Feng village’s October report on the “individual incentives of cash crop cultivation” prompted 
the Minqin government to assign cash crop production to individual households in December 
 
1979, three years ahead of the central government’s da bao gan policy.155 The improved 
efficiency and valuation of labor elevated the cadres’ standing in the village immensely,156 which 
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The changes in procurement price in the early 80s encouraged peasants to expand grain 
production. Ironically, within a few months of the 1984 “Wasteland Conservation” law, most 
villages in Minqin began clearing out the collective woodland they so meticulously protected 
during the Collective Era.157 Lacking capital and mechanized tools, peasants in the same village 
had to pool resources and work together to reclaim land. As such, the village secretaries and 
production leaders not only had to coordinate joint labor, they also needed to balance the varied 
interests and demands of the peasants. Since, the majority of the water used for irrigation came 
from mechanized wells, dug and maintained by villagers, the authority of the grassroots cadres 
became simultaneously constrained and enabled by their personal bonds with the peasants. In 
other words, the village secretaries’ power relied more and more on interpersonal and 
interfamilial relationships and became “paternalistic” (Womack 1991). For example, Zhu 
recalled early land reclamation in Tian Bin village as, 
Zhu: Roughly around 84 and 85, the production team held a meeting to discuss whether 
to open up land around the village. Back then, land reclamation was done by the whole 
village. Once the team met and decided on an area suitable for reclamation, every 
household would have a piece. 
KRM: How did the village meetings divide up the new plots? 
Zhu: It depended on the size of each household. For example, if you have five people in 
the household, your family would receive five shares. The team would work mark the 
plots in advance, and everybody work together to level the land. Every household would 
have their shares of the new land (emphasis added by the author). 
KRM: Did the villagers have mechanized tools? Did you need to pay a tax on the newly 
acquired plots? 
Zhu: No, it was all done manually. The agricultural tax was based on the size of the 
household, not by the plots you leased. So, the government did not even bother to 
regulate. 
KRM: So, would you ask the government to interfere if there was any conflict in setting 
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Zhu: There was no need. Once you open up a plot, everyone in the surrounding villages 
would respect that. After all, most of the boundaries were first set up by our ancestors 
(emphasis added by the author).158 
 
Zhu’s answers showcase the re-emergence of tradition and clan identities as factors in resource 
allocation during the early years of reform. In this context, every interaction becomes a part of a 
continuing series of exchanges (White 1989). The expectation of continuity stabilizes “the social 
group and its environment” because it reduces the likelihood for social actors to exploit long- 
term sustainability for short-term gains (Dietz et al. 2003). It was no wonder that most of my 
interviewees recalled the early reform period as a time of fair growth, and in many cases, the 
village secretaries could still mobilize enough peasants to maintain (even expand) the 
shelterbelts.159 From 1979 to 1984, though the inflow to Minqin continued to decrease, the 
number of deep bore wells and actual irrigated area did not increase significantly (See Chapter 3 
Graph 1 and 2). From the establishment of production groups in 1979 to the implementation of 
the Household Responsibility System in 1982 and the collapse of the commune system in 1983, 
every policy change in Minqin involved the reinterpretation of productive and social relations 
and was, in effect, a reconceptualization of state-society relations realized through a series of 
compromises between established habits of social control and improved efficiency in production. 
This institutional equilibrium was achieved through the re-emergence of paternalist relationships 
in the village networks and subsequently, in the actualization of grassroots governance. Yet, the 
“growing out of plan” nature of the post-1978 reform and the constant struggle in the center- 
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Three Western Zone Migration 
 
Before the Great Western Development Project in the 2000s, the most important state-led 
development drive in northwestern China was the Three Western Zone Migration and 
Development Project [hereafter San-Xi Project], which lasted from 1983 to 2012. In all, more 
than 1.6 million people were relocated from eastern Gansu (din xi) and southern Ningxia (xi hai 
gu) to the Hexi- Corridor (Xinhua News 2012). The thirty-year project was the first regional 
poverty alleviation effort in China and was also the first World Bank-sponsored development 
initiative in China (Li 1993:69). In 1982, the western part of the Loess Plateau experienced the 
worst drought in history, and close to 2 million peasants in the region ran out of food (Mei 2000). 
The chair of the State Council’s Agricultural Development Committee, Wang Li, visited the 
region, and was shocked by the profound poverty he witnessed. More than 75% of peasants in 
Dingxi lived below China’s poverty line, which was only half of the standards set by the United 
Nations (Zhang 1994). In 1983, scholars from the Food and Agricultural Organization of the 
United Nations determined the arid ecology of the San-Xi region to be “unfit for human 
inhabitance” (Li 1991). Worse, from 1952 to 1982, the average frequency of severe drought in 
the region increased from every 4 years to 1.4 years (Ge 1993:5). The San-Xi region had been a 
major headache for provincial bureaucrats in Gansu and Ningxia as well. “The peasants there 
relied on relief grains (fan xiao liang) every year, which was a major drain on provincial 
financial resources. They would beg en masse in Lanzhou and Xi’an, which generated much 
social unrest”.160 Thus, the State Council of China decided to invest heavily to promote 
migration to the Hexi Corridor. According to the National Poverty Alleviation and Development 
Office, the Hexi Corridor had three major advantages over other regions in China: cultivable 
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land, long daylight hours, and most importantly, ample water resources (Li 1993:18). The project 
planned to reclaim 5 million mu wasteland in addition to developing 100 million mu of grassland 
for grazing in Hexi. Regarding infrastructure, the project would expand an additional 4 million 
mu of irrigated plots, which would increase the total grain output of Hexi to 6 billion jin by 1992. 
 
Hexi would support the “Shipping Western Grain East” initiative (xi liang dong yun) by 
providing 2.5 billion jin of commodity grain to prefectures on the Loess Plateau (66). As such, 
“Hexi’s current labor force is not enough to achieve this goal, we will need to move at least 200 
thousand peasants in a few years” (57). 
To receive the direct fiscal transfer from the central government, the local governments in 
 
Hexi had to pledge matching grants. Also, “all investment received had to prioritize irrigation 
and agricultural electricity projects. The migration settlement zones would receive first 
consideration of poverty-alleviation grants from the central and provincial government” (Ge 
1991:47). The communist state learned from the playbook of the Qin Dynasty as well: “Every 
migrant would receive 300 RMB and lumber to construct their houses. All newly settled land 
would be exempted from agricultural tax, agricultural specialty tax, village-township surcharges 
until three to five years after the migrants produce any surplus grain”.161 Moreover, the Gansu 
provincial government gave prioritized credit lines in addition to short term loans to encourage 
the construction of deep-bore wells and supplementary ditches (Feng 2006). The state-led 
development project was successful. Within a decade, the poverty rate in eastern Gansu dropped 
to around 10 %, and, by 1994, Hexi was already producing more than 7 billion jin of commodity 
grain every year (Tong and Wang 1994, Zhao 2015). To be noted, most of the migration went to 
Zhangye and Jiuquan prefectures in the western parts of the Corridor. Minqin only placed less 
 
 




than a thousand migrants on the provincial farm in Cai Qi, and the San-Xi grants were used to 
improve rural infrastructure, forest preservation and anti-desertification projects in the oasis.162 
Though the population density in the oasis did not increase substantially, the San Xi Migration 
still profoundly impacted the oasis ecology. The insatiable desire for commodity grain made the 
peasantry in Minqin drastically expand wheat production, exhausting the diminishing water 
resources and soil fertility. Once unleashed, the flow of migration exceeded the state’s regulating 
capacity and caused unplanned ecological degradation in the He-Xi Corridor (Zhao 2007). 
Moreover, before the San-Xi Project, Minqin directed most of the agricultural development fund 
to support its Township and Village Enterprises (TVE) to increase its prospective tax base. 163 
However, since its grants and loans were earmarked only for irrigation and electric grid 
 
construction, the San-Xi Project unintentionally depleted the Center’s funding to other poverty- 


























Figure 7 Changes in Poverty-Alleviation Subsidies to Minqin County 1983 to 2002 
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Receiving little support to improve the human capital and technological skills of the peasantry, 
the Minqin County government could only depend on the expansion of cash crop cultivation and 
the establishment of large county-owned enterprises to generate revenue for the San-Xi Project 
matching funds. For the next twenty years, this misplaced focus skewed Minqin’s development 
trajectory and eventually torn asunder the fiscal soundness of the county. 
Tax Reform in the 1980s 
 
The development of local adaptations (tu zhen ce) in Minqin happened coincidentally 
with the rapid change of fiscal relations between the central and Gansu provincial governments. 
Though the harsh ecology limited its agricultural development, Gansu had always ranked high in 
total provincial revenue during the Collective Era. Wary of the impending invasion of foreign 
imperialists and domestic class enemies, Mao started the Third-Line Construction Initiative in 
1964, which relocated much of China’s heavy industry plants to interior provinces. By 1980, the 
communist state had invested 20.5 trillion RMB and transferred more than 4 million industrial 
workers to the Chinese hinterland (Wang 2008). Rich in mineral resources, Gansu benefited 
tremendously from the investment which had financed the construction of 4 industrial 
projects/cities in addition to numerous mines throughout the province.164 The proceeds of these 
SOEs were shared equally between the central and provincial governments. During the 1970s, 
the SOE revenues constituted the majority of Gansu’s tax return to the central government and 










164 These heavy industry enterprises/cities were Lanzhou Petroleum Refinery, Jiuquan Steel, 
Jinchang Nickel Refinery, and Baiying Copper and Coke Refinery. 
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Figure 8 Gansu Provincial Tax Return to the Central Government 
 
However, in 1981, the central government made these enterprises centrally-owned, and Gansu 
lost the majority of its industrial tax base (Gansu Local History Editorial Board 1990). Gansu 
immediately faced a fiscal crisis. 
To compensate for the lost revenue, the provincial government increased extraction from 
its counties which led the local government to expand cash crop production.165 This was a 
marked transition in the local governments’ attitude to cash cropping during the collective era. In 
the 1960s and 70s, cash cropping was viewed as a hindrance to local self-reliance because it 
diverted labor from grain production. The local state agents had no incentives to increase cash 
crop cultivation because the quotas were used to earn foreign reserve and to support the national 
industry. For example, in 1978, the Gansu provincial government ordered the Wuwei District to 
increase the production of watermelon seeds for the export market in Hong Kong. Minqin was 
instructed to turn in 50% of the harvest to state-owned export companies in the district and 40% 
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to other provinces to fulfill the economic plan. The production teams could only keep 10% of the 
harvest for seeding in the coming year.166 The central and provincial governments often had to 
use political sanctions to coerce local state agents to increase production. A 1972 order for 
Wuwei to increase wool production for export stated, “This mission was connected to Chairman 
Mao’s revolutionary diplomacy. It will support world revolution and accelerate socialist 
development domestically. Its success is a crucial political mission for all involved”.167 However, 
in the early 1980s, the Minqin county government began to arbitrarily push the peasants to plant 
sugar beets. The beets were transported to the provincial-owned sugar mill in Huang Yang 
Township of Wuwei to pay for tax obligations. The county bureaucrats soon discovered how 
lucrative sugar was in the post-1978 dual-track pricing system and ordered the peasants to forgo 
crop rotation.168 As a result, the soil fertility was exhausted rapidly, and, in 1984, Minqin’s sugar 
beet crop was annihilated by Rhizoctonia solanibecause infection (Minqin County Annals 
1994:332). As the inflow of Shiyang River continued to decrease, the downstream Lake Zone 
townships had to rely solely on well water for irrigation, which caused widespread top soil 
alkalization.169   To survive, the peasants had to expand production to previously uncultivated 
land. Reclamation from the surrounding desert became the only option for the county to maintain 
its revenue streams. 
Around the same time, the collective system (da ji ti) officially ended when towns and 
townships replaced communes as the basic unit of the bureaucracy.170 Since the Household 
Responsibility System significantly reduced the grassroots cadres’ role in the valuation of labor, 
 
166 Minqin County Bureau of Grain 1978 #23 
167 Wuwei District Revolutionary and Production Head Office 1972 #307 
168 Minqin Communist Party 1981 #24 
169 Minqin County Bureau of Finance 1984 #156 
170 Village secretaries are generally from the peasants and though they receive salaries from the 
state, they are not considered as members of the bureaucracy (gong wu yuan). 
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the assignment of work-unit and grain quota in economic plans became obsolete. On the one 
hand, the retreat of the central government from the management of local economy improved the 
efficiency of decision-making and drastically reduced its administrative cost. On the other, to 
stay competitive in the global economy, the center had to rapidly accumulate capital to upgrade its 
aging SOEs. Instead of rebuilding the collective extractive apparatus, the central government 
decided to sign fiscal contracts with provincial governments and use the parastatal procurement 
and marketing agencies to control the distribution of resources (Rozelle, Park, Huang et al. 2000). 
Lacking revenue, the Gansu provincial government, in turn, signed fiscal contracts with its 
county government.171 In this system, lower-level governments acted as tax farmers for the 
 
bureaucrats immediately above them and were given a bonus if the tax extracted surpass the 
agreed amount between the two.172 However, in the new system, the responsibilities to provide 
public goods were placed on the shoulders of the county governments which were responsible 
for their own annual expenditures.173 As a result, each unit of the local state had to figure out a 
way to become self-sustaining and increase its contribution to the county coffers. The 
development of tax farming in the mid-1980s negatively affected the proper functioning of 
governance at the county level. 
A major cause of the county’s fiscal pressure came from the “tiao tiao kuai kuai” of the 
Chinese bureaucracy. The development of “tiao tiao kuai kuai” came from the compromise of 
governance during the collective era when the central government lacked the funding to support 
the bureaucracy (Pang 1983). Though the CCP aspired to form a totalitarian regime which would 
“impose rational management over social life by means of complex organization” and make the 
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state as “one single bureaucratic system extended over the entire society,” the bureaucratic 
structure established was actually “the mirror image of the rational bureaucracy” as proposed by 
Weber (U 2007:6-9). As stated by U (2007:3), “CCP established multiple hierarchies of authority, 
status, and income as well as a labor force of poor skills subject to intrusive and arbitrary 
disciplines.” In this system, the daily operation of lower-level bureaus and agencies are under the 
leadership of both the vertical and horizontal chains of command. 
 
 
Figure 9 Counter Bureaucracy 
 
For example, the head of the Forestry Bureau of Minqin reports to the Minqin County party 
secretary as well as the Gansu Department of Forestry. The county creates the budget to support 
daily administration of the bureau, and the provincial department provides fiscal payments to 
support the implementation of specific policies. As the center continued to retreat from local 
affairs, the lower-level state agencies in Minqin were fiscally abandoned by both the provincial 
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and county funding sources. In 1979, the Bureau of Forestry in Minqin were instructed by the 
county to find their own revenues to support the cost of administration (zi qiu ping heng) and in 
1982, the county started to request a fiscal tribute from these administrative units (Minqin 
County Annals 1994:211). The Bureau of Forestry had to lease out 900 mu of conservation areas 
to generate cash, which constituted 90.4% of its revenue by 1985 (217). In a meeting of 
provincial taxation cadres, the provincial Ministry of Finance bureaucrats stated “Based on the 
policies from the central government, we destroyed the stereotypes that the administration of 
finance was only about receipts and pay-outs by putting the growth of agricultural production as 
the priority. We will insist on pushing for growth finance (shen cheng cai zheng)”.174 Minqin’s 
representative proclaimed in the meeting, “we have uniformly outsourced (bao gan) fiscal 
responsibility to lower-level administrative units, and more than 90% of them kept the outsource 
quotas” (ibid). Soon, the county government began to demarcate “wasteland” boundaries for all 
of its administrative units so they could lease the reclaimed land either to peasants in surrounding 
villages or directly to employees (zhi zhong). In 1987, the Wuwei Prefecture Bureau of Forestry 
told the lower-level cadres, 
There are term limits for the heads of the forestry station, usually 3 to 5 years. In order to 
continue their terms, the station heads have to fulfill their responsibilities which are the 
major evaluation criteria for job performance…The Responsibility system can be 
implemented in three ways: 1) a 3-5 year lease to individuals who fulfill annual profit 
quotas and are responsible for production costs; 2) a yearly lease with the production 
quotas tied to rewards; or 3) a direct lease to groups in the station, again with rewards and 
fines-No matter which way is chosen, the station head needs to insist on upholding the 
socialist principles and properly deal with the relations between the state, the collective, 
and the individual-The stations [hence the administrative units] will keep at least 60 to 
70% of the total revenue.175 
 
For cadres in the lower-level administrative units in Minqin, the pressure of revenue growth was 
 
174 Gansu Ministry of Finance 1986 Notes of the Advanced Collectives and Individuals 
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175 Wuwei Prefecture Bureau of Forestry 1987 #2 
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intense. They had to fulfill the revenue quotas that were set by both the county and higher-level 
officials, which increased every year.176 Failure to do so created not only bad evaluations of their 
job performance but also the deprivation of livelihood of their underlings. As recalled by a 
former county Bureau of Forestry official, “This [revenue growth] was not just about my 
promotion. Given how tight-knitted the danwei was, your failure would ruin every social 
relationship you and your family had. I had 117 families to feed, watering the trees was the last 
thing on my mind”.177 
A Hard Place 
 
The rapid increase in Minqin’s tax revenue since the 1980s was directly related to the 
introduction and expansion of cash cropping in the oasis, especially the cultivation of black and 
red seeding melons. 
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After the 1984 epidemic, the bureaucrats in Minqin had to search for a new cash crop to rotate 
with sugar beets. They decided to introduce the Lanzhou seeding melon (zi gua), which was only 
cultivated in the provincially-owned Qin Feng Collective Farm, to the peasantry. Zi gua was 
particularly suitable for Minqin’s sandy soil and dry climate, and its seeds (da ban gua zi) had a 
much larger export market and better profit margin than sugar beets and cotton.178 As a result, its 
cultivation ballooned from less than 120 mu in 1983 to 90646 mu to 1989 (Minqin County 
Annals 2011:221). Until 1989, the county did not benefit directly from taxing the cultivation of 
seeding melons. Instead, the initial financial boom primarily came from the lease of reclaimed 
land which was assigned to lower-level administrative units to increase their budgetary 
solvency.179 The expansion of cash crop cultivation generated few costs to the county. The 
bureaucrats used the San Xi Migration Project fiscal transfer as loans for the peasants to drill 
deep-bore wells.180 It also charged more and more mandatory fees as water and land resources 
became scarce.181 Most importantly, like its practices for many other government functions, 
Minqin County had long outsourced the cost of tax collection to the townships.182 
One of the last steps of mid-1980s tax reform was the establishment of the township/town 
finance in 1985. The township/town finance was designed to resolve budgetary conflicts between 
rural counties and communes, an everlasting issue during the Collective Era. By setting up the 
township/town budgets, the Minqin County government agreed to forfeit its share of the pre- 
 
 
178 Interestingly, the cultivation of zi gua in the Hexi Corridor had a lot to do with Taiwanese 
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1985 agricultural tax owed by the communes so they could relieve the county finance from the 
obligation to provide public goods to the peasants.183 The county government also relieved itself 
from managing overdue loans by requesting the townships to turn in 70% of the agricultural 
revolving funds. The township governments would delegate tax collection to village secretaries 
and were allowed to keep 20% of the agricultural surcharge. 184 However, the township 
governments had to submit all of the tax collected before receiving their operating budgets. The 
refund received depended entirely on the percentage of tax quota completed by the township in a 
given year. If tax quota was fulfilled, the township government could keep a share of the profit. 
According to the Gansu provincial government, the linking of the township operating budgets to 
tax collection was designed to rapidly expand the tax base by promoting “the commodification of 
agricultural economy”.185 In the coastal provinces, the tax farming scheme accelerated the 
development of TVEs in the late 1980s. Nevertheless, for Minqin whose economic role was to 
provide commodity grain to the province, the few “tax bases” to expand were the numerous tax 
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Figure 11 Changes in Educational Surcharge in Minqin 1978-2002 
 
The township cadres and village secretaries found themselves between a rock and a hard place. 
The enormous costs associated with running a rural society and supporting the bureaucracy were 
placed squarely on their shoulders. Extracting enough cash from the peasants surpassed any other 
task in rural governance because the fulfillment of tax quotas would affect the promotion and 
termination of the cadres’ positions (Li 2005b).  The tax burden thus changed the norms and 
behaviors of village secretaries, which altered how water and land were distributed in the oasis. 
In 1986, the Gansu provincial government began to strengthen its control over the extra- 
budgetary income of the lower-level governments.186 The new rules, ironically, legitimized the 
collection of administrative fees in exchange for public services, which soon became the primary 
source of income for the operating budgets of the village committees. Under enormous pressure 
to generate revenue, the role of grassroots cadres rapidly changed from facilitators of agricultural 
production to enforcers of the growth machine. Contrary to the collaborative practices in the 
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early 1980s when initiatives to reclaim surrounding “wasteland” needed the approval from the 
whole village, by 1989, most village secretaries monopolized decision-making and auctioned the 
land to the highest bidder who could pay for the drilling of deep-bore wells. 
As recalled by Yeh: the decision to open land used to involve everyone. The fingerprints 
of every household head had to be on the loan documents. However, the government 
needed the money, and by late 1980s, it cost much more to drill wells than before, so land 
was given to those who could pay. The leaser (cheng bao hu) would sign a 5-7 year lease 
with the village committee before they spent any money to level the land, and they kept 
the revenue during that period of time. 
KRM: Did the government know this practice? 
Yeh: Yes, the contracts were only valid after the committee reported them to the 
township government. The leasers might be from another village or the surrounding 
townships as well.187 
 
Du, who leased 120 mu of dry riverbed near Shuang Zi Ke Township in 1989 stated, 
 
Du: I made a profit when the price of melon seeds reached 9 yuan per jin, and I doubled- 
down my investment and opened up land. According to the terms of the contract, I could 
keep the “wasteland” for seven years and each year, I had to pay a management fee to the 
village committee. 
RKM: How much did it cost you to open the well? Did you take out a loan? 
Du: Close to 180 thousand yuan. It was a “hundred-meter well” after all. Loans were easy 
to get back then. Just tell the rural credit unions that you wanted to purchase productive 
materials like fertilizer, mulch film, or whatever….nobody cared. 
RKM: How did you plan to make that money back in seven years? 
Du: By planting as much seeding melon and pumping as much water as possible. The 
market crashed in 1989 though, and I ended up earning nothing in those years.188 
 
The booming melon seeds market mentioned by Du prompted the Gansu provincial government 
to implement a 10% melon seeds agricultural specialty tax in 1989 (Minqin County Annals 
2011:418). In less than two years, agricultural specialty tax accounted for 62% of the total 
county revenue generated by agricultural production (Minqin County Annals 2011:482). To 
properly assess the value of the cash crop, grassroots cadres from the villages and township 
levels would visit the plots in early summer and before harvest. The arbitrary assessments 
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created many conflicts between the cadres and the peasants who often employed personal 
networks to negotiate the tax quota.189 The perceived shirking and the crash of the melon seeds 
market in 1989 forced the county government to implement the Township/Town Fiscal 
Responsibility Regulation in late 1989, which drastically cut subsidies to the townships/town and 
forced them to balance their annual budget by reducing expenditure. As a result, the townships 




























Figure 12 Village and Township Agricultural Tax Surcharge in Minqin County 1986-2001 
 
The Minqin county government stated in the annual Township Taxation Meeting, 
 
In order to reward the advanced and discipline the rest, those townships who fulfill their 
tax quota before the end of September will receive a 300 yuan bonus, 200 yuan for the 
end of October, and for those who can’t complete their assignments, we will deduct the 
November and December salaries of the major supervisors in the township. The 
experience from Daba Township, which fulfilled the quota two months earlier than 






189 Interview #5 
124  
production team, and one team cadre to each household and person. We need to uphold 
our patriotism and be clear about rewards and punishments.190 
 
That September, the Gansu provincial government announced that compared with 1988, its tax 
and fee revenue increased by 19.64%. The county government then requested the counties to 
double the tax income related to agriculture in the 8th Five Year Plan (1990-1995).191   The 
extraction of surplus value soon became so brutal in Minqin that the wife of a former head of 
township in Minqin said, “Back then, I always called him the captain of the beat-down, smash-up, 
and rob-all brigade (da za qiang da dui)” 192 
 
To improve the efficiency of agricultural specialty tax collection and to prevent the 
townships from stealing their share, the Minqin county government altered how melon seeds 
were assessed. Instead of relying on the township cadres, the county set up four check-up points 
on the only county road connecting Minqin to Wuwei. All trucks passing the stations needed to 
be weighted, and the county government would charge 8% of the per kilogram market price as 
tax. As a result, the county’s tax revenue increased dramatically after 1992. However, the 
improved efficiency in extraction proved to be detrimental to the Minqin’s ecology. For starters, 
the efficiency in taxation elevated the relative cost of tax evasion for the peasants and cash crop 
merchants. Thus, “once the government set up the ‘No.1 Gate of the World” on Minwu Rd., we 
had to smuggle out the crops. We always put together a convoy consisted of several trucks, a tow 
truck, and a small bulldozer and drove the convoy through the deserts to Inner Mongolia at 
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and village surcharges. Before 1992, the township and village cadres had to assess each mu of 
melons planted. This practice allowed them to exercise surcharges on reclaimed land and village 
plots equally, thereby assuring the township government a share of melon seeds proceeds. After 
the county took over, the specialty tax was based on the total weight of the harvest and was 
usually levied at the crop buyers. To making up for the loss, the township cadres had to double- 
charge the village land. It therefore made financial sense for peasants to abandon their assigned 
plots and the subsequent double-surcharges in the villages in exchange for the large-scale land 
reclamation projects in the deep desert where they only had to pay the county a small fee to 
extract well water. Chen recalled, 
Large-scale land reclamation started to appear only after the county exercised agricultural 
specialty tax in 1992. Those who had the means would use bulldozers to open hundreds 
of mu in a few days and drill wells hundreds of meters deep. These people were the elites 
of Minqin because of the enormous cost and risk involved. The cash crop market was like 
a casino, and people could lose all they had with a bad harvest. 
KRM: Weren’t there numerous regulations like the 1987, 1989, and 1993 laws 
prohibiting land reclamation? 
Chen: Yes but the county never interfered.194 
As a result, the total cultivation area of seeding melons ballooned after 1992 and the numbers of 
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In addition to the unfair tax burden, another enabler of the rapid expansion of reclaimed 
land in Minqin in the early 1990s was the rural credit union and agricultural banks (Sheng 1986). 
As China slowly integrated into the global market and received loans from the World Bank, its 
banking sector started to be influenced by the global financial system. The People’s Bank of 
China increased its primary interest rates to 7.02% in 1985, 8.64% in 1988, and 11.34% in 1989. 
During the 8th Five-Year Plan, primary interest rates in China hovered around 10%. On the one 
hand, the high interest rate combined with the failure of the dual-track pricing system caused 
rapid inflation (10% in 1985, 20% in 1988, and 18% in 1989) across China, which was the 
primary cause of the 1989 political unrest (Zhao 1993). On the other, the interest rate created 
enormous pressure for cadres in rural branches of agricultural banks and credit unions to 
generate a profit because their salaries were tied to yearly quotas as well. In Minqin, the cadres 
viewed cash cropping as the major avenue to increase the return of loans issued. Under the 
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directives of the county government, the cadres started to invest in privately funded irrigation 
projects (min jian shuili) “agricultural technology (nong ye keji).”195 Under the guidance of the 
county government, the credit unions started to provide 400 to 500 thousand loans (in RMB) to 
production teams and individuals who had land reclamation projects (Minqin Bureau of 
Propaganda 1993:27). The credit unions even directly financed county-led reclamation projects 
in Chengsheng and Deng Ma Ying Lake (28). Simultaneously, to promote the local cash crop 
market, the rural credit unions and agricultural banks in Minqin started the “Black Melon Seeds 
Battle” (hei gua zi da zhan xuan feng) providing 178 million RMBs credit to cash crop buyers 
from 26 provinces in 1991 and 1992 (38). As a result, the melon seed market started to boom in 
the early 1990s. 
However, the easy access to credit and the rising prices of the cash crop did not benefit 
the majority of the peasants in Minqin. Inflation in the cost of production materials ate away 
most of the modest gains in income. Between 1988 and 1989, agricultural production costs 
increased 23.5% in Gansu.196 In the 1990 Township Finance Meeting, the chief bureaucrat of the 
 
Provincial Ministry of Finance stated, “Our current productivity and supplies cannot support the 
construction of basic infrastructure and consumption, which made us to owe much national and 
provincial debts”.197 The central government was experiencing severe budget shortfall as well. 
To make up the shortfalls, state treasury notes (guo ku juan) and special fiscal bonds were issued 
 
by the central government and each level of government needed to fulfill its quota. The Gansu 
provincial government was assigned to sell 210 million worth of bonds. Wuwei District, in turn, 
had to come up with 9 million, and it promptly passed the bond obligations to its subordinate 
 
 
195 Gansu Provincial Government 1989 Selected Essays from the 1st Township Finance Meeting. 
196 Ibid 
197 Minqin County Bureau of Finance and Taxation 1990 #180 
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counties.198 In 1990, Minqin’s success in providing tax revenue to the province earned it the 
recognition of being the “Most Advanced County in Increasing Production”. Ironically, this 
award caused both the provincial and district governments cut its fiscal subsidy to the county and 
extended its high-extraction fiscal contract for another five years (Minqin County Annals 
2011:16). 
 
Doomed by its success, the bureaucrats in Minqin had to scramble to increase revenue 
sources. The county government’s first move was to delegate all agricultural funds to the support 
of local township and village Enterprises which centered on the local cash crop market.199 
Suddenly, the county became flushed with state and bank issued high interest loans. In addition, 
 
owing to the state’s over-extraction of surplus, the peasants in Minqin had no formal channels 
through which they could accumulate their profit for future investment opportunities. Instead, the 
rising price of cash crops lured the peasants to become speculators and middlemen of the seeding 
melon market. “Most of the village enterprises created by the high-interest loans were small-time 
cash crop buyers who relied on kinship networks.” They were all small operations (xiao da xiao 
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Number of Enterprises 
Collective Private Individual 
(Ge ti hu) 
1986 60 0 210 
1987 66 4 541 
1988 64 52 1293 
1989 66 45 965 
1990 52 14 891 
1991 59 14 811 
1992 47 7 973 
1993 49 10 984 
1994 56 11 1276 
1995 78 10 1372 
1996 78 11 1564 
1997 74 14 1770 
1998 45 29 836 
1999 47 55 908 
2000 47 76 977 
2001 43 90 1070 
2002 37 94 1102 
*Minqin County Annals 2011 
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The speculators made profits by interfering with the agreements between the growers and 
major Taiwanese buyers. When the market price was good, these village enterprises used inflated 
prices to encourage the peasants to break the previously signed contracts. 
The seeding melon markets were destroyed by the Minqinese themselves. When the 
market boomed in the early 1990s, the cash crop vendors stuffed the bags with dirt and 
grass to increase their weight. The Taiwanese were cheated so many times that they 
started to pay the farmers after they finished examining the goods in Lanzhou, and the 
peasants had to wait for several weeks before seeing any cash. Some of the buyers had 
political connections and monopolized the loans, and others had to pay them a surcharge 
for the access. A lot of these buyers accumulated their first barrel of gold (di yi tong jin) 
in this way and invested their profit to open more land.201 
 
However, when there was an overproduction, these buyers often broke the contracts they 
promised the peasants who had to dump their crops way below the market value. In one extreme 
case, “a connected buyer embezzled almost 10 million RMB of loans he obtained through private 
channels and escaped to Sheng Zheng. He alone caused the crash of the melon seeds market in 
1993. After he disappeared, nobody in Minqin had the cash to buy from the peasants”202 As the 
cash crop market in Minqin became more and more risky and capital-intensive, the price 
fluctuations caused the mass abandonment of reclaimed land. Since there was no surface 
vegetation left, soil fertility became exhausted and the seasonal wind picked up the sandy top of 
the reclaimed plots. Minqin began to experience more and more dust storms, which drastically 
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Figure 14 Price of Black Melon Seeds 
 
At the same time, the parastatal procurement systems, which had provided stable revenue 
to the County, began to disintegrate as well. Based on the production and distribution quotas of 
the planned economy, the procurement stations were constrained by the dual-track pricing 
system.204 They also lacked the acuity of the speculating capital and their losses piled up as the 
melon seeds trade became more and more lucrative. Moreover, Minqin was assigned to be the 
national base for commodity crop production in the second decade of the San-Xi Project.205 
Minqin was ordered to continue high level of grain production in addition to rapidly increase its 
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Figure 15 Total Cultivation of Water Melon Seeds and Total Wheat Production 
 
To achieve this goal, Minqin had to come up with more than 11 million RMB of 
supplementary funding in the 9th Five-Year Plan to support the expansion of the irrigation and 
electricity networks.207 To raise revenues, the County government started the “Raising the Dam 
Zone and Develop the Two Wings” Project (xin ba ji hu, kai fa liang yi). The county government 
borrowed heavily to start its land reclamation projects in the outskirts of the oasis and rapidly 
expand the county-owned enterprise (Minqin County Annals 2011:18-23, 25-36, 97-124).208 
These endeavors were supposed to increase the county’s tax base and resolved the 
underemployment issues caused by the disintegration of the procurement system. Minqin also 
started to attract Taiwanese exporters to set up seed factories within the county limit by 
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based on surplus extraction from cash crop production. The changing macro-fiscal landscape in 
 
China soon destroyed Minqin’s ambitious development plan. 
 
The 1994 Tax Reform 
 
The trend of decentralization after 1979 severely weakened the Chinese central 
government’s ability to control the implementation of macro-economic policies (Wong 1997). 
Lacking effective monitoring, the central government’s share of the tax revenue declined steadily 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, reaching 22% in 1993 (Wong 2002). Worse, since its primary 
revenue source was the aging urban SOE sector which was debilitated by liberalization, the 
central government’s revenue/GDP ratio eventually dropped to the low teens in 1996 (Wong 
2000). By the early 1990s, the central government even had to borrow from coastal provinces to 
balance its budget (Zhou 2006). To modify the intergovernmental fiscal relations (and solidify its 
political control,) the Tax-Sharing System (fen shui zhi) was introduced in 1994, which 
established separate kitchens (extractive apparatus) between the central and sub-national 
governments. The reform aimed to increase “the revenue stream for the central government, but 
it also created a regressive tax system and a new set of problems for villagers as well as local 
government particularly underfunded mandates” (Kennedy 2013). In the new system, the central 
government takes all of the consumption tax and three-fourth of the Value Added Taxes tax, 
China’s two largest revenue collecting taxes in addition to taxes on SOEs and banks (Chen 
2008a). The provincial and local governments were left with agricultural tax, specialty 
agricultural tax, income tax, and proceeds from land leases (Takeuchi 2014). In addition, the new 
system also linked the amount of central government’s remittance to the provinces to the tax 
revenue provided, compounded by the annual revenue growth targets of each province, which 
put poor provinces at a disadvantage (Kennedy 2013). Moreover, the 1994 tax reform left the 
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distribution of expenditures untouched, which put sub-provincial governments under more fiscal 
pressure to provide public goods (Park A 1996). For many governments, the remaining portion 
was insufficient to maintain their own budget, and thus they utilized money from government 
branches beneath them to balance this deficit. This practice has left township governments with 
the least amount of tax resources available as they had no governments beneath them (only rural 
citizens) to pull from, as well as, the largest tax burden as every layer of government was pulling 
from their funds. As the majority of taxes collected were going to the central government, 
subnational governments were forced to rely on extra-budgetary incomes, which had severely 
increased rural tax burden (Kennedy 2013). The central government’s subsidies did little to 
alleviate rural tax burden, as most subsidies were based upon a tax rebate system that favored 
coastal provinces, and usually, the subsidies were earmarked for industrialization projects that 
seldom took place within rural townships (Fock 2008, Jikun Huang 2011). 
The regressive nature of the 1994 tax reform was especially harmful to hinterland 
counties like Minqin as relatively well-off counties in poor provinces suddenly had to shoulder 
the most of the tax burden (Gang 1998). Moreover, as China continued its negotiation to join the 
WTO, the central government began to tighten the loans made to state-owned enterprises. 
Minqin’s plan to use the lease income from reclaimed land to support the expansion of its 
county-owned SOEs backfired. Since these enterprises were built with high-interest loans, once 
credit access and subsidies dwindled, the SOEs could not support their interest payments.210 
Worse, since the local government could only extract 25% of the VAT and tax the enterprises’ 
 
income, the tax base shrank rapidly as the county-owned SOEs’ income was less than its 
 
accruing interests. From 1995 to 2000, twenty of the twenty-two county-owned SOEs went 
 
 
210 Gansu Provincial Party Committee 1996 #42 
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bankrupt (Minqin County Annals 2011:49). The most spectacular collapse came from the county 
sugar mill, an 8.7 million RMB project first initiated in 1987. To secure enough investment from 
the central government, the Minqin county chief magistrate went to Beijing 42 times and 
eventually garnered the support of the World Bank to build the largest sugar mill in Gansu 
(Minqin County Propaganda Bureau 1993). To ensure a steady supply of raw materials, the 
County government forced every peasant household to plant at least 1 mu of beets and 
encouraged mass planting in reclaimed areas.211 Within a year of its opening, the County sugar 
mill fell behind on its interest payments. Instead of providing a stable stream of tax revenue, the 
sugar mill drained the county’s reserve. Ma remembered, 
Instead of cash, the peasants received baitiao (government I-Owe-Yous) for the produce 
they turned in. People started to use baitiao to pay taxes and buy fertilizers, and the 
government, in turn, used baitiao to pay salaries. These baitiaos were almost identical to 
cash. It wasn’t until 1998 when the government refused to accept baitiao as tax payments 
that people became aware that the government might never pay them back, and baitiaos 
started to depreciate rapidly.212 
 
For a period of time, cash liquidity disappeared in the oasis and bartering was again on the rise. 
As a result, Minqin County government had an acute fiscal crisis. 
Dance Around the Golden Calf 
 
To fulfill its annual revenue growth goals during a fiscal crisis, the Minqin county 
government imposed the fiscal remittance system (cai zheng fan huan) which was first 
implemented between the central and provincial governments. Township and village cadres only 
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county.213 The changes in intergovernmental fiscal relations meant that every level of 




























Figure 16 Comparison of Provincial Revenue Source in Gansu 1990-2004 
 
Consequently, tax collection at the township and village levels became ruthless. In sharp contrast 
from their leadership/facilitator roles in the mid-1980s, grassroots cadres had to act as local 
agents of the predatory state. Gong, who worked in Cai Qi towns remembered, “After the tax 
reform, as we experienced more and more resistance from the peasantry, we had to utilize 
several administrative tools [imprisonment and forced auction] (xing zheng shou duan)”.215 Chen 
 
had a more vivid description, 
 
The township cadres would usually raid the villages with police and local thugs. They 
kicked your doors open and just removed everything they saw. If you refused to pay, they 
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guizi [derogatory term for the WWII Japanese invaders].” And we would carry our 
belongings and hide in the field.216 
The incessant pressure on the grassroots cadres to generate fiscal income eventually planted the 
 
fertile soil for political capitalism where capital produces “predatory profits” from “unusual 
transactions with political bodies” (Weber 1978:164-165). According to Ganev (2009), “political 
capitalism emerges from the social and institutional disarray that hampers the more or less 
automatic reproduction of institutionalized political and economic practices… and the 
established routines and enforceable norms that constitute bureaucratic apparatus implode.” The 
transformation in intergovernmental fiscal relations pushed the disintegration of the grassroots 
bureaucracy to the point that many grassroots cadres in Minqin had to borrow from the hei lao 
da [bosses of local underground economy] to fulfill their ever-increasing year-end tax quotas.217 
Gradually, the authority of the county and township governments were replaced by the ming jian 
 
li liang [civilian powers/local hooligans] who used their collaboration with the cadres to 
accumulate capital. De-bureaucratization then turned norms governing resource allocation into 
discretions made by patron-client ties between the emerging bourgeois and bureaucrats who 
“behave as an uncoordinated multitude of self-interested agents pursuing immediate financial 
gratification” (Ganev 2009). Because of this, in a political capitalist system, decisions regarding 
resource distribution were often affected by institutional incapacity (Love 1986). The institutions 
in Minqin became so weak that even though the provincial and prefecture governments 
repeatedly tried to rein in unregulated land reclamation and groundwater extraction218, the 
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forestconservation laws quickly became empty institutions in Minqin 219 Instead, it was the hei 
lao da who enforced the consensus on water usage. “Whenever conflicts over reclaimed land and 
water erupted between villages, we always called for Mr.X. The path he walked in the sand 
became the laws”.220 Weber’s description (as quoted by Ganev) of the de-bureaucratization 
process of a unitary bureaucracy perfectly matches to the situations in post-1996 Minqin county: 
A wild dance around the Golden Calf, gamblers grabbing at every chance opportunity 
escaping through the pores of the bureaucratic system, the loss of every standard for any 
kind of business-ethical distinctions and inhibitions and an iron compulsion forcing 
everybody, including even the most conscientious businessman, either to join in and howl 
with the hyenas on this unique Golgotha of all economic ethics-or else be punished with 
economic destruction (Weber as cited in Ganev 2009). 
 
Conclusion: the Treadmill of Taxation (in a political oriented capitalist system) 
 
In the late 1990s, the Minqin county government recruited Taiwanese capital to start 
cash-crop plantations by conducting large-scale land reclamation projects in the outskirts of the 
oasis. However, the projects suffered immediate setbacks when hundreds of peasants from 
Wuwei and Minqin violently attacked the workers, destroyed the equipment repeatedly, and 
blockaded the only road connecting Nanhu to Wuwei and Minqin.221 On the surface, the unrest 
was yet another conflict over the dwindling water resources. However, the violent confrontation 
showcased the deep divide between the state agents and the peasantry of Minqin. Though it did 
lift the average household income in the oasis, two decades of economic liberalization had 
caused severe ecological and social disorganization in Minqin. The rapid increase in Minqin’s 
tax revenue did not help the authoritarian state to accumulate capital for state-led development; 
instead, the more tax revenue was collected, the higher the fiscal deficit of the local government 
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became (please see Figure 18 in Chapter 5). Similarly, the more money invested in irrigation and 
agricultural technology to improve productivity, the more soil fertility and environmental 
conditions declined in Minqin (Figure 19 in Chapter 5). By the end of the 1990s, black dust 
storms (hei feng bao) had become a regular occurrence in the oasis. The depletion of 
groundwater and the mass abandonment of reclaimed lands had triggered severe desertification 
in Minqin. As a result, more than 100 thousand people were forced to abandon their farmland 
and became ecological migrants.222 
The Treadmill of Production theory relied heavily on O’Connor’s (1973) article on the 
 
fiscal crisis of the state. In addition to being the facilitator of the accumulation of capital 
(surplus), the state is the only institution equipped to alleviate and (in some cases, regulate) the 
externalities of industrialized production (Schnaiberg 1980). Though dealing with the 
externalities of development, the state legitimizes the operation of the treadmill that requires 
more and more investment in technology to increase the scale of production and subsequently 
profit margin (Konefal and Mascarenhas2005). Unfortunately, the expansion of production 
causes the intensification of withdraws and additions to the environment, and the consequences 
were disproportionately concentrated among the disadvantaged. The state would have trouble to 
balance its roles in facilitation and legitimation, which eventually created a fiscal crisis 
characterized by large budget deficits and the business cycle (O’Connor 1973). 
The environmental deterioration in Minqin fits well into the treadmill of production 
analysis. Driven by the incessant demands from the higher-ups in the counter bureaucracy, the 
local agents had to constantly increase its tax extraction and promote expansion in production, 
which was akin to the constant needs for capital accumulation in the treadmill model. The 
 
222 Minqin Daily 1999 April 3 
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expansion of production relied on investment in technological breakthroughs (deep-bore wells, 
chemical fertilizers, and the expansion of hydraulics) that changed productive relations and 
subsequently re-defined human-nature relations. The discretionary nature of the 
intergovernmental fiscal relations prompted rapid expansion of cash crop production and the 
intensification of additions and withdraws into the fragile semi-arid ecology. As the ecological 
condition worsened, on the one hand, the state had to divert more and more resources to maintain 
the scale of production (and extraction), thereby creating the intensification of capital investment 
in agricultural production. On the other, the state had to provide assistance and enforce 
compliance when the declining ecology and the vacillation of capital dispossessed the peasantry. 
Lacking unified rules and depending on patron-client ties, the counter bureaucracy became 
bloated as the enforcement and maintenance tasks had to rely on extra-budgetary (enterprise) 




Figure 17 Changes in Fiscal Dependents in Minqin County 1990-2002 
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The crisis forced the grassroots cadres to abandon their legitimation duties and instead, they 
became agents of the predatory state who only focused on the surplus extraction and profit 
accumulation through collusion with capitalist interests. Since, the fiscal and political stability of 
the center was connected to the efficacy in the extraction of surplus by the patrimonial 
fragmentation of local governance, the suppression of dissents was brutal and arbitrative. 
Lacking countervailing forces to constrain the growth (and taxation) machine, the ecology of the 
oasis rapidly collapsed, and the peasantry was left exposed to the capricious nature of the 




Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
 
我們這一代的人就是拿著祖先的碗吃著子孫的飯-Our generation holds the bowls of our 




“The deterioration of Minqin’s ecology happened because the peasants were greedy and 
ignorant. They were blindly pushing for land reclamation for quick profits, which exhausted the 
groundwater” as recounted in the Wuwei Ri Bao article commemorating the 5th anniversary of 
the Shi Yang River Watershed Management Plan.223 The Plan closed more than 3000 deep-bore 
wells in 2009, limited each peasant’s cultivated area to no more than 2.5 mu in 2010, and pushed 
for the relocation of more than 200 thousand people by 2020.224 Put another way, the 
Management Plan not only marked the ending of a fervor era for cash crops, for most Minqinese, 
but also signified the beginning of the end of the oasis’ environmental history. Riding my 
motorbike through endless abandoned farmsteads in the Nan Hu and Chang Shen townships, I 
frequently marveled at the sheer determination, fortitude, and diligence of the owners, who, 
however transiently, tamed the Yellow Dragon and made the deserts bountiful. These 
entrepreneurs endured great risks for taking out high interest loans (which could suddenly 
become overdue when the political connections evaporated), opening wells reaching 300 meters 
deep (wells that collapse easily because of the instability of sands), and for the backbreaking 
labor to dig irrigation canals and plant hundreds of trees to form the shelter belt. Most 
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cash crop market, knowing how capricious the weather, the flow of capital, and the institutional 
framework were. 
These folks were indeed “the elites of Minqin,” whose attributes were not that different 
from the Calvinist Weber studied. However, as stated by Xue Shu, “Only some of the peasants 
made a profit during the booming years of the 1990s. And all of our dreams came to an end after 
2005”.225 The questions remain: Under what circumstances did the elites’ calculated pursuits of 
 
instrumental rationality became detrimental to their substantive rationality (Kalberg 1980)? In 
other words, what cognitive limitations shaped the bounded rationality of these “social economic 
actors,” which caused them to destroy the long-term sustainability of the oasis, the very 
foundation of their livelihood and prosperity? Why would the Minqin County and Gansu 
Provincial governments allow (even participate in) the destruction of the environment which had 
always been the priority of governance in the oasis? How did corporatism become so entangled 
into the fabric of local bureaucracy? To answer these questions, one needs to look into “the 
rationality and choice within the context of the institutional framework of a given society and 
historical epoch” (Nee 2003). My findings have shown that the “context,” which structured 
socioeconomic actions causing environmental degradation in Minqin, was constituted by an 
interwoven web of fiscal obligations between different levels of government. These fiscal 
obligations shaped the material interests of the peasants and the cadres who were entangled in a 
zero-sum game of surplus extraction. When governance became subsumed with surplus 
generation to keep the unitary bureaucracy from disintegration, agricultural production became 
disembedded from its underlying social relations and ecology. A fiscal crisis of the state then 
occurred when the worsening ecological and social conditions kept elevating the real cost of 
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production in the oasis. The vicious cycle continued until 2004 when the state changed its 
extractive methods, thereby altering the fiscal relations between the central and local 
governments. 
Center-Local Relations in the Hydraulic Empire 
 
The vast arid region west of the Yellow River has fueled the expansionist imagination of 
Chinese rulers, which, in turn, has shaped the environmental history of the Hexi corridor in the 
last two thousand years. In its environmental history, the size of settlements in Minqin always 
corresponded to the strength of the dynastical center thousands of miles away. When the center 
was strong, these settlements would benefit from efficient resource allocation and acted as major 
trading and military outposts of the empire. When the power of the empire ebbed, they were 
either sacked by the nomadic tribes from the Tibetan plateau and the Mongolian steppe or 
temporarily became independent fiefdoms. Both outcomes resulted in drastic reduction of local 
population as settled land was abandoned. The exposed land became barren as high seasonal 
wind stripped the soil away which altered the course of inland rivers. The manipulation of 
agricultural tax rates was used to solidify the dynastical control on the frontier region by 
increasing population and economic production. Nature was viewed by the center not only as an 
unlimited substratum for material production but also as a worthwhile obstacle to be overcome 
by implementation of the center’s will. Thus, the environmental history of Minqin showcases the 
intricate yet repetitive pattern of interaction between the state extraction policy and the oasis 
ecology in Hexi. 
Patrimonial State and Paternalistic Relations 
 
Settled agriculture in Minqin could only become viable when the hydraulics were built 
and properly maintained through the military-style mobilization of the peasantry and mass 
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investment from the center. Ironically, the central governments’ need for mono-cropping and the 
cost of extraction tended to limit the tax base and the potential surplus of agricultural production. 
When the center was strong, political mobilization could temporarily sustain the war against 
natural laws—agricultural production in arid regions. When the center became weak, the 
extraction and the maintenance of economic system were outsourced to local state agents who 
had very different political and economic interests from the policies set by the center. For the 
local gentries, tax farming in the Hexi Corridor created stable and lucrative avenues for the 
primitive accumulation of capital and establishment of paternalistic authority. Yet, the tensions 
between the patrimonial state and the paternalistic power of the clans continue to cause 
unbalanced tax burdens for the peasants, which, in turn, shaped economic organization and 
humans’ relation to nature. The political-economic institutions of production and extraction 
imposed by the patrimonial state could not form a rational-legal bureaucracy and, consequently, 
had to rely on local gentries who lacked the necessary capital and jurisdiction to maintain 
hydraulics in the entire watershed. The monopoly of access to water and of power to extract 
eventually created severe stratification and social instability when the hydraulic system broke 
down, and the oasis settlement would enter periods of decline because of declining ecology. 
Irrigation and Neo-Traditionalism of the Communist State 
The communist regime in Hexi was engaged in the same pattern of interaction with 
nature after 1949. The myriad changes in agricultural and taxation policies resulted from Mao’s 
failed attempts to unify and modernize a disintegrated empire in one generation. Mao’s mono- 
cropping policy to increase grain output to fight the “imperialist enemies” echoed the push for 
grain in dynasties past. After he wiped out the gentry, Mao was left with the option to militarily 
reorganize the peasant society into production teams, brigades, and communes. Within the 
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collectivist system, power became based on political privileges in the hierarchy, which 
inadvertently positioned the local bureaucrats as the local elites. Although Maoist mobilization 
promoted grassland preservation in Minqin, the peasantry connection to nature also became 
broken in the process and could only be mediated by administrative and production commands 
from the communes. The communist bureaucracy in Minqin viewed the restoration and 
expansion of irrigation crucial to its legitimacy and, more importantly, governing strategies. In 
the oasis ecology, those who monopolize the access to water control the distribution of land as 
well as the rhythm of agricultural production, which constituted the spatial and temporal axes of 
productive relations in agrarian societies. However, compared with its predecessors, the Chinese 
Communist state was able to penetrate much deeper into the daily interactions of its subjects. 
Since the middleman between state and society in rural China, the gentries, were 
annihilated in the early years of PRC and that the means of production were controlled by the 
state, the peasantry in Minqin had no choice but to become organizationally dependent on the 
bureaucracy. The dams, canals, and embankments built by the state not only constricted the flow 
of water; they were also a stringent form of social control in the oasis. Irrigation was a powerful 
political weapon for the Communist as the hydraulics transformed nature into be a component in 
the statecraft of domination. The enormous cost to change the landscape was in reality what 
Foucault (1977:92-102) termed “the political investment of the body” because, by controlling the 
flow of water, the state could discipline subsistence peasants enough to turn them into farm 
laborers regulated by the center. Should the planned economy operate like a delicate pocket- 
watch, combining the works of distinctive parts to a synchronized whole, then the managed flow 
of Shiyang River must be the coil springs that timed and regulated the social and economic 
organizations of the agrarian society in Minqin. 
147 
 
Counter-Bureaucracy and Resource Management 
 
The turmoil of the Cultural Revolution incapacitated the taxation apparatus of the 
totalitarian regime. Another cause of the instability of fiscal relations was that the rigidity of the 
procurement system could not generate enough growth to support the weight of the bureaucracy. 
The center’s decision to impose political control by monopolizing production and distribution 
created an economic system with high transactional cost and low efficiency. Further, since the 
center could only move the disorganized bureaucracy through mobilization based on ideology 
and that one’s ideological purity could only be determined by those in close proximity, the 
exercise of power rapidly became constricted in localized social relations. Ironically, the 
bureaucratization of the proletarian dictatorship, in effect, turned the administrative hierarchy 
into thousands of independent fiefdoms constructed by millions of patron-client ties, which 
dramatically weakened state capacity. 
The Gansu provincial government repatedly attempted to regain its control over the 
revenue streams by requiring the lower-level governments turn in the full amount of tax collected 
and required the lower-level governments to negotiate the division of extra-budgetary income 
every year. The extremely low stability of fiscal relations and the mercurial predatory behaviors 
of the center and provincial governments prohibited any resemblance of budget continuity at the 
lower-level of governance. As a result, the lower the position was in the command chain, the 
more self-reliant the state agent had to be, and the more coercive and discretionary governance 
became.  Behind the facade of a totalitarian regime, murky jurisdictions and patronage 
relationships crisscrossed the bureaucracy. As political purges destroyed the bureaucratic norms 
governing the cadre’s behavior, rural governance was left to each commune that acted as 
patrimonial fiefdoms. The fragmentation of political power prohibited a comprehensive approach 
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to agricultural production and water conservation. Since the dysfunctional bureaucracy could not 
support a rational approach to extraction, the ensuing chaos in fiscal relations detrimentally 
shaped peasants’ relation to nature during the Dazhai movement years. In the Wuwei District, a 
decoupling of formal and informal institutions soon emerged over water resources. To ensure 
their fiscal (thus, political) survival, throughout the Shi Yang Watershed, state agents in 
upstream settlements started to extract as much water as possible regardless the detrimental 
effects to the downstream oases.  The disintegration of the water-sharing agreement subsequently 
generated enormous rent-seeking opportunities for bureaucrats who had any authority, however 
remote, over water distribution.  The overlapping boundaries of extraction caused continuous 
conflicts between villages, as well as between peasants and collective farms owned by the Gansu 
province. The county government’s adjudication had limited effects, as the inter-village conflicts 
slowly ate away the facade of the collective system. 
Institutional Transformation and Changing Productive Relations 
 
When the de-revolution of the communist system began to hasten the retreat of the state 
in the 1980s, new forms of taxation and procurement were created to maintain the extractive 
function of the bureaucracy. The legacy of the hybrid authority soon ushered in the era of local 
corporatism and rapid ecological destruction in Minqin. As the absolute state retreated, the 
grassroots cadres needed to protect the villagers from the unreasonable demands of the higher- 
ups (Sui 1989). They also had to jockey for the county funding as the “vertical relations of 
command- in which the state unilaterally controls production, resources, and pay scales” 
gradually dissolved. The “deliberate institutional ambiguity” in reality empowered grassroots 
cadres’ capability to arbitrate village disputes and allowed the cadres and peasants to circumvent 
ideological battles. From the establishment of production groups in 1979 to the implementation 
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of the Household Responsibility System in 1982 and the collapse of the commune system in 
 
1983, every policy change in Minqin involved the reinterpretation of productive and social 
relations and was, in effect, a reconceptualization of state-society relations realized through a 
series of compromises between established habits of social control and improved efficiency in 
production. This institutional equilibrium was achieved through the re-emergence of paternalist 
relationships in the village networks and subsequently, in the actualization of grassroots 
governance. Yet, the “growing out of plan” nature of the post-1978 reform and the constant 
struggle in the center-local fiscal relations would turn grassroots state agents in Minqin into the 
foot soldiers of a growth-machine. 
To stay competitive in the global economy, the center had to rapidly accumulate capital 
to upgrade its aging SOEs. Instead of rebuilding the collective extractive apparatus, the central 
government decided to sign fiscal contracts with provincial governments and use the parastatal 
procurement and marketing agencies to control the distribution of resources. Lacking revenue, 
the Gansu provincial government, in turn, signed fiscal contracts with its county government.  In 
this system, lower-level governments acted as tax farmers for the bureaucrats immediately above 
them and were given a bonus if the tax extracted surpass the agreed amount between the two. 
However, in the new system, the responsibilities to provide public goods were placed on the 
shoulders of the county governments which were responsible for their own annual expenditures. 
As a result, each unit of the local state had to figure out a way to become self-sustaining and 
increase its contribution to the county coffers. The development of tax farming in the mid-1980s 
negatively affected the proper functioning of governance at the county level. The township 
cadres and village secretaries found themselves between a rock and a hard place. The enormous 
costs associated with running a rural society and supporting the bureaucracy were placed 
150 
 
squarely on their shoulders. Extracting enough cash from the peasants surpassed any other task 
in rural governance because the fulfillment of tax quotas would affect the promotion and 
termination of the cadres’ positions (Li 2005a).  The tax burden thus changed the norms and 
behaviors of village secretaries, which altered how water and land were distributed in the oasis. 
For example, once the county government started to implement the Township/Town Fiscal 
Responsibility Regulation in late 1989, the township cadres had to invent taxable causes to 
balance their annual budget by reducing expenditure. To making up for the loss, the township 
cadres had to double-charge the village land. It therefore made financial sense for peasants to 
abandon their assigned plots and the subsequent double-surcharges in the villages in exchange 
for the large-scale land reclamation projects in the deep desert where they only had to pay the 
county a small fee to extract well water. Land reclamation and deep-bore wells began to increase 
rapidly in Minqin. 
The Treadmill of Production and the Disembedded Economy 
 
The rapid expansion of reclaimed land in the oasis caused the crash of the melon seeds 
market and exhausted soil fertility. Owing to the state’s over-extraction of surplus, the peasants 
in Minqin had no formal channels through which they could accumulate their profit for future 
investment opportunities. Instead, the rising price of cash crops lured the peasants to become 
speculators and middlemen of the seeding melon market. The speculators made profits by 
interfering with the agreements between the growers and major buyers. By inflating the 
contractual prices when the market was good and depressing the market when there was an 
overproduction, the speculators not only created wide price fluctuations which caused the mass 
abandonment of reclaimed land, but also inadvertently destroyed the parastatal procurement 
stations that lacked the acuity of the speculating capital. The bankruptcy of the procurement 
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stations left the county with no stable revenues, and institutional disarray began to emerge in the 
unitary bureaucracy. The Minqin County government chose to borrow heavily to open more 
reclaimed land. The generated income was directed toward the expansion of county-owned 
enterprises that were supposed to increase the county’s tax base and resolve the 
underemployment issue caused by the disintegration of the bureaucracy. 
 
 
Figure 18 Taxation and Fiscal Deficit 
 
Nevertheless, the 1994 tax reform, which wanted to reduce the center’s reliance on the 
local extraction apparatus disrupted the 8th five-year plan in Minqin. The transfer of the 75% of 
the value-added tax to the central government’s coffers deprived Minqin of the opportunity to 
industrialize. As a result, the county government set stricter and stricter tax quotas and heavier 
sanctions against grassroots cadres in the township and village levels. The unfair tax burden 
made more and more peasants in Minqin abandon their lease plots. At the same time, the sudden 
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rise in interest rates in China in the mid-1990s made the newly-built county-owned enterprise 
unprofitable. The collapse of the county sugar mill, an 8.7 million RMB project, bankrupted 
most of the remaining peasants who had been forced to plant sugar beets to generate income for 
the county. As the government I-Owe-Yous became the de facto currency in the oasis, cash 
liquidity disappeared in Minqin. To pay off the heavy interest, the county government recruited 
Taiwanese capital to start cash-crop plantations by conducting large-scale land reclamation 
projects in the outskirts of the oasis. Needless to say, the dispossessed peasants sabotaged the 
projects, and the authoritarian state had to spend more and more to control social unrest. The 
fiscal crisis of the state emerged when the price of social control, desertification, and water 
scarcity escalated production costs and disembedded productive relations from established social 
relations. As the ecology of Minqin continued to deteriorate, the government became more and 
more reliant on profit-making opportunities related to political privileges, which dramatically 
weakened the long-term sustainability of the oasis. 
 












Age Highest Professional Status 
 
Location Date Interviewed 
A M 34 County Level: Cadre Changning Township 2011-2-15 












chai2 M 37 Peasant Shoucheng Township 2011-2-18 
chai3 F 54 Peasant Shoucheng Township 2011-3-23 






















































































































fang F 47 Peasant Changning Township 2011-3-25 







































































57 Provincial Official: 





he1 M 54 Peasant Daba Township 2010-12-7 































































li3 M 55 Peasant Daba Township 2011-2-12 













li6 M 43 Village Level Cadre Changning Township 2011-2-15 
li7 M 39 Peasant Shoucheng Township 2011-2-17 













li10 M 64 Peasant Daba Township 2011-2-21 













li13 M 49 Peasant Shuangcike Township 2011-3-27 
























li17 M 46 County Level: Head 
of People's 




   Assembly   













liu1 M 76 Peasant Shuangcike Township 2011-3-23 
liu2 M 52 Peasant Changning Township 2011-3-26 













lu2 M 75 Peasant Suwu Township 2011-3-21 









































































ma1 F 89 Peasant Shoucheng Township 2011-2-18 
ma2 M 47 Peasant Shoucheng Township 2011-2-18 




ma4 M 45 Peasant Shoucheng Township 2011-2-18 
ma5 M 69 Peasant Shoucheng Township 2011-2-18 
ma6 M 75 Peasant Shoucheng Township 2011-2-18 
ma7 M 78 Peasant Shoucheng Township 2011-2-19 
ma8 F 81 Peasant Shoucheng Township 2011-2-19 
ma9 F 74 Peasant Shoucheng Township 2011-2-19 


















































pan F 49 Peasant Dongba Township 2011-3-28 




































shi2 M 51 Peasant Jiahe Township 2011-4-10 




shi4 F 38 Peasant Jiahe Township 2011-4-10 




























































wang1 M 42 Peasant Nanhu Township 2011-2-12 
wang2 M 47 Village Doctor Suwu Township 2011-2-24 
wang3 F 52 Peasant Suwu Township 2011-3-22 
wang4 M 39 Peasant Shuangcike Township 2011-3-23 
wang5 M 38 Peasant Changning Township 2011-3-25 
wang6 F 36 Peasant Changning Township 2011-3-25 
wang7 F 43 Peasant Daba Township 2011-4-9 


























































xue1 M 41 Peasant Daba Township 2011-7-14 
xue2 M 62 Peasant Daba Township 2011-7-15 
xue3 M 74 Peasant Daba Township 2011-7-19 
























xie1 M 56 Peasant Daba Township 2011-2-21 
xie2 M 43 Peasant Shuangcike Township 2011-3-27 























yang1 F 47 Peasant Changning Township 2011-3-26 
yang2 M 49 Peasant Changning Township 2011-3-26 

















   (Major)   
zhan1 M 39 Peasant Shuangcike Township 2011-3-27 
zhan2 M 36 Peasant Dongba Township 2011-3-28 
zhang1 F 48 Peasant Changning Township 2011-3-26 
zhang2 M 52 Peasant Changning Township 2011-3-25 
zhang3 F 49 Peasant Jiahe Township 2011-4-10 







































































































   Head of Bureau   


























xian M 42 Peasant Suwu Township 2011-2-24 
zhang7 F 37 Peasant Suwu Township 2011-2-24 
liu5 M 46 Peasant Daba Township 2010-12-21 
mo F 48 Township Cadre Changning Township 2011-9-28 


























ren M 47 Peasant Minqin County 2010-11-25 
wang10 F 86 Peasant Changning Township 2010-12-8 
zhang8 F 27 Township Cadre Daba Township 2010-12-9 
zha M 47 Peasant Dongzhen Township 2011-3-4 
bai2 F 43 Peasant Xiqu Township 2077-3-9 















zhang9 F 26 Peasant Suwu Township 2011-5-20 
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Guan Yu Diao Cha Tian Bao<Nong Ye Shui Shi Xing Qi 









Xibei Jun Zhen Wei Yuan Hui 11Yue15Ri Ban Bu Cheng Zhi 


















甘肅省新解放區農業稅暫行條例施行細則 Gansu Sheng 

























關於整理一九四九年度公糧入倉的指示 Guan Yu Zheng Li 
1949 Nian Gong Liang Ru Cang de Zhi Shi 
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Bureau of Hydro-Geological 
Engineering 
地质对地下水开采的几点意见 Di Zhi Dui Di Xia Shui 























水问题报告 Guan Yu Zhao Ji Wu, Yong, Min San Xian 
Shui Li Bu Men Fu Ze Tong Zhi Yan Jiu Jun Shui Wen 



















示 Zhong Gong Zhong Yang Guan Yu Quan Dang 















处的用水报告 Guan Yu Minqin Wuwei Liang Xian Dui 
Qing Shui He, Niang Niang Tai, Lei Tai Hu Deng Chu 


















通知 Sheng Cai Zheng Ting Guan Yu Jin Yi Bu Jia 
Qiang Nong Cun Ji Shi Shui Wu Zheng Zheng Gong 


























Guan Yu Nong Cun Gong Xiao He Zuo She, 
Cheng,Xiang Shou Gong Ye He Zuo Zu Zhi, He Zuo 
Shang Dian, Ge Ti Shou Gong Ye,Xiao Shang Xiao Fan 























甘肃省水利厅征收 1962 年水费的通知 Gansu Sheng 














































利工作会议总计的通知 Guan Yu Yin Fa He Xi Di Qu 
1964 Nian Shui Li Gong Zuo Zong Jie He 1965 Nian 
Shui Li Gong Zuo An Pai Yu He Xi Di Qu 1964 Nian 


















关于夏灌第一次苗水配水问题的通知 Guan Yu Xia 













Guan Yu Jian Fa Jian Hua Liang Shi Na Shui Gui Ding 












1966 年 1 月 1 日起发行新版全国通用粮票 1966 
Nian1Yue1Ri Qi Fa Xing Xin Ban Quan Guo Tong 




Wuwei County Economic 
Planning Team 
武威县太平滩农田水利规划说明书 Wuwei Xian Tai 



















进展情况报告 Wuwei Zhuanqu Nong Tian Ji Ben Jian 
She "Wu Hao" Gui Hua Dui Guan Yu Gui Hua Gong 





Wuwei District Revolution 
and Production Frontline 
Agriculture Office 
 
一九六七年农业生产工作总结报告 1967 Agricultural 
























Zhuan Qu Ba Ge Yue Nong Ye Sheng Chan Gong Zuo 






























Gansu Sheng Ge Ming Wei Yuan Hui Sheng Chan Zhi 
Hui Bu Guan Yu Zhuan Fa"Guo Wu Yuan Yu 1968 
Nian Du Shou Gou Nong Fu Chan Pin Jiang Shou Biao 



















通知 Guan Yu Gansu Sheng Zhuan Qu Xia Da 1968 












关于抓好当前农业生产工作的几点意见 Guanyu Zhua 
Hao Dang Qian Nong Ye Sheng Chan Gong Zuo De Ji 


















关于当前下放安置共组中几个问题的通知 Guan Yu 
Dang Qian Xia Fang An Zhi Gong Zu Zhong Ji Ge Wen 













黄羊区水利大会战的情况反映 Huang Yang Qu Shui 




















关于武威超采我县泉水的报告 Guan Yu Wu Wei 



































人民公社基本核算单位粮食分配表 Ren Min Gong 























关于迅速开展秋季造林工作的通知 Guan Yu Xun Su 






















源问题的报告 Guan Yu Qing Shi Diao Cha Chu Li 
Xiying,Jinta,Huangyanghe Shang You Po Huan Shui 












李坦同志在武威县双城改土现场会议的讲话 Li Tan 
Tong Zhi Zai Wuwei Xian Shuang Cheng Gai Tu Xian 



























基本建设的调查报告 Tai Shan Ya Ding Bu Wan Yao, 
Ping Tian Zheng Di Xian Gao Chao--Xin Sheng Da Dui 























两县泉湖使用问题的处理决定 》的几点意见 Minqin 
Xian Ge Wei Dui<Wuwei Di Qu Ge Ming Wei Yuan 
Hui Guan Yu Min,Wu Liang Xian Quan Hu Shi Yong 













关于新改外河引水渠的报告 Guan Yu Xin Gai Wai He 





Wuwei County Agriculture 
and Forestry Bureau 
Records 
 
一九七一年度农业税征收任务分配表 1971 Nian Du 



















报 Guan Yu Chuan Da Guan Che Di Wei ER Ci Quan 


















告 Wuwei Xian Kai Zhan Fang Han Kang Zai Dou 













关于贯彻执行全省打井工作会议的意见 Guan Yu 
Guan Che Zhi Xing Quan Sheng Da Jing Gong Zuo Hui 














Yu Yin Fa "Xian Zheng Wei Dui Wu Wei Xian Gong 
















报 Guan Yu Chuan Da Guan Che Di Wei Er Ci Quan 



















急通知》的意见 <Guan Yu Li Ji Dong Yuan Qi Lai Da 
Yi Chang Kang Han Duo Liang Ren Min Zhan Zheng 

































武革生字 第 102 号 关于抗旱生产的情况汇报 
(71)Wu Ge Sheng Zi Di 102 Hao Guan Yu Kang Han 




















关于进一步加强市场管理的紧急通知 Guan Yu Jin Yi 
















Sheng Chan Da Dui Gao Nong Tian Ji Ben Jian She De 












武威县农机工作会议纪要 Wuwei Xian Nong Ji Gong 







































Yu Li Ji Xian Qi Nong Tian Shui Li Ji Ben Jian She 



































关于当前农业生产情况的汇报 Guan Yu Dang Qian 
























武威县革命委员会生产指挥部文件 Wuwei Xian Ge 



















Yu Xiyinghe Er Gan Qu Fa Sheng Shui Li Jiu Fen de 






















Guan Yu Jin Yi Bu Luo Shi Ren Min Gong She Jing Ji 


















问题的通知 Guan Yu Mian Hua, You Pin, Tian Cai 
Deng Wu Zhong Jing Ji Zuo Wu Shou Gou He Jiang 




















关于分配公粮任务的通知 Guan Yu Fen Pei Gong 
























Yu Zeng Bo Da Jing Bu Zhu Fei, Gang Cai, Shui Ni de 


















































关于切实加强水利投资管理使用的通知 Guan Yu Qie 
























依法收回一打三反运动， 按损失核销处理 Zai Wen 
Hua Da Ge Ming Zhong Qun Zhong Zu Zhi Jie Yong 
Mian Fei Xian Jin, Liang Piao Wei Yi Fa Shou Hui Yi 















关于农村社队企业征收所得税问题的通知 Guan Yu 
Nong Cun She Dui Qi Ye Zheng Shou Suo De Shui 













关于农村征税几个问题的处理意见 GuanYu Nong 
























1973 年生产的 580 部上帝步犁比规定价 1973 Nian 









关于购置潜水泵问题的报告 Guan Yu Gou Zhi Qian 
























甘肃省民勤县粮食局文件 Gansu Sheng Minqin Xian 












关于分配新增五百眼机井及补助费的通知 Guan Yu 
































































































































查 Minqin Xian Dong Zhen Gong She Dang Qian Nong 
Ye Sheng Chan He Qun Zhong Sheng Huo De Qing 






Wuwei Prefecture Grain and 
Taxation Archives 
关于段云同志的讲话 Transcription of Duan Yun’s 
speech in the northcentral, northwest, and northeast 




Gansu Development and 
Reform Commission 
石羊河流域重点治理规划 Shi Yang He Liu Yu Zhong 
Dian Zhi Li Gui Hua 
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现将重兴公社贯彻中央 37 号文件的初步调查材料转 
发，请各级领导同志一阅 Xian Jiang Zhong Xing 
Gong She Guan Che Zhong Yang 37 Hao Wen Jian de 
Chu Bu Diao Cha Cai Liao Zhuan Fa,Qing Ge Ji Ling 



















当前收回到逾期农贷的情况报告 Dang Qian Shou Hui 














Wo Men Guan Che Zhong Yang 37 Hao Wen Jian de 














Xiqu Gong She Da Ba Si Dui Shi Xing Xian Jin Jiang Li 













Wuwei Xian Di Xia Shui Kai Cai Li Yong Xian Zhuang 























件 Guan Yu Minqin Xian Hu Qu Guan Qu Zai Shiyang 
He Li Chang Yi Liang Tan Lin Qu Da Qun Jing Chou 

















杰大堆试点 An Ji Jing Hua Fen Lian Xi Chan Liang De 


















查 Minqin Xian Dong Zhen Gong She Dang Qian Nong 
Ye Sheng Chan He Qun Zhong Sheng Huo de Qing 

















提成奖励 Mao Da Dui Lin Chang, Nong Ke Dui Shi 
Xing Ren Wu Cheng Ben Bao Gan,Chao Chan Jie Yue 














Lian Xi Chan Liang Fen Zu Zuo Ye Shi Jia Kuai Nong 















Xian Wei Luo Shi Nong Cun Jing Ji Zheng Ce Shi Dian 






















公社附智二队决算分配试点情况 Kou Liang An Gong 
Fen Fen Pei Jia Zhao Gu Ye Ke Yi, Hao Zhe Li!-- Shou 
Cheng Gong She Fu Zhi Er Dui Jue Suan Fen Pei Shi 

















劳动管理现状的调查 Yan Ge Shi Xing Ding E Guan Li 
Jian Jue Jiu Zheng Ping Jun Zhu Yi--Zhou He Da Dui 









关于试行取水许可通知 Guan Yu Shi Xing Shui Xu Ke 

















查 Minqin Xian Dong Zhen Gong She Dang Qian Nong 
Ye Sheng Chan He Qun Zhong Sheng Huo de Qing 














一降 Bao Chan Dao Zu Li Gan Jian Ying-- Yong Feng 














Xian Wei Luo Shi Nong Cun Jing Ji Zheng Ce Shi Dian 

















劳动管理现状的调查 Yan Ge Shi Xing Ding E Guan Li 
Jian Jue Jiu Zheng Ping Jun Zhu Yi--Zhou He Da Dui 























—湖区安种水浇不上，自留地大幅增加 Yi Hu Qu An 



























通知 Guan Yu Pi Zhuan Shui Dian Jv<Guan Yu Shi 















Bao Hu Tian Ran Zhi Bei He Fa Zhan Lin Mu Chai Wan 

































Hao Yi Zhi Nong Zi Jin Jue Da Bu Fen Yong Yu Xiang 











































中共中央关于 1984 年农村工作通知-荒地承包期 Zhong 
Gong Zhong Yang Guan Yu 1984 Nian Nong Cun Gong Zuo 











































入减少 Xiqu Gou Xiao Zhan (Hu Qu) Di Yi Ci Chu 
Xian Kui Sun You Yu Nong Fu, Xu Chan Pin, Shi You 
Deng Jing Ying Ye de Hua Chu, Yi Ji Hu Qu Nong Min 
Jing Ji Shou Ru Jian Shao 
 
1986 
Gansu Ministry of 
Finance 



















































































Minqin Xian Xiliang Zhen San Fu Gao Shui Dan Hua 
















关于 1970 年度灌溉意见的请示报告 















Guan Yu Jia Qiang Bao Hu Lin Mu, Shu Mu, Chai Wan, 














Guan Yu Dui Hui Lin Hui Zhi Bei Ken Huang Wen Ti 










<Guan Yu Dui Hui Lin Hui Zhi Bei Ken Huang Wen Ti 



























































Guan Yu Xia Da Minqin Xian 89 Nian Guan Gai  Shi 

















Guan Yu Wo Xian Shui Yuan Di Zao Puo Huai Qing 














































Guo Wu Yuan Guan Yu Ji Xu Zuo Hao Gansu, 

















况的报告 Datan Xiang Dongda Cun Zai Zong Gan Qu 















关于“武威地区 1991 年干支架及田间配套工程建设 
总结”的报告 Guan Yu"Wuwei Di Qu 1991 Nian Gan 
Zhi Jia Ji Tian Jian Pei Tao Gong Cheng Jian She Zong 













Guan Yu <Jia He Zhi Gan Fen Qie Gong Cheng Shi 




















<Guan Yu Jia Qiang Lin Mu Zhong Zi, Miao Mu Shi 

















体方案的审查意见 Guan Yu Dui Wuwei, Zhangye 
Liang Shi"Guo Jia Ji" Shang Pin Liang Ji Di Jian She 

















工作总结》的报告 Guan Yu Bao Song <Wuwei Shi 
1992 Nian Nong Ye Shang Pin Liang Ji Di Jian She 









农用国有土地有偿使用办法 Nong Yong Guo You Tu 














Guan Yu Jia Qiang Shui Tu Yi Ji Lin Mu Zi Yuan Guan 













Guan Yu Yan Jin Yin Zhi He Shi Yong Jia Mao "Qu 














Guan Yu Jia Qiang Shui Tu Yi Ji Lin Mu Zi Yuan Guan 
































Guan Yu Jia Kuai Fa Zhan Xiang Zhen Qi Ye Ruo Gan 













不断扩大黑瓜子加工生产规模 Bu Duan Kuo Da Hei 
















































转发农业部、财政部《关于下达 1994 年扶持粮棉大 
县发展经济专项贷款贴息规模计划的通知》和《扶 
持粮棉大县发展经济专项贷款贴息办法》的通知 
Zhuan Fa Nong Ye Bu, Cai Zheng Bu <Guan Yu Xia Da 
1994 Nian Fu Chi Liang Mian Da Xian Fa Zhan Jing Ji 
Zhuan Xiang Dai Kuan Tie Xi Gui Mo Ji Hua de Tong 
Zhi> He <Fu Chi Liang Mian Da Xian Ji Ji Fa Zhan 













Guan Yu Yin Fa Sheng Xu Mu Jv Guan Che <Jue 


























Gansu Sheng Ren Min Zheng Fu Pi Zhuan Sheng Shui 
Li Ting Sheng Wu Jia Wei Yuan Hui Guan Yu Jia Kuai 
Wo Sheng Shui Fei Gai Ge You Guan Wen Ti de Qing 













Shi Shi Qu Shui Xu Ke Zhi Du Jia Qiang Shui Zi Yuan 













Gansu Sheng Mingqin Xian "Jiu Wu" Jie Shui Guan Gai 
































Guan Yu Jin Yi Bu Fang Kai Gao Huo Guo You Xiao 




















的通知 Guan Yu Zai Quan Xian Mu Cai Shi Chang Shi 










关于全区进行乡镇财税合一试点 Guan Yu Quan Qu 













关于坚决制止惠林回执被打井开荒的决议 Guan Yu 
Jian Jue Zhi Zhi Hui Lin Hui Zhi Bei Da Jing Kai Huang 














Guan Yu Jia Qiang Lin Ye Jian She Bu Fa Jia Qiang Zhi 














Guan Yu Jian Jue Zhi Zhi Luan Kan Lan Fa Nong Tian 



























的紧急通知》<Guan Yu Jia Qiang Lin Ye Jian She Bu 
Fa Jia Qiang Lin Mu Zhi Bei Zi Yuan Guan Li de Yi 
Jian> He <Guan Yu Jian Jue Zhi Zhi Luan Kan Lan Fa 
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